



# **NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL**

**MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA**

## **CAPSTONE PROJECT**

**CA 2025: THE STRATEGIC DESIGN OF CIVIL AFFAIRS**

by

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June 2015

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**CA 2025: THE STRATEGIC DESIGN OF CIVIL AFFAIRS**

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## **ABSTRACT**

The goal of this capstone is the strategic redesign of the U.S. Army Civil Affairs (CA) Regiment in 2025 in support of the Army 2025 strategic vision. Design Thinking is the process used to plan and develop this strategic design. The authors led a twenty-person Civil Affairs design team through the five-phase process of Design Thinking adapted from the Stanford D School model: discovery; problem framing; ideation; prototyping; and testing. Design Thinking's collaborative and multidisciplinary approach to planning yielded innovative prototypes of CA identity, strategic messaging, branding, human resource management (e.g., recruitment, selection, training, and professionalization) and force structure. Two of these prototypes are in the initial stages of implementation within the CA Regiment, while the others await higher resolution development. The capstone concludes with recommendations as to how the Regiment can build on this creative and innovative endeavor to ensure its strategic relevance in the future.

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## LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

1SG	First Sergeant
1st SFC(A)	1st Special Forces Command (Airborne)
1st SWTG(A)	1st Special Warfare Training Group (Airborne)
7th CSC	7th Civil Support Command
7th WfF	7th Warfighting Function
9th MSC	9th Mission Support Command
95th CA BDE(A)	95th Civil Affairs Brigade (Airborne)
96th CA BN(A)	96th Civil Affairs Battalion (Airborne)
AAA	American Anthropological Association
AC	active component
ADM	Army Design Methodology
ADP	Army Doctrine Publication
ADRP	Army Doctrine Reference Publication
ADT	Agricultural Development Team
AIT	advanced individual training
AOR	area of responsibility
APAN	All Partners Access Network
ARSOF	Army Special Operations Forces
ASPG	Army Strategic Planning Guidance
BCT	brigade combat team
BDE	brigade
BN	battalion
CA	civil affairs
CAA	Civil Affairs Association
CAAS	Civil Affairs Assessment and Selection
CACD	Commander's Appreciation and Campaign Design
CACOM	Civil Affairs Command
CAO	Civil Affairs Operations
CAOCL	Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning
CAT	Civil Affairs Team
CBA	Capabilities Based Assessment
CCC	Captains Career Course
CENTCOM	U.S. Central Command
CEW	Civilian Expeditionary Workforce
CF	conventional forces
CGSC	U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
CHLC	Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Cells

CIM	Civil Information Management
CIMDPS	Civil Information Management Data Processing System
CJCMOTF	Coalition Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
CMAG	Civil Military Advisor Group
CME	Civil Military Engagement
CMO	Civil Military Operations
CMOC	Civil Military Operations Center
CMSE	Civil Military Support Element
COIN	Counterinsurgency
CONUS	Continental U.S.
CORDS	Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support
CPT	Captain
CR	Civil Reconnaissance
CRC	Civilian Response Corps
CSA	Chief of Staff of the Army
DA	Department of the Army
DOD	Department of Defense
DoDD	Department of Defense Directive
DOS	Department of State
DSG	Defense Strategic Guidance
DVIDS	Defense Video and Imagery Services
ECAD	European CA Division
ePRT	Embedded Provincial Reconstruction Team
EUCOM	U.S. European Command
FAO	Foreign Service Officer
FHA	Foreign Humanitarian Assistance
FID	Foreign Internal Defense
FM	Field Manual
FOCA	Friends of Civil Affairs
FORSCOM	Forces Command
FSO	Foreign Service Officer
GCC	Geographic Combatant Command
GPF	General Purpose Forces
GSN	Global Special Operations Forces Network
HA	Humanitarian Assistance
HMW	How Might We
HN	Host Nation
HQ	Headquarters
HRM	Human Resource Management
HTAT	Human Terrain Analysis Teams

HTS	Human Terrain System
HTT	Human Terrain Team
HUMINT	Human Intelligence
IMSG	Institute for Military Support to Governance
IT	Information Technology
JCET	Joint Combined Exchange Training
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JFC	Joint Force Commander
JIEDDO	Joint Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Defeat Organization
JIIM	Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental and Multinational
JP	Joint Publication
JROCM	Joint Readiness Oversight Council Memorandum
JTF	Joint Task Force
LREC	Language, Regional Expertise and Culture
LTC	Lieutenant Colonel
MACV	Military Assistance Command Vietnam
MAJ	Major
MCAT	Mobilization Civil Affairs Training
MCCLL	Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned
MCoE	Maneuver Center of Excellence
MDMP	Military Decision Making Process
MG	Military Government
MI	Military Intelligence
MISO	Military Information Support Operations
MOS	Military Occupational Specialty
MOSQ	MOS Qualified
MSG	Master Sergeant
NA	Nation Assistance
NCO	Non-commissioned Officer
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
NLF	National Liberation Front
NSG	Naval Security Group
NSPD	National Security Presidential Directive
NSS	National Security Strategy
OCO	Overseas Contingency Operations
OCS	Officer Candidate School
OE	Operational Environment
OEF	Operation ENDURING FREEDOM
OIF	Operation IRAQI FREEDOM
ORA	Organizational Risk Analyzer

OSINT	Open Source Intelligence
POI	Program of Instruction
POM	Program Objective Memorandum
POV	Point of View
PPBE	Planning, Programming, Budget and Execution
PRC	Population and Resource Control
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
PSYOP	Psychological Operations
QDR	Quadrennial Defense Review
RAF	Regionally Aligned Forces
RC	Reserve Component
ROTC	Reserve Officer Training Course
RVN	Republic of Vietnam
S/CRS	Secretary of State's Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization
SAMS	School for Advanced Military Studies
SCA	Support to Civil Administration
SECDEF	Secretary of Defense
SF	Special Forces
SFA	Security Forces Assistance
SGM	Sergeant Major
SIGACT	Significant Activity
SIGINT	Signal Intelligence
SNA	Social Network Analysis
SOC-FWD	Special Operations Command (Forward)
SOF	Special Operations Forces
SOFA	Status of Force Agreement
SORB	Special Operations Recruiting Battalion
SSRA	Social Science Research and Analysis
SWAATC	Special Warfare Advanced Analysis and Targeting Course
SWOT	Strength, Weakness, Opportunities, and Threats
TCE	Theater Coordination Elements
TLP	Troop Leading Procedure
TRAC-LEE	TRADOC Analysis Center–Fort Lee
TRADOC PAM	TRADOC Pamphlet
TRADOC	Training and Doctrine Command
TSC	Theater Security Cooperation
TSOC	Theater Special Operations Command
UAP	Unified Action Partner
USACAPOC(A)	U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations (Airborne)
USAJFKSWCS	U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School

USAR	U.S. Army Reserve
USARPAC	U.S. Army Pacific
USASOC	U.S. Army Special Operations Command
USAWC	U.S. Army War College
USMA	United States Military Academy
USSOCOM	U.S. Special Operations Command
UW	Unconventional Warfare
VC	Vietcong
VEO	Violent Extremist Organization
VTC	Video Teleconference
WO	Warrant Officer

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## I. INTRODUCTION

*The future will require an increasing number of operations within and among populations and an enhanced ability to consolidate and integrate contributions from government, military, and coalition partners.*

—General Raymond T. Odierno

### A. ARMY 2025 VISION

The global security environment will continue to be increasingly complex and unstable, shaped by emergent trends of urbanization, hybrid threats, the rise of non-state actors, and new state challenges to the international order (2010 NSS, pp. 8–9; 2014 QDR, pp. 3–8; 2015 NSS, pp. 7–10; Odierno & McHugh, 2015, pp. 4–6; Odierno, Amos & McRaven, 2013; Department of the Army, 2014b, pp. 10–14). To meet these changes and challenges, General Raymond T. Odierno, Army Chief of Staff, and John M. McHugh, Secretary of the Army, (2015) envision the Army of 2025 and beyond as the world's premier land force, an agile organization applying sustained expeditionary land power while serving as the key integrator of United States (U.S.) and allied efforts in defense of the Nation and its interests. As Odierno & McHugh (2015) write in *The Army Vision: Strategic Advantage in a Complex World (2015)*, the Army will need to be an agile, expert, innovative, interoperable, expeditionary, scalable, versatile, and balanced force, one that will

effectively employ lethal and non-lethal overmatch against any adversary to prevent, shape, and win conflicts and achieve national interests. It will leverage cross-cultural and regional experts to operate among the populations, promote regional security, and be interoperable with the other military Services, United States Government agencies and allied and partner nations. Leveraging the total force, it will consist of a balanced, versatile mix of scalable, expeditionary forces that can rapidly deploy to any place on the globe... Composed of agile and innovative institutions, soldiers, and civilians, the United States Army of 2025 will provide strategic advantage for the Nation with trusted professionals who strengthen the enduring bonds between the Army and the people it serves. (pp. 6–11)

To deliver on these expectations, the Army must demonstrate both unity of effort and synchronization of all instruments of national power in conjunction with the activities of unified action partners (UAPs).<sup>1</sup> Civil Affairs (CA) is central to the coordination and collaboration with UAPs, host nation (HN) partners, and the local populace. CA's primary role is to develop persistent and enduring relationships that build capacity, transparency, and trust among the partners and the populations with whom CA interacts in order to support commanders' unified actions<sup>2</sup> and influence long-term military outcomes (Odierno & McHugh, 2015, pp. 3–4).

## **B. CAPSTONE PURPOSE**

Currently, the U.S. Army, as described by Odierno & McHugh (2015), is “a force simultaneously in transition, in action, and in preparation” (p. 2). After a decade and half of sustained Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) deployments, the Army is experiencing a period of retrenchment, resource constraints, and downsizing. Realigning CA is particularly important, not only to adapt the Regiment to the dynamic global security environment, but to support the Army 2025 vision, and in so doing, demonstrate its own strategic relevance.

The purpose of this capstone, therefore, is to strategically design the CA Regiment to support the Army 2025 strategic vision. A strategic design is an organizational roadmap that sets direction and identifies the key design elements that must be realigned with the direction in order to respond to the challenges of a dynamic environment (Roberts, 2014).

## **C. TRADITIONAL APPROACH TO SETTING DIRECTION**

The traditional approach to setting an organization's future course can be found in business. Ansoff (1965) launched the formal strategic planning school popularized in the

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<sup>1</sup> Army Doctrine Reference Publication No. 3-0 (ADRP 3-0, May 2012) defines UAPs as “those military forces, governmental and nongovernmental organizations, and elements of the private sector with whom Army forces plan, coordinate, synchronize, and integrate during the conduct of operations.”

<sup>2</sup> Unified action requires leaders to “synchronize, coordinate, and when appropriate, integrate military operations with the activities of other governmental and nongovernmental organizations to achieve unity of effort” (JP 3-0, 2011, p. xi).

1970s. Initial conceptualizations defined strategic planning as a prescribed formal process of strategy formation, strategy implementation, and strategy evaluation (David, 2007; Steiner, 1969). Although some scholars and practitioners at the time viewed strategic planning and strategic management as the same process, others considered strategic planning a specialized process central to strategy formulation (David, 2007).

Strategic planning first involved environmental scanning, which Brown and Weiner (1985) defined as using cognitive radar to scan the world systematically to identify new, unexpected, major and minor information (p. xi). Others later recommended that environmental scans include an internal analysis of the organization's mission, vision, strengths, and weakness (Morrison, 1992). Environmental scanning is now considered essential to organizational survival (Aguilar, 1967; Auster & Choo, 1993; Coates, 1986; Collings, 1968; Fahey & Narayanan, 1986; Fahey, King, & Narayanan, 1981; Hambrick, 1979; Kefalas & Schoderbek, 1973; Morrison, Renfro, & Boucher, 1984; Sutton, 1988).

Strategic planning has been used extensively by both businesses and the military. Examples of business strategic planning, especially in companies facing volatile and unpredictable environments, can be found within the oil industry. Grant (2003) describes the detailed planning systems of the world's largest oil companies, Royal Dutch/Shell, Exxon, Mobil, British Petroleum, Elf Aquitaine, Texaco, ENI, and Amoco. His assessment of their multi-national, multi-business strategic planning processes concludes that their "planning systems fostered adaption and responsiveness, but showed limited innovation and analytical sophistication" (p. 491).

An example of military strategic planning is illustrated by the U.S. Naval Security Group (NSG). Frentzel, Bryson, and Crosby (2000) describe the NSG Command's six-year strategic planning process. The Command's aim was to refocus and develop better strategies to deal with the new demands for military preparedness in response to dramatic shifts of the post-Cold War, Congressional pressures for cross-service cooperation, and the emergence of new technologies. The NSG's incremental process was guided by the strategic planning framework of strength, weakness, opportunities, and threats (SWOT) traditionally used by public and non-public organizations (p. 402).

#### D. STRATEGIC PLANNING APPROACHES AND THEIR CRITICS

In *Strategy Safari: A Guided Tour through the Wilds of Strategic Management*, Mintzberg, Ahlstrand, and Lampel (2005) describe 10 different approaches to planning: design, planning, positioning, entrepreneurial, cognitive, learning, power, cultural, environmental, and configuration. Of the 10 approaches, the capstone authors chose to examine further the Planning School for its business applications, and the Positioning School for its military applications. Table 1 provides a summary of both schools and their applications (Mintzberg, Ahlstrand, & Lampel, 2005, pp. 354–359).

Table 1. Strategic Planning versus Strategic Positioning

Comparison of the Two Schools		
	Business Field	Military Field
	Planning	Positioning
ROOT DIMENSIONS OF THE SCHOOL		
Sources	Ansoff 1965	Purdue work (Schendel, Hatten) mid 1970s; then Porter 1980 and 1985
Base Discipline	(Some links to engineering, systems theory, etc.	Economics, military history, etc.
Champions	"professional" managers, MBAs, staff experts, etc.	analytical staff, consulting "boutiques", military writers, etc.
Intended Message	formalize	analyze
Realized Message	program (rather than formulate)	calculate (rather than create or commit)
CONTENT AND PROCESS DIMENSIONS OF THE SCHOOLS		
Strategy	plans decomposed into sub strategies and programs	planned generic positions (economic and competitive), also ploys
Basic Process	formal, decomposed, deliberate (prescriptive)	analytical, systematic, deliberate (prescriptive)
Change	periodic, incremental	piecemeal, frequent
Central Actor (s)	planners	analysts
Organization	structured, decomposed, acquiescent (for programming)	source of competitive advantages, otherwise incidental
Leadership	responsive to procedures	responsive to analysis
Environment	acquiescent (checklist of factors to be forecast or controlled)	competitively demanding but economically analyzable, ultimately acquiescent when understood

Comparison of the Two Schools		
	Business Field	Military Field
	Planning	Positioning
CONTEXTUAL DIMENSIONS OF THE SCHOOLS		
Situation (best environmental fit)	simple and stable (and so predictable), ideally controllable	simple, stable, and mature (therefore structured and so quantifiable)
Form of Organization (implicitly favored)	large machine (centralized, formalized; also divisionalized)	large machine, preferably in commodity or mass production (centralized, formalized); also divisionalized and "global"
Stage (most likely)	strategic programming	assessment

The table compares key components of both schools and fields. It highlights the basic process by which the central actors formulate their strategies based on their organizational characteristics, typical environment and stage (Mintzberg, Ahlstrand, & Lampel, 2005).

Further analysis reveals both the Planning and the Positioning Schools are linear processes and tend to assume charting a course of action as a simple problem in a stable environment. Their root response to the environment tends to be reactive rather than a proactive. As seen in both the content and process dimensions, the goal of each school is to follow routine, prescriptive processes, rather than attempt to search for and take advantage of creative opportunities.

Thus, both schools have their critics. For example, Potts (1984) describes General Electric's successful effort in leading the anti-planning charge in the 1980s. In *The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning*, Mintzberg (1994) shows evidence through stories, empirical research, and studies that planning never works, citing the claim in the *Business Week* cover story published on September, 17, 1984 that the "reign of the strategic planner may be at an end" (p. 62). Strategic planners have long list of tools and techniques to evaluate the environment; yet, it is difficult for them to identify and select the best methods, apply them and measure their results.

The positioning school also has been criticized, specifically for being too narrowly focused and relying heavily on economic factors over political ones. In addition, Mintzberg, Ahlstrand, and Lampel (2005) assert that positioning school

practitioners prefer to stay home—detached from the environment—and calculate the possibilities, e.g., Clausewitz’s claim of “calculation” being “the most essential thing to...the end” in gaining superiority (p. 115). This school is focused on generic positions in the global context and not on understanding unique contexts and situations. For example, the military often will seek to apply generic answers to problems while waiting for the proper opening in the environment in which to execute them.

#### **E. THE SEARCH FOR ALTERNATIVES: THE DESIGN APPROACH TO DIRECTION SETTING.**

The search is on for new ways to set organizational direction. Both the planning and positioning schools have been shown to be inadequate, leading Carlopio (2011) and others to insist that addressing environmental and organizational complexity require something more than the traditional methods. Camilus (2008) contends ill-defined problems or solutions require a non-traditional method. Roberts (1991), referencing the Department of Defense (DOD), similarly postulates that due to organizational complexity and the need for both coordination and adaptation within the DOD, traditional models of decision of making in strategic formulation are inadequate and require a paradigm shift from strategic planning to innovative designs (pp. 45–52). Razzouk and Shute (2012) add that assisting personnel “to think like designers may better prepare them to deal with difficult situations and to solve complex problems” (p. 14).

##### **1. Design Approach to Planning**

Design theory has attracted innovators across academic disciplines and organizations, beginning with Herbert Simon’s (1969) notion of human interaction in the design realm. Others have followed suit, introducing new perspectives on design theory and practice (Buchanan, 1992; Cross, 2006, 2011; Krippendorff, 2006; Lawson, 2006; Schon, 1983). Eventually, design has come to be viewed as an alternative to traditional methods of strategic planning. For example, Raimond (1996) championed design as “creative, imaginative, right-brained, concerned with values, emotional commitment, and energy,” that seeks to “imagine an ideal vision of what we would want our future to be.” In contrast, he viewed the traditional approach to planning as “rigorously analytical, left

brain(ed), quantitative, good at programmable planning” (p. 213). Mintzberg, Ahlstrand, and Lampel (2005) picked up these themes and described the design approach to planning as a process of conception while Borja de Mozota (2003) viewed the design approach to planning as an integration of design into the strategic formulation process.

There are many attractive features to the design approach to planning. Some include multidisciplinary collaboration, which aids in engagement, problem-solving and innovative solutions (Kinnaman & Bleich, 2004). Design also enables organizations to tackle complex, “wicked”<sup>3</sup> problems, such as helping large systems designs their future (Roberts, 2014). In addition, the design planning process outlines a blue print for organizational change, by identifying conditions supportive of such change (Nadler & Tushman, 1997).

## **2. Army’s Interest in Design**

In 2007, the School for Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) developed a design curriculum called the Art of Design as part of TRADOC’s effort to incorporate design planning to address complex military problems. The six-week course was divided into five modules: critical thinking, foundations for design exploration, design methodology, communication, and leading design. Based on feedback from the Art of Design course, and insights gathered from SAMS’ design students who participated in Unified Quest exercises,<sup>4</sup> TRADOC published Pamphlet 525-5-500, *Commander’s Appreciation and Campaign Design (CACD)* in 2008 to signal its intention to incorporate the design approach into doctrine (Banach, 2009, pp. 98–99).

Current U.S. Army doctrine lists Army Design Methodology (ADM) as one of the three planning methodologies for Army leaders.<sup>5</sup> ADM is defined as *a methodology for applying critical and creative thinking to understand, visualize, and describe unfamiliar problems and approaches to solving them* (Department of the Army, 2012, p. 7). The

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<sup>3</sup> A wicked problem is defined as a problem that cannot be completely described or completely answered (Rittel & Webber, 1973). Design problems are often considered “wicked” (Cross, 2006).

<sup>4</sup> Unified Quest is an annual U.S. Army war game sponsored by TRADOC, Joint Forces Command and SOCOM with participation of members of the interagency, academia, and military from around the world to discuss responses to global future conflicts.

<sup>5</sup> The other two planning methods are Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) and Troop Leading Procedure (TLP).

ADM process consists of framing the operational environment, framing the problem, and developing operational approaches—in the form of a design concept—to solve the problem. The design concept reflects the commander's conceptual understanding of the environment and the problem, and serves as the link between design and detailed planning. Based on the understanding developed during ADM, the commander issues guidance to the planning staff for more detailed planning using MDMP (Department of the Army, 2012, p. 7; Banach, 2009, pp. 100–102; School of Advanced Military Studies [SAMS], 2010, pp. 131–140). However, the introduction of design planning, particularly ADM, into the U.S. Army has not been without challenges.

Since U.S. Army doctrine officially adopted ADM in the 2010 publication of FM 5-0 *The Operation Process*, there has been no shortage of discussions among commanders, planners, and academics regarding the methodology, its potential applications, and the many barriers to its integration into Army operations (Banach, 2009; Buchanan, 2012; Kober, 2010; Nocks, 2010; Shatzer, 2014; Swain, 2014). The criticisms cover a wide spectrum: inconsistent and confusing terminology and description of design (Martin, 2010); lack of clearly defined relationship between design and detailed planning (Kober, 2010, pp. 5–9; Nocks, 2010, pp. 7–8); an overly complicated and elitist Army design process (Buchanan, 2012; Shatzer, 2014, pp. 11–12); and an ADM process that discourages creativity (Shatzer, 2014, pp. 27–28). Wolters (2012) summarizes the issues associated with the introduction of ADM into the U.S. Army in research sponsored by U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences (Table 2). Among Wolters' (2012) findings, the most consistent, and significant issues are the conceptual barriers, attributed mostly to the inconsistent definitions/descriptions of design terminology and methodology, which lead to confusion and additional barriers to ADM's integration into the Army planning process (pp. 9–16).



Table 2. Summary of Barriers to Integrating Design into Army Operations  
(from Wolters, 2012)

<b>Barriers to Integrating Design into Army Operations</b>	
Terminology and Language Barriers	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Perception that Design lexicon is over-complicated, dense, and elitist</li> <li>• Lack of consistent terminology; the lexicon continues to evolve</li> <li>• Language has fostered a sense of divisiveness and an 'us vs. them' mentality</li> </ul>
Conceptual Barriers	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Inconsistent definition and description of Design</li> <li>• Lack of agreement as to whether Design is new vs. mission analysis by a new name</li> <li>• Insufficient description of the gap Design is intended to fill</li> <li>• Inconsistent views on the operational level at which Design is appropriate</li> <li>• Lack of clarity on how Design connects to other planning activities, specifically to the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP)</li> </ul>
Organizational Culture Barriers	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Strong cultural tradition of reductionist-analytic thinking</li> <li>• Culture of deference and obedience to authority</li> <li>• Incentive systems that do not encourage thought processes that are characteristic of Design</li> </ul>
Command-level Barriers	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Insufficient Commander involvement in Design</li> <li>• Competing demands for Commanders' time and attention</li> <li>• Limited understanding of when to use Design and the benefits it offers</li> <li>• Mismatch between personality/leadership styles of typical commanders and those needed for Design</li> </ul>
Application Barriers	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Disagreement over whether (and to what extent) Design should be proceduralized vs. remain more conceptual in nature</li> <li>• Lack of examples and evidence of utility</li> <li>• Practical challenges of applying Design in the real world, such as recognizing situations for which it is appropriate, building the Design team, and facilitating discourse</li> </ul>

### 3. Capstone Approach

This capstone will apply the design approach to planning to assist the CA Regiment in creating a strategic design for its future. However, rather than following the Army's approach to design, this capstone will employ Design Thinking—a process of creating, innovating, and problem solving to invent the future (Roberts, 2014).

Defined as a process in which people from multiple perspectives and disciplines collaborate to solve problems creatively (Brown & Wyatt, 2007; d. school, 2013; Roberts, 2014; Rose & Kelly, 2013), Design Thinking is the methodology of choice for this capstone. It enables the authors not only to analyze gaps in performance as identified

by the archival record,<sup>6</sup> but also to capture stakeholders' insights that will prompt innovative solutions to close those gaps. The goal is to develop a strategic design for CA 2025 that supports the Army's 2025 Vision.

## **F. CAPSTONE STRUCTURE**

This capstone is organized into seven chapters. Chapter I introduces the Army 2025 strategic vision to provide a context for this capstone: the creation of a strategic design for CA 2025. Chapter I also summarizes the traditional approaches to planning and explains why they are inadequate given the complex challenges facing CA. The chapter then introduces the design approach to planning and signals the capstone project's value-added contribution, the use of Design Thinking as a methodology to produce a strategic design.

Chapter II describes the methodology of Design Thinking used to create CA's strategic design. It summarizes the unique features of Design Thinking and outlines the Design Thinking methodology: discovery; problem definition; ideation; prototyping; and testing. The chapter concludes with a description of the application of Design Thinking to the CA Regiment and the steps taken to produce CA's strategic design.

Drawing from archival records and discussions with stakeholders, Chapter III presents the findings of the Discovery Phase of Design Thinking. Archival research summarizes CA's past and present strategic direction and the current state of the CA Regiment. Discussions with stakeholders—both CA and non-CA personnel—offer important insights and divergent perspectives on CA's ongoing challenges.

Section one of Chapter IV identifies CA's major challenges and problems, Define Problem Phase. Section two summarizes and prioritizes the creative ideas generated to address these problems, Ideation Phase.

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<sup>6</sup> Since 2006, there have been various efforts to identify and address CA capability gaps, including the 2009 CSIS study (Hicks & Wormuth, 2009), the 2011 Joint Readiness Oversight Council Memorandum (JROCM) 162-11, and the CA Capabilities Based Assessment (CBA) by TRADOC Analysis Center–Fort Lee (Little, 2013, p. 29). There have also been academic theses and monographs published by the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), U.S. Army War College, and U.S. Army Command and General Staff College to examine the CA Regiment's ongoing challenges. These past CA studies, however, have utilized variants of the traditional strategy development in drafting their recommended solutions.

Chapter V introduces the design team's prototypes developed to make the creative ideas more concrete and tangible, Prototyping Phase.

Chapter VI summarizes the feedback received on various iterations of the prototypes, Testing Phase.

Chapter VII discusses the proposed phased implementation of CA 2025, including the CA leadership's next steps to operationalize the prototypes. In addition, the authors discuss the potential of using Design Thinking methodology to support the change process. The chapter concludes with a summary of the lessons learned.

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## **II. METHODOLOGY**

Design Thinking is the methodology used in this capstone to suggest a new strategic design for CA. It is defined as a process in which people from multiple perspectives and disciplines collaborate to create new products, processes, services and strategic designs (Acumen & IDEO, 2014; d. school, 2013; Roberts, 2014; Rose & Kelly, 2013).

This chapter describes the basic features of Design Thinking, introduces the Stanford D School five-phase Design Thinking model, and describes how Design Thinking is used to guide the CA community in creating its strategic design for the future.

### **A. BASIC FEATURES OF DESIGN THINKING**

#### **1. Human-Centered Design**

Design Thinking seeks to derive tailored-made solutions to solve design challenges (Acumen & IDEO, 2014, ch. 1). Designs are not solely judged in terms of the technological features or their economic viability. Good designs pursue the “sweet spot” that integrates people’s needs with technological feasibility and economic viability. For example, Kellogg’s discovery of hospital patients’ need for an alternative in breakfast choices was human-centered, which laid the foundation for a billion dollar company (Thomsen, 2013). Launching a design process, thus, begins with understanding the problems people are facing, especially their latent needs, to order to come up with creative solutions. Creative designs that emerge from the design process then are assessed in terms of their technological features and costs.

#### **2. Radical Collaboration**

Design Thinking requires radical collaboration among its designers. Such collaboration brings group members from different backgrounds and specializations to work together to solve problems, “Harnessing collective perspectives” and “building on the ideas of others” (d.school, 2013, pp. 3–28), increases a group’s potential to surface new ideas and generate creative solutions, and potentially launching transformational change (Page, 2014).

### **3. Visual and Embodied Learning**

Visual learning is the visual representation of ideas and concepts to help designers understand complex ideas and to identify points of difference and similarity. All design work needs to be visually displayed to help the team chart its progress over time. (Acumen & IDEO, 2014, ch. 1). Embodied learning, often described as “thinking with one’s hands,” challenges designers to think more deeply about the problem by translating their deep thoughts and ideas into the physical realm. When combined, visual and embodied learning aid designers in embracing abstract concepts, which then may become the source of new inspiration for a given problem or challenge.

### **4. Bias Toward Action**

Design Thinking is action-oriented. Rather than spending the bulk of allotted time mired in analysis and abstract discussions, the design team moves quickly toward building things to anchor the team’s deliberations on what ideas or concepts work and which do not. The building starts with low-resolution prototypes and then with testing and feedback moves to higher and higher resolutions when the feedback is positive (d.school, 2015).

### **5. Design Space**

Design Thinking’s physical space is open and designed with movable furniture to enable collaboration and support design activities. It has plenty of whiteboards for displaying sticky post-it notes and other creative items. Walls typically are covered with the results of brainstorming, user statements, pictures, etc. to aid in the creative process.

## **B. STANFORD D SCHOOL FIVE-PHASE MODEL OF DESIGN THINKING<sup>7</sup>**

Stanford’s Hasso Platner Institute of Design (D School) was founded in 2005 by David Kelley, a Stanford professor of Mechanical Engineering (d.school, 2012). Kelley’s human-centered design work (Rose & Kelly, 2013) informs Stanford’s integrative approach to Design Thinking. It combines creative and analytical approaches, insists on

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<sup>7</sup> There are other design thinking models—IDEO, Acumen, Nueva, etc.—but the authors chose Stanford’s model.

cross-disciplinary collaboration, draws on “methods of engineering and design, and [integrates] them with ideas from the arts, tools from the social sciences, and insights from the business world” (d.school, 2015).

Design Thinking begins with a design challenge—usually in the form of a problem, issue, or question facing a company or organization. Discussions also specify the design constraints imposed by the project’s sponsor, such as time, resources, or other limitations. To address the problem, issue, or question, a design team then launches the five-phase Design Thinking model (Figure 1): empathize, define, ideate, prototype, and test.




Figure 1. Stanford University Five-Phase Design Model  
(from d.school, 2014, p. 7)

## 1. The Empathize Phase

The Empathize Phase initiates the exploration of the problem and its context. The designer’s goal is to observe, listen, and learn from the people who live with the problem in order to understand their perspectives and fundamental needs. As Tim Brown (2009) describes it, the “real goal is ... helping people to articulate the latent needs they may not even know they have” (p. 40).

There are many ways to gather information on people’s needs, including examining archival records and observing people in their work. A third way is to conduct face-to-face discussions in the person’s environment (d.school, 2014). A two-person team works well, with one individual asking questions and the other recording the responses.

Questions should facilitate a natural conversation and evoke stories, often prompted by “why” to probe for richer and deeper experiences. The second designer captures the themes of the conversation and the non-verbal reactions that will enable the designers to interpret the person’s stories and experiences.

## **2. The Problem Definition Phase**

The Problem definition Phase reframes the design challenge. Often design challenges are not well articulated and represent only the presenting problem and not the underlying problem or issue facing the organization. The design team then may need to reformulate the problem statement after gathering information from the Empathy Phase.

Two tools to assist the designers to reformulate the problem are Empathy Maps and Point of View statements. An Empathy Map, as shown in Figure 2, is divided into four quadrants. The upper left quadrant captures the person’s key words and phrases during the conversation. The lower left quadrant captures the person’s nonverbal actions. The upper right quadrant describes the designer’s interpretation of what the person actually thinks (not what is said, but what the designer thinks the person actually means). The lower right quadrant requires the designer to interpret what the person is actually feeling. Thus, the right-hand side of the empathy map reflects the designer’s interpretation, not the interviewee’s direct statements or his actions. Since thoughts and feelings cannot be observed directly, the designer must infer by paying careful attention to the person’s language, tone, and word choices. Utilizing these four quadrants aids the designer in capturing a person’s thoughts and feelings, which can then be used to help reframe a problem.






Figure 2. An Example Empathy Map

A Point of View Statement (POV), shown in Figure 3, helps the designer synthesize the information collected from all the conversations and Empathy Maps. The statement captures information in three parts: a description of the person in general terms; the person's desires; and the underlying needs driving those desires. To complete the problem framing, the design team then synthesizes the POV statements to create an overarching problem statement.

### Point of view (POV) statement

Insights

- (Insights derived from the empathy map)

Stakeholder's name:

Affiliation:

Analyst's name:

Date:

POV Statement

(User – Briefly describe stakeholder based on your post-it notes)

needs

(Needs – Use verbs to describe things they want to do/ or happen based on your post-it notes)

because

(Insights – What you have learned about your stakeholder's feelings/view based on your post-it notes to leverage in your design)

Figure 3. An Example POV Statement

### 3. The Ideation Phase

The Ideation Phase generates ideas to address the reframed problem. Using “how might we” (HMW) questions, designers launch a brainstorming session where they encourage a spectrum of ideas, defer judgment, and build on the ideas offered (Brown, 2009). Designers typically use both analytical and intuitive thinking to generate a variety of ideas, which, according to Euchner (2012) are needed to “create successful breakthroughs” in Design Thinking (p. 10). They also use abductive logic to move from an observation to a proposed explanation accounting for the observation. The ideal is to find the simplest and most likely explanation, or what Martin refers to as “inference to the best explanation” (Martin, 2009, p. 8) and others simply describe as “design magic.”

When generating new ideas, the goal is to widen the possible solution space for the given problem, which is why designers are encouraged to build on others' ideas before selecting their preferred solution (d.school, 2013; d.school, 2014). As the ideas increase in number, designers often form idea groupings or categories of similar ideas. This visual clustering, in turn, can lead to deeper insights, which generate even more ideas. One form of clustering is mind mapping—a visual representation to distinguish fundamental relationships within and between the idea groupings. Figure 4 depicts a mind mapping utilizing pictures and sticky notes to illustrate related ideas.



Figure 4. An Example of Mind Mapping (from Roberts, 2015)

After generating ideas, designers must choose which ideas to carry forward into prototyping. First, they establish criteria on which to base their selection, and then they vote (d.school, 2014). Ideas receiving the most votes go forward, depending on the number of prototypes the designers have the time and resources to build.

#### **4. The Prototyping Phase**

The Prototyping Phase transforms ideas into physical representations (d. school, 2013). Prototypes come in many different tangible forms: sketches, models or physical objects, role-playing, skits, and videos. Figure 5 illustrates a prototype example.



Figure 5. Exploration Prototype Example (from Roberts, 2015)

The goal of prototyping is to start with a rough representation of an idea (e.g., napkin drawing) to prompt a design team conversation. Rough representations or low-resolution prototypes are preferred since they constitute small investments in time and resources. Designers then move to higher and higher resolution prototypes upon discovering what aspects of their prototypes work and which do not, learning from their mistakes. “Fail early to succeed sooner” is the designer’s motto (Brown, 2009, p. 17).

## 5. The Test Phase

The Test Phase is an iterative conversation between designers and those for whom they are designing. The goal is to solicit feedback on the prototype as a solution to the design problem. Testing may result in different outcomes: go forward with the prototype and continue making higher resolutions; go forward but with minor modifications; go back to the drawing board and select other ideas to prototype; or possibly, return to the problem, how it is defined, and repeat the design thinking process. Ideally, through this iterative process, a tailored-made solution emerges to the sponsor’s design challenge.

## **C. DESIGN THINKING APPLIED TO CIVIL AFFAIRS**

### **1. Key Roles**

#### ***a. Initiators***

The authors initiated this project due to their concerns over CA's ability to remain strategically relevant in 2025. The CA Regiment is facing existential challenges, and the authors chose Design Thinking as the methodology for addressing them.

#### ***b. Sponsor***

1st Special Warfare Training Group (Airborne) [1st SWTG(A)] partially funded this project. During a speech at Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), a command representative challenged the CA and the Psychological Operations (PSYOP) students to transcend the "enabler" term by changing the strategic value of their respective organizations. This command representative assessed the importance of the project and agreed to provide limited funds for research travel. Throughout the process, the sponsor was the liaison that provided the authors' access to key personnel.

#### ***c. Designer and Facilitators***

Dr. Nancy Roberts was the designer and facilitator of the design workshop, guiding the authors and the design team throughout this process. She also recruited experienced facilitators (Dr. Frank Barrett, Ms. Ann Gallenson, Ms. Anita Salem, and Ms. Eleanor Uhlinger) to assist with the facilitation. Together they contributed over 30 years of invaluable Design Thinking experience to the process.

#### ***d. Design Team***

The initial design team consisted of the authors. Eighteen others then joined the effort during a four-day onsite Design Thinking Workshop at NPS. The 20-member design team members, gathered from across the force, provided the following representation: one from U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), three from U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations (Airborne) [USACAPOC(A)], one from 1st SWTG(A), five from 95th Civil Affairs Brigade

(Airborne) [95th CA BDE(A)], five from 85th CA BDE, and three from NPS. They represented a small sample of CA professionals in terms of gender, age, ranks, deployments, unit assignments and other factors. The design team consisted of 19 males and one female; their ages ranged from 33 to 45 years old, with an average age of 39. Combined, members of the team possessed over 60 deployments to the following countries: Iraq, Afghanistan, Turkey, Syria, Yemen, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Kosovo, Central African Republic, Bosnia, Armenia, Albania, Azerbaijan, Poland, and Macedonia. Their ranks included four LTCs, twelve MAJs, one CPT, one SGM, one 1SG and one MSG.

## **2. Design Constraints**

The command representative's guidance contained few constraints. The main concern focused on the feasibility of outputs. However, the project did have constraints in terms of resources, time, and organizational divisions.

In this fiscally constrained environment, funds limited the number of discussions and visits during the Discovery Phase. Given such constraints, the authors chose Ft. Bragg, NC—the home station for the majority of the participating organizations: 1st SWTG(A), 95th CA BDE(A), USACAPOC(A), IMSG to conduct in-person discussions with stakeholders. All other discussions with personnel outside of Ft. Bragg, NC were held via email, telephonic conference, and video teleconference (VTC), etc. In addition, some personnel were not considered for the design team due to a lack of funds.

Limited time also constrained this project. The senior-leader selection process of design participants was truncated and focused on selecting the best available person, rather than the best person for the workshop. The four-day workshop limited the time designers could discuss and produce prototypes, and some personnel had to leave the workshop before its conclusion to resume their command duties. An additional test phase at Ft. Bragg, NC raised issues about the prototypes that the authors' capstone timeline did not allow them to investigate. Finally, senior leaders outside the Civil Affairs community seek more input from non-CA personnel to complete the project. The authors will recommend another design workshop to address those leaders' concerns.

Bridging the organizational divides proved to be another challenge. The authors' experiences primarily have been on active duty within the 95th CA BDE(A) and 1st SWTG(A), which made finding informal leaders from other organizations to assist in the Discovery Phase and the selection of workshop participants difficult. In addition, the authors strove to manage relationships among the organizations to ensure the project was viewed as a community endeavor.

### **3. Design Thinking Process**

#### ***a. Phase 1: Discovery/Empathize***

The Discovery/Empathize<sup>8</sup> Phase began when *the authors* conducted archival research into CA by examining Army assessments, JROCM 162-11, the CA CBA by TRAC-LEE. The authors also reviewed academic theses and monographs published by the NPS, USAWC, and CGSC. In addition, authors probed numerous open source web pages, such as Defense Video and Imagery Services (DVIDS), organizational Facebook pages, Combatant Command (COCOM) web pages, and a variety of news websites. Other unclassified data sources included the Civil Information Management Data Processing System (CIMDPS), a 95th CA BDE(A) database that contains survey data from operational deployments and the USACAPOC(A) Command Brief that outlined several U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) CA deployments. These data sources allowed the authors to analyze the CA Regiment using visual graphic depiction via ARCGIS and Social Network Analysis (SNA), both of which are illustrated in Chapter III.

Building on their archival research, the authors expanded their exploration to include discussions with members of the CA Regiment—1st SWTG (A), U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSWCS), 1st SFC(A), USACAPOC(A), Institute for Military Support to Governance (IMSG), 95th CA BDE(A), 85th CA BDE, and other CA personnel serving organizations across DOD and Department of State (DOS). In addition, the authors reached out to nine personnel outside

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<sup>8</sup> The authors slightly modified the Stanford Design Thinking model for the CA community. Specifically the 1st phase, empathize, was characterized as discovery. The modified phase is still human-centered; the addition clarifies the authors' process to discover the context from the CA Regiment's archival field as well.

the CA Regiment in Forces Command (FORSCOM), U.S. Army Armor School, Maneuver Center of Excellence (MCoE) NCO Academy (NCOA), U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC), Pentagon, U.S. European Command (EUCOM), U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), DOS, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). These contributors included one senior Special Forces (SF) officer, one senior Armor officer, and seven senior CA officers.

Discussions with the above personnel revolved around the following themes:

- CA's strategic narrative
- CA Regiment's ongoing challenges
- Opportunities for the CA Regiment
- The threats facing the CA Regiment
- Suggestions for improvements in the CA Regiment

The authors expressed gratitude to the discussants for their contribution, requested support from their organizations in the form of personnel to attend the upcoming NPS design workshop, and indicated this project will be published the summer of 2015.

The Discovery/Empathize Phase continued when an 18-person design team joined the authors for a four-day NPS Design Workshop 3–6 March, 2015. After the workshop designer and facilitator introduced the team to Design Thinking and the team crafted its rules of engagement, the expanded team, now augmented to 20 people, reviewed the authors' initial results in the Discovery Phase, which included an overview of the future environment, the current state of CA, and archival highlights, in order to establish a common understanding among the whole team. In addition, the design team broke into subgroups of two to three individuals to discuss the above themes with two senior SF officers, four academics, five mid-grade CA officers, and one Marine Special Operations officer. A total number of 21 discussants were involved in the discovery process both prior to and during the workshop.



***b. Phase 2 Problem Definition***

Based on the archival data and the 21 Empathy Maps and POV statements (see illustrations in Chapter IV), which were used to organize data from the discussions, the next step called for the design team to identify challenges/problems that CA needed to address. Writing one problem per sticky note, the design team placed sticky notes on a wall for all to see. Then a subset of designers quickly reorganized the sticky notes into affinity diagrams—groupings around a common theme. As the design team began to see how the common themes might be interconnected, discussion ensued and insights emerged. The design team then identified a core problem: CA lacked a common identity and that lack drove many other problems the team identified.

***c. Phase 3 Ideate—Generating Ideas***

The design team’s ideation focused on generating new ideas for a CA identity statement. Working independently, three subgroups generated new identity statements following the guidelines in Figure 6.



Figure 6. Questions for Identity

***d. Phase 4 Prototyping***

(1) Step 1. Each subgroup briefed its version of the CA identity statement to the other two. Rather than vote on a preferred identity statement, three design team members, one from each subgroup, worked to combine the best elements of their three versions in a “fishbowl” as the other design team members observed. The final version

went through slight modification by the 20-person design team and then was unanimously accepted. The statement can be found in Chapter V.

(2) Step 2. The design team then turned to the remaining problems identified in Phase 2, Problem Definition. The workshop designer asked the design team to vote on the most important problems to address given the new identity statement. Team members quickly identified the major problem areas: branding, strategic messaging, education, selection and recruitment, training, force structure, talent management, information and knowledge management, culture, career management, generational gap, resources, metrics and feedback, and benefactor.

The workshop designer then asked team members to “vote with their feet” and stand next to the problem area in which they had a personal interest. The team members then reconfigured the problem areas and formed three new subgroups to work on prototypes: strategic messaging and branding; human resources management; and force structure. Details on all prototypes can be found in Chapter V.

*e. Phase 5 Test: Workshop Feedback*

The design team gathered feedback on the prototypes from different sources. Each subgroup provided feedback to other sub-groups on their prototypes. The design team also requested feedback on their prototypes from individuals who had participated in the Discovery Phase. A senior officer also provided feedback from a strategic perspective.

(1) Post-Workshop Feedback. Following the workshop, the design team continued to refine the prototypes, based on field experts’ opinions, institutional norms, and the Army’s change process. For example, the authors contacted a marketing professor for assistance with branding efforts, and senior leaders provided knowledge and understanding on how to navigate the Army change process.

(2) Feedback from CA Regiment. The authors and available design team members assembled at Fort Bragg, NC to present the four main prototypes—identity, strategic messaging and branding, human resource management, and force structure—to the CA Regiment in three different sessions: one for senior-level leaders, one for battalion and company leaders, and one for team leaders. In addition to the personnel

attending the three sessions, the authors received additional feedback through VTC, regular teleconference capabilities, and emails to reach a wider audience within the CA Regiment.

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### **III. DISCOVERY PHASE**

#### **A. ARCHIVAL RECORD**

The CA archival record is vast and complex. This chapter summarizes the CA Regiment's current threats and opportunities and the distribution of its forces viewed through the lens of geospatial analysis and social network analysis. Appendix A offers a more extensive picture of its lineage from its inception to 2011. It documents the debates concerning CA's strategic direction, brand, organizational design, and culture. Appendix B provides an overview of CA's global presence by COCOMs from 2006–2014.

##### **1. Threats from the Environment**

CA's operational environment is increasingly complex and unstable. In examining the future operating environment, the Strategic Landpower Task Force—chartered by the U.S. Army, the U.S. Marine Corps, and U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM)—highlights the threat of hybrid warfare involving multiple entities, the growing capacity of non-state actors to challenge state authorities and destabilize regions, and the increasing pace and mutability of human interactions across boundaries (Odierno, Amos, & McRaven, 2013). Similarly, Pamphlet 525-3-1 *Win in a Complex World* published by TRADOC in 2014 to outline the new U.S. Army Operating Concept, describes a complex environment characterized by growing urbanization (Department of the Army, 2014b, pp. 12–13).

In the fifth installment of its *Global Trends* series intended to stimulate strategic thinking, the National Intelligence Council (2012) describes the future global trends in 2030. Some of these trends are more directly relevant to the operational environments where CA forces deploy. For example, as urbanization continues to grow, 60 percent of the world population (4.9 billion people) is projected to reside in urban centers by 2030 (p. v), making the human terrain in these densely populated areas much more complex. Power is expected to be more diffuse with the growing number of state and non-state actors, limiting multilateral governance and fragmenting the political landscape. Social, economic, and political changes fuel a governance gap as countries move through different stages of

autocracy or democracy. As approximately 50 countries, concentrated primarily in the Middle East, Africa, Southeast and Central Asia, transition from autocracy to democracy, more political turmoil is expected with a destabilizing effect on the operational environment (p. vii). Politically dissonant, youthful ethnic minorities in countries with mature populations increase the risk of intrastate conflicts, especially with the aid of communications technologies to facilitate social movements. The risks of interstate conflicts also increase as new regional powers emerge and change the dynamics of the international system. Moreover, an increasingly diverse ideological landscape, coupled with wider access to lethal and disruptive technologies, will lead to higher potential for conflicts where the use of violence is no longer the monopoly of the states (p. ix).

## **2. Threats from Competition**

Stanton (2010) cites a 2009 paper by USAR Major Brad Striegel titled, “Civil Affairs Functional Specialty Review” to discuss how *ad hoc* constructs, such as the Human Terrain System (HTS), Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), and Agricultural Development Teams (ADTs)<sup>9</sup> filled the capability gaps that CA “should have nurtured, developed and updated.” Capabilities traditionally identified as CA core competencies—cultural knowledge, civil information management (CIM), CMO planning and coordination with UAPs, HN and coalition partners, and CA functional specialties—have been, to various degrees, neglected by CA practitioners. This neglect has undermined the branch’s strategic relevance and threatened its allocation of resources in an increasingly fiscally constrained environment.

### ***a. Human Terrain System***

With the U.S. intelligence staff’s traditional focus on the enemy—through collection and analysis of human intelligence (HUMINT), signal intelligence (SIGINT), and significant activity (SIGACT) reports—information on the political, economic, and sociocultural environment was often neglected by the S-2 shops (Flynn, Pottinger & Batchelor, 2010, pp. 7–8), highlighting a capability gap in cultural intelligence. Consequently, the U.S. Army and

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<sup>9</sup> Run by the National Guard.

the U.S. Marine Corps intelligence schools adjusted their programs to include cultural analysis training for both enlisted personnel and officers, as well as provide reach-back capability for deployed units (Connable, 2009, p. 58).

In 2004, the U.S. Army established the TRADOC Culture Center to develop cultural training programs for deploying troops and provide them with the cultural knowledge needed in OEF and OIF. Similarly, the U.S. Marine Corps established its Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning (CAOCL) in 2006 to provide pre-deployment cultural training with embedded civilian social scientists and trainers (Connable, 2009, p. 58). In both OIF and OEF theaters, CA personnel and Foreign Service officers (FAOs) served as cultural and political advisors to commanders and their staffs. Even though the services began to expand the sizes of their CA and FAO forces in response to the high demand signal, the gap in cultural capability remained during the early years of OEF and OIF (Connable, 2009, pp. 59–61; Golinghorst, 2010, p. 4).

In 2006, U.S. Army TRADOC jointly developed the HTS program with the Joint Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Defeat Organization (JIEDDO). The core of its program was to have civilian social scientists and anthropologists embedded with deployed troops to improve decision makers' understanding of the complex sociocultural environments in Iraq and Afghanistan (Golinghorst, 2010, p. 4; Lamb, Orton, Davies & Pikulsky, 2013, p. 22). HTS deployed Human Terrain Teams (HTTs) to support BDE-level commands; Human Terrain Analysis Teams (HTATs) to support division-level commands; Theater Coordination Elements (TCEs) to support deployed teams, theater headquarters (HQs); and Social Science Research and Analysis (SSRA) teams to provide support at the theater level by facilitating and analyzing surveys conducted by contracted local organizations. In addition, HTS maintained CONUS-based components that provided administrative and technical support, training, and reach-back capability (Clinton, Foran-Cain, McQuaid, Norman, & Sims, 2010, pp. 1–4).

The first HTT deployed in February, 2007 to Khost, Afghanistan to support 4th Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 82nd Airborne successfully as proof-of-concept (Lamb et al., 2013, p. 23). Under the renewed lens of the population-centric counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy re-energized by General David Petraeus, HTS initially received positive

reviews, including a favorable assessment from Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) Robert Gates and a congressional testimony of Colonel Martin Schweitzer, the BCT commander in Khost. Five HTTs subsequently deployed to Iraq with mixed performance; two teams imploded due to “intense personal conflicts” and had to be redeployed (Gezari, 2013; Joseph, 2014, p. 14; Lamb et al., 2013, pp. 22–23). However, with the support of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), Petraeus, and Gates, the HTS program received an expanded budget for 26 teams that was subsequently rushed to recruit, train, and field. From the very beginning, the HTS program has been marred with systemic problems ranging from recruitment, human resourcing, training, mismatched skills, and organizational competence, to management, working relationships, and personnel disciplinary issues (e.g., fraud, sexual harassment, racism) (Clinton et al., 2010, pp. 2–8; Gezari, 2013; Joseph, 2014, pp. 26–31; Lamb et al., 2013, pp. 24–25).

Among the persistent opposition the HTS has drawn since its inception, fundamental criticisms have come from the American Anthropological Association (AAA) over ethical issues of anthropological applications in support of the military (Gezari, 2013; Joseph, 2014, p. 20) and from members of the military intelligence (MI), CA and FAO communities, asserting that HTS attempts to duplicate capabilities that already exist—but need further development—in the services (Connable, 2009, pp. 59–63; Golinghorst, 2010, pp. 25–26). By doctrine, U.S. Army CA conducts civil information management (CIM) as one of its five core tasks. CIM is defined as *the process whereby civil information is collected, entered into a central database, and internally fused with the supported element, higher HQ, and other USG<sup>10</sup> and DOD agencies, IGOs,<sup>11</sup> and NGOs* (Department of the Army, 2014a, p. 3–10). The CIM process includes six steps: (1) collection through civil reconnaissance (CR), data mining, and collaboration with HN, UAPs, and coalition partners, (2) collation, (3) processing, (4) analysis, (5) production, and (6) dissemination. At the core of the CIM process is the analysis of civil information to provide decision makers situational understanding and knowledge of the civil component of the operational environment, including its political,

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<sup>10</sup> U.S. government.

<sup>11</sup> Intergovernmental organizations.



economic, social, cultural, structural, and informational dimensions (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2013, pp. I-1–12), the very *raison d'être* for HTS. Connable (2009) also recognizes that the capabilities claimed by HTS mirror those doctrinally provided by U.S. Army CA, and questions the logic behind such duplication, rather than an improvement of existing capabilities in the U.S. military (p. 61). The cost of the HTS program exceeded 600 million dollars by 2012 (Gezari, 2013), and 720 million dollars to date, by another estimate (Gonzalez, 2015).

Assessments of the HTS have been mixed, from limited success with numerous systemic problems (Clinton et al., 2010; Lamb et al., 2013, pp. 26–28), to a deeply flawed program that put Afghans and Americans at risk (Gezari, 2013), to even a “poorly conceived, grossly mismanaged boondoggle,” and “the costliest social science program in history” (Gonzales, 2015). Joseph (2014) further asserts that any successful efforts, as perceived by HTS personnel, were “largely at the relatively simple level of cultural awareness” instead of at the more strategically sophisticated level of providing sociocultural information to inform decision makers (p. 39). HTS as an *ad hoc* program has not only distracted DOD from a concerted effort to improve its existing cultural capabilities, but also diverted resources from the recruitment, training, and educational programs to improve and expand such capabilities in the services (Connable, 2009, p. 64). After much turmoil, including the removal in 2010 of Steve Fondacaro, the original program manager, and Montgomery McFate, the first chief social scientist, reportedly for feuding with TRADOC, the HTS program faces an uncertain future with no major role. However, HTS is still recruiting and sustaining its training program at Fort Leavenworth, KS (Joseph, 2014, pp. 28, 99). In the FY 2016 Army Unfunded Requirements List enclosed with the recent request from Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) to the House Committee on Appropriations for additional funding, a pilot HTS program for PACOM was itemized together with a pilot Open Source intelligence (OSINT) program, totaling 28 million dollars, further indicating that the HTS program is still very much active (Odierno, 2015).

***b. Provincial Reconstruction Teams***

In OEF and OIF, PRTs represented another *ad hoc* construct to implement CMO in support of stability operations. Joint doctrine defines a PRT as a civil-military team—with interagency and multinational partners—*capable of independently conducting operations to stabilize a part of the OE*<sup>12</sup> *by enhancing the legitimacy and the effectiveness of the HN government* (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2013, p. II–22). The reconstruction and stabilization program in Afghanistan began with the Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Cells (CHLC) staffed by U.S. Army CA personnel during the early phase of OEF. The program was expanded in 2002, first with the deployment of a Coalition Joint CMO Task Force (CJCMOTF) and subsequently the creation of the first PRTs in Afghanistan with a force protection component and interagency representatives on staff (Perito, 2005, p. 2; Sellers, 2007, pp. 5–6). As a means of burden-sharing among the U.S.-led Coalition, the number of PRTs grew to 32 by 2011 under three main models: U.S., German, and British. The majority of the PRTs were established and led by the United States; some mature U.S.-led PRTs were subsequently handed over to Coalition partner countries (Center for Army Lessons Learned [CALL], 2011, pp. 35–39; Perito, 2005, pp. 3–5; Sellers, 2007, pp. 8–15). Typically, at the core of a U.S.-led PRT was a Reserve Component (RC) CA Company that performed the function of a Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) and provided CATs for the supported BCT. The *ad hoc* nature of the PRTs in Afghanistan resulted in a wide range of challenges and varying degrees of operational success, as summarily observed by the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) (2007):

Army Civil Affairs (CA) personnel received 14 weeks of training but said that they needed more preparation for the varied tasks needed to reconstruct and develop a foreign province. They stressed the need for detailed training in negotiating, contract development, evaluating and vetting contractors, and program budgeting and management.

The personnel assigned to a PRT are typically a mix of soldiers, Marines, airmen, and sailors of varying ranks, gender, MOSs,<sup>13</sup> and active/reserve

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<sup>12</sup> Operational environment.

<sup>13</sup> Military occupational specialties.

components, without regard to specific qualifications. The Sharana PRT Commander has an armor MOS and had no civil affairs experience or training prior to this assignment. A communications operator may be responsible for maintaining the vehicle fleet, while an infantry Marine may be responsible for the computer network and SATCOM equipment. Many of them are on their first deployment and have a noncombat MOS. Personnel assigned to PRTs need more pre-deployment civil affairs training and more force protection training, including the use of crew served weapons. The U.S. Army has recognized the need for specialized training of PRT personnel. U.S. Forces Command has issued specific guidance and established web-based training resources.

Cultural awareness at both the micro and macro level is critical to the success of a PRT. In at least one instance, a female U.S. Army Civil Affairs (CA) officer filled a critical leadership position. In spite of her excellent credentials, she may be being set up for failure because of the cultural bias regarding women of the Afghani tribal leadership with whom she must negotiate. (pp. 4–5)

The PRT construct was implemented in Iraq in 2005 with one fundamental difference: the teams were under DOS control and led by a senior Foreign Service officer (FSO) (Abbaszadeh et al., 2008, p. 5; Sellers, 2007, pp. 17–18). Ten embedded PRTs (ePRTs)—also led by a civilian director—were introduced as part of the 2007 surge and integrated into BCTs in strategic hot spots to allow BCT commanders more control and influence over PRT activities in their assigned areas of responsibility (AORs) (Sellers, 2007, pp. 20–22).

Sharing many of the same challenges—lack of resources, qualified personnel, training, integration—PRTs in Afghanistan and Iraq highlighted another glaring problem: inadequate CIM that jeopardized the effectiveness of the reconstruction efforts and interagency cooperation (Abbaszadeh et al., 2008, pp. 7–14; Perito, 2005, pp. 11–14; Sellers, 2007, pp. 33–40). A more salient lesson was that the PRT construct, as accurately observed by senior CA practitioners, was an enhanced CMOC with an integrated civil and interagency component (Sellers, 2007, pp. 47–55). Since operating a CMOC is a CA core competency, CA should have played a role as an integral component, if not *the* core component of the PRT construct. However, in both Afghanistan and Iraq, CA only had a supporting role on a PRT, as one of the “enablers” (CALL, 2011, p. 42). The inadequate training and operational experience of the RC CA personnel on the PRT staff did not help

the case. As a common practice on U.S.-led PRTs in Afghanistan, CA personnel were subordinate to non-CA military commanders who had little or no prior CMO or CA training (MCCLL, 2008, p. 11; Sellers, 2007, pp. 55–61).

**c. *Civilian Response Corps and Civilian Expeditionary Workforce***

Shortfalls in CA functional specialties have been widely discussed and recognized as a critical capability gap in the RC (Edwards, 2012, pp. 8–17; Florig, 2006, pp. 60–61; Kimmey, 2005, p. 18; Mitchell, 2011, pp. 6–10; Stanton, 2010; Storey, 2012, pp. 18–19). The fourteen functional specialties—typically acquired by RC CA personnel from civilian education and career experience—are organized into six functional specialty areas as shown in Figure 7 (Department of the Army, 2014a, p. 2–18). Given the needs for civilian expertise in post-conflict stability and reconstruction operations, there have been programs by other agencies willing to fill such a capability gap—namely the Civilian Response Corps (CRC) under DOS, and the Civilian Expeditionary Workforce (CEW) under DOD (Civic, 2013, pp. 149–150).



Figure 7. Six CA Functional Specialty Areas with 14 Functional Specialties  
(from Department of the Army, 2014a, p. 2–18)

Historically, the role of overseas post-conflict nation building has defaulted to the U.S. military. National Security Presidential Directive-44 (NSPD-44) was issued in 2005 to promote the whole-of-government approach and provide policy direction for interagency cooperation in stability and reconstruction efforts, with the Secretary of

State's Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) as the lead agency (Civic, 2013, p. 149; Hicks & Wormuth, 2009, pp. 24–26; Serafino, 2012, pp. 3–5). The S/CRS proposed the establishment of the CRC in 2006 to create a cadre of civilian experts—an active component (CRC-A) of 250 members, a standby component (CRC-S) of 2000, and a reserve component (CRC-R) of 2000<sup>14</sup>—trained and equipped for overseas deployments in support of stability and reconstruction efforts (Farr, 2012, p. 22; Serafino, 2012, pp. 14–15). Officially launched in 2008, the CRC continuously encountered a series of funding challenges that impeded the development of its three components (Farr, 2012, pp. 21–22; Serafino, 2012, pp. 14–21). Van Roosen (2009) perceives the establishment of the CRC as a superficial duplication of the functional specialty cells in USACAPOC(A) and, hence, potentially an asset to Joint Force Commander (JFCs) (p. 15).

In 2009, under Directive 1404.10 (Department of Defense, 2009), the DOD established the CEW to be organized, trained, cleared, equipped, and ready to deploy in support of combat operations by the military; contingencies; emergency operations; humanitarian missions; disaster relief; restoration of order; drug interdiction; and stability operations (p. 1). CEW recruits volunteers from the pool of current civilian, as well as former civilian and military DOD employees, for four categories: Emergency Essential (E-E) for combat and combat support; Non-Combat Essential (NCE) for non-combat support; Capability-Based Volunteer (CBV) as backfill for E-E and NCE; and Capability-Based Former Employee Volunteer Corps as the reserve for CBV (p. 3). CEW has a database of over 17,000 resumes to draw from and hires personnel—excluding DOD employees with dual-status National Guard or Reserve Technician—as federal employees (Civic, 2013, p. 150; Dunigan, 2012, p. 3). Dunigan (2012) lists the following positions filled by CEW personnel (pp. 2–3):

- Contracting staff (Commander's Emergency Response Program)
- Security administration staff
- Public affairs staff conducting media relations and developing communication strategies for deployed U.S. forces

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<sup>14</sup> CRC-A deployable within 48 hours, CRC-S 30 days, and CRC-R 45–60 days.

- Foreign affairs staff
- General attorneys
- Transportation specialists performing vehicle maintenance
- Information technology (IT) managers
- Language specialists and cultural advisers to U.S. officers
- Intelligence specialists providing technical and IT support to intelligence personnel on U.S. bases in theater
- Human resources assistance staff
- AFPAK Hands performing development and government capacity-building work in Afghanistan
- Civil engineers working with HN, U.S. contractors, and NGOs on CMO projects

The 2012 report by RAND Corporation also notes that the CEW is evolving and potentially transitioning from its voluntary basis to a more steady-state, traditional program with position requirements identified by the services (Dunigan, 2012, p. 3). Since the DOD has a more robust budget than the DOS, the CEW program potentially can be expanded with civilian skillsets similar to those offered by CA functional specialty cells and CRC (Civic, 2013, p. 150).

CRC—currently under the DOS Bureau of Conflict and Stability Operations (CSO)<sup>15</sup>—is projected to grow to 500 for CRC-A, and 4,000 for CRC-R (Serafino, 2012, p. 24). Similarly, CEW is projected to grow to a total of 20,000 to 30,000 employees (Dunigan, 2013, p. 1). In a hostile fiscal environment of increasing budget constraints, competition is inherent among the “service” providers—service in this case being the civilian expertise essential to stability and reconstruction efforts.

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<sup>15</sup> CSO subsumed S/CRS in November 2011.

### **3. Opportunities**

#### **a. *The Human Domain***

*Time and again, the U.S. has undertaken to engage in conflict without fully considering the physical, cultural, and social environments that comprise what some have called the “human domain”.*

—General Odierno, General Amos, Admiral McRaven

It is commonly understood that war is inherently a human endeavor, or a contest of wills between or among organized groups (Odierno, Amos, & McRaven, 2013). To emphasize the U.S. Army’s role in persistent population-centric operations, Odierno and McHugh (2015) further asserts in *Army 2025 Vision* that, “war, ultimately, is conducted on land with adversaries seeking to maintain control over, and often fighting in the midst of larger civilian populations” (p. 4). Cleveland and Farris (2014) postulate that, while the *existence* of a human being in conflict is not a new idea, the *relevance* of human factor in conflict has become more salient in modern warfare (p. 40).

Given the threats from the future operational environments as discussed in the previous section, Odierno, Amos and McRaven (2013) assess a growing significance of the human domain in future conflicts. Therefore, CA needs to embrace its core competency—namely its ability to access, analyze, and influence the relevant populations—and continue to develop the required skills to provide JFCs the necessary shaping options of the human domain in future conflicts.

#### **b. *The 7th Warfighting Function: Engagement***

In 2014, TRADOC published Pamphlet 525-8-5 (TRADOC PAM 528-8-5) to introduce engagement as the 7th Warfighting Function (7th WfF)—or specifically, “the related tasks and systems that influence the behaviors of a people, security forces and governments”—to address the shortfalls in current Army Concept Framework (Department of the Army, 2014c, p. 5). The two components of this new framework of engagement are *partnership activities*, which include CMO, security cooperation activities, security assistance, foreign internal defense (FID), and security force assistance (SFA); and *special warfare activities*, which include unconventional warfare (UW),

COIN, Civil Affairs Operations (CAO), and Military Information Support Operations (MISO) (pp. 12–15). The 7th WfF also emphasizes the importance of interdependence among Conventional Forces (CF),<sup>16</sup> Special Operations Forces (SOF), and UAPs to share information, coordinate mutual activities, and maintain influence through persistent engagement (p. 5).

*c. The Global SOF Network*

In the 2013 USSOCOM posture statement to Congress, House Armed Services Committee Admiral William H. McRaven articulated USSOCOM’s vision to build a Global SOF Network (GSN) to “support interagency and international partners, in order to gain expanded situational awareness of emerging threats and opportunities,” through the persistent presence of small SOF footprint in critical locations, under the authority of the geographical combatant commands (GCCs) and COMs (McRaven, 2013a, p. 4). Through Civil-Military Support Elements (CMSEs), USSOF provide direct support to the interagency efforts to counter violent extremist ideology and diminish drivers of violence exploited by al-Qaeda and other violent extremist organizations (VEOs) (p. 5). Civil Military Engagement (CME)—the formal USSOCOM program of record under which CMSEs are deployed to over 25 countries to support the GCCs, Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs), and Chiefs of Mission (COMs) through regionally synchronized activities—plays an important role in USSOCOM efforts to build the GSN.

CME is a globally synchronized and regionally coordinated program of country-specific and regional actions executed through, and with indigenous and interagency partners, to eliminate the underlying conditions and core motivations for local and regional support to violent extremist organizations and their networks (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2013, p. II–6). CME supports the indirect approach in shaping the environment to defeat VEOs as outlined in Concept Plan 7500 (CONPLAN 7500) DOD Strategy Against Terrorism. In the 2008 USSOCOM posture statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee, Admiral Eric T. Olsen (2008) emphasized that the indirect approach requires more time to achieve effects, but “ultimately will be the decisive effort” (p. 5). As he

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<sup>16</sup> CF and General Purpose Forces (GPF) will be used interchangeably in this capstone.



reported then, GCCs were increasingly requesting CMSEs to enhance their indirect operations, as part of the NA efforts, by enabling partners to combat VEOs, deterring tacit and active support for VEOs, and eroding support for extremist ideologies (p. 8).

ATP 3-57.80 *Civil Military Engagement* succinctly describes the CME concept (Department of the Army, 2013):

The TSOC in support of the GCC plans, coordinates, requests, and manages the CME at the theater level. CME is a subset of NA.<sup>17</sup> CME is synchronized with the GCC's contingency and theater campaign plans, as well as the DOS mission strategic plan of the AMEMB in the HN where operations are conducted. CME is designed to identify and address critical civil vulnerabilities in undergoverned [sic] and ungoverned areas or high-threat environments.

CME is USSOCOM's conceptual contribution, and it is part of the DOD's strategy to build partner capacity (BPC) in a preventive, population-centric, and indirect approach to enhance the capability, capacity, and legitimacy of partnered indigenous governments. The successful execution of CME operations addresses the causes or drivers of instability or popular grievances of the indigenous population that can be exploited by destabilizing elements within the operational environment to include violent extremists. (p. 4–1)

CMSEs are small, task-organized CA elements manned, trained and equipped by the 95th CA BDE(A). When deployed, a CMSE is placed under the operational control of the TSOC and provides direct support to the COM, while working closely with members of the country team, the interagency, and other USSOF elements in country in support of theater security cooperation (TSC) through regionally synchronized activities. Through persistent engagement with HN populace, civilian institutions and military, as well as partnerships or *ad hoc* working relationships with IGOs and NGOs, the CMSE conducts and facilitates targeted CMO activities to build partner capacity and reduce and mitigate civil vulnerabilities, while enhancing access and influence for the TSOC, GCC and the country team. There are currently CMSEs deployed to over 25 countries in support of SOCCENT, SOCAF, SOCEUR, SOCSOUTH and SOCPAC.

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<sup>17</sup> Nation assistance.

The 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG) (Department of Defense, 2012) directed the U.S. military to, whenever possible, “develop innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches to achieve our security objectives,” given the new fiscal realities and reduction in resources (p. 3). Such direction was echoed in the *SOCOM 2020* vision by Admiral McRaven (2013b):

Given the increasing complexity and uncertainty in the global environment, it is imperative USSOCOM become more agile, even more flexible, and ready for a broader range of contingencies. We shall achieve this through the development of globally networked, innovative, low-cost, and small footprint approaches to achieve our nation’s security objectives. Success in the future demands unprecedented levels of trust, confidence, and understanding—conditions that can’t be surged.

Effective networks are best created before a crisis. Building networks requires relationships and relationships require trust. Building trust requires time and commitment. Persistent engagement based on mutual trust and understanding best positions the force to build relationships. SOF must sustain and then improve capacity to shape the operational environment while building relationships based on trust and sharing experiences, hardships and knowledge with our partners.

In support of Ambassadors and GCCs, aligned with our interagency partners, SOF will provide small unit, forward-based persistent presence closely integrated with our partners to protect our interests and provide rapid response. We simply cannot surge trust at the time of crisis. (pp. 1, 5)

CMSEs will be an essential part of the GSN as envisioned by Admiral McRaven, as these forward-based, persistent-presence SOF teams with small footprint continue to develop trust and relationships with not only the HN partners, but also the country teams, and the UAPs in the priority countries where they operate.

#### **4. Current State of CA through Mapping Analyses**

The authors continued to explore and discover the CA community context through mapping analyses. First, geospatial analysis is used to visually depict the global CA presence from 2006 to 2014. Second, SNA is used to explore the CA community as a whole in 2014 among command, operational, training, and partnerships relationships. Lastly, the authors use a traditional line and block chart to illustrate the current state of the CA community.

*a. Geospatial Analysis*

Given the active duty CA expansion beginning in 2006, the authors wanted to identify what CA expansion looked like in terms of operational deployments. Using Google Earth, ARCGIS, and other software tools to illuminate the temporal and geospatial features of the deployed CA units, the authors explored the spatial relationships among the specific CA deployments from 2006 to 2014 and the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) objectives. Based on an analysis of CA deployments by components, the authors identified issues central to understanding the CA's critical role.

The two-mode data for our analysis consists of CA deployments, by entity and country, between 2006 and 2014. The authors relied almost exclusively on open-source data, such as DVIDS, organizational Facebook pages, COCOM webpages, and a variety of news websites. Other unclassified data sources include the CIMDPS and the USACAPOC(A) Command Brief.

The authors first charted CA deployments by entity and location using open-source data coded in a two-mode formatted spreadsheet. Then, after identifying an appropriate base map with country shape files, the authors annotated and adjusted the map projection and datum. The coded data was then incorporated through the Layer Properties menu and each country was color-coded based on the presence of a specific CA entity, or a combination of CA entities (i.e., Iraq and Afghanistan). Once that coding was complete, various documents, such as the QDR and individual COCOM Commander Posture Statements were reviewed in order to identify priorities for resources and assets. Lastly, the geospatial relationship between the CA entity and deployment locations was analyzed in order to determine how they supported the QDR priorities, as well as to identify and record any other significant observations.

As depicted on the map in Figure 8, the countries in dark purple are countries in which U.S. Army CA had a presence between 2006 and 2014. Presence is defined as either a persistent presence, CMSE, Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET), liaisons, and/or regular exercises. The chart depicts just how CA deployments to 78 countries—39.7 percent of the 196 recognized countries of the world minus North America—during

the past eight years have supported the QDR's second and third pillars to "Build Security Globally" and "Project Power and Win Decisively." Specific instances are highlighted during the COCOM analysis portion (See Appendix B). Another point of interest with regard to the significant number of countries in which CA forces have had a presence during the past eight years is that when compared to the much promoted "Global SOF Network," CA forces alone have been operating in as many, if not more countries (78 v. 75 countries) (McRaven, 2013a).




Figure 8. Global CA Presence from 2006–2014

According to former SOCOM commander, Admiral McRaven, this robust, global presence is critical in order to

support to public diplomacy, and interagency efforts to counter violent extremist ideology and diminish the drivers of violence that al-Qa'ida and other terrorists exploit...neither we nor our partners can kill our way to victory in this fight. These efforts require continuity and perseverance. Episodic engagement is inefficient and has the potential to create

animosity due to unmet expectations by the governments and populations we are trying to support. Over the long-run, these proactive activities reduce strategic risk, protect American lives, and reduce the need for expensive response to terrorist attacks. (McRaven, 2013a)

Figure 9 graphically depicts CA's presence from 2006–2014 by component, along with a histogram outlining the number of countries in which each CA entity has deployed. Based on the data gathered, the highlighted red circle indicates an opportunity for the CA Regiment. This particular area illustrates where organizations have had operational overlap; it reveals an opportunity for the community to examine knowledge sharing and transfer. In addition, the chart suggests that RC CA forces have deployed to the most countries, though this should be of no surprise considering it is the largest of the three CA entities. What the authors found of particular interest is that the newest of all organizations, the 85th CA BDE, has been present in 22 countries despite only being active since 2011.




Figure 9. Global CA Presence (by Component) from 2006–2014

The 95th CA BDE(A) and USACAPOC(A) have found a niche by maintaining an enduring presence through recurring deployments and/or exercises in low-threat and allied theaters in which they conduct low-cost humanitarian assistance programs, and by providing training to build military and governmental capacity. Expansion has allowed AC CA to focus solely on rapid deployment and initial entry capability in support of SOF mission sets. A significant finding is that despite an active duty expansion from one battalion to 10 over the course of eight years, RC CA forces have had the most forces deployed to the SOUTHCOM, EUCOM, and AFRICOM areas of operation (See Appendix A).

***b. Social Network Analysis***

Social Network Analysis (SNA) is used to illuminate the CA community. Everton (2012) described SNA it as the process of “detecting and interpreting patterns of social ties among actors” (p. 9; de Nooy, Mrvar & Batagelj, 2005, p. 5). SNA is typically used for dark networks, although it is becoming more prevalent in examining light networks. The focus of this analysis is on the entire CA community at the organizational level through its various networks: CA command, CA training, CA operations, and CA partnerships. Illumination of this light network informed later discussions concerning important players within CA’s environment to inform its strategic design.

In exploring the CA community, the first step is to define the network boundaries from 2006 to 2014, the year when CA officially became a branch and the year this project was initiated. The authors used a nominalist approach whereby the researcher defines the boundaries to construct the CA network. Two criteria informed this step:

- The organization must be formally affiliated with the CA Regiment: 95th CA BDE(A) and 85th CA BDE in the AC; USACAPOC(A), 7th Civil Support Command (7th CSC), and 9th Mission Support Command (9th MSC) in the RC; and civilian industries.
- The organization is deployed in a CA capacity.

Limiting the examination to U.S. Army CA forces aids in information gathering, problem framing, and CA redesign.

Further analysis was conducted by looking at relational ties. Everton (2012) posits that ties can be anything: resources, affiliations, friendships, kinship, and, etc. There are four relations that were used in this project. The first tie is command, where a hierarchal relationship exists between two CA units that conduct CA operations. The second tie is training, where an organization is responsible for executing a portion of the Civil Affairs' training pipeline. The third tie is operations, where CA units were deployed to a foreign countries conducting CA operations-missions, exercises, training foreign militaries, assisting with local governance activities, international distastes, etc. The fourth and final tie is partnership, where one organization is connected to another organization for collaborative activities.

After defining the network boundaries and establishing relational ties and attributes, the authors uploaded the data into the Organizational Risk Analyzer (ORA), a recent SNA software package that has gained credibility (Everton, 2012). The analyses reveals four sub-networks: CA command; CA training; CA operations; and CA partnerships. Analyses involve measures of betweenness centrality (an actor who lies on the shortest path distance between two other actors); closeness centrality (an actor who is closer in path distance to others in the network); eigenvector centrality (an actor who has ties to those who are highly centralized); degree centrality (the number of ties an actor has (Everton, 2012, p. 398). In addition, other metrics used were network path length, the distance between pairs of actors within the network and network diameter—basically, the breadth of the network (Everton, 2012). These measures were chosen to aid in identifying key organizations in a position to assist with CA's strategic design through formation, implementation, and evaluation. Appendix B provides a more in-depth discussion of the four sub-networks of the CA Regiment analyses.

Figure 10 depicts the CA network; it combines the CA command, CA training, CA operational, and CA partnership networks in order to have a comprehensive look at the CA community. Figure 10 contains (1) colored nodes that represents different types of the organizations, (2) colored links which represents which network the nodes belong to, and (3) illustrates the connections within the overall network. Figure 10 is a sociogram of the CA Combined Network, and Table 3 provides its metrics.






Figure 10. CA Network

Table 3. CA Network Metrics

Networks	Topography		Centralization			
	Diameter	Average Path Distance	Degree	Betweenness	Closeness	Eigenvector
Command	6.000	3.938	0.023	0.016	0.001	0.061
Training	3.000	1.805	0.024	0.001	0.000	0.875
Operations	7.000	2.183	0.016	0.003	0.000	0.467
Partnership	6.000	3.499	0.352	0.795	0.244	0.888
Combined	8.000	3.961	0.023	0.574	0.012	0.462

The network is large, consisting of 244 nodes and forms around four clusters that are noteworthy. Analysis revealed that the partnership sub-network has more centralization across the four measures compared to the other networks, as seen in Table 3. Within this network, there are four major players indicated by the red circles on Figure 6: Civil Military Advisor Group (CMAG), Civil Affairs Association (CAA), Friends of Civil Affairs (FOCA), and IMSC. Among these influential organizations the CMAG has the most partners, and is part of Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOFF) initiative to



improve CA strategic value (U.S. Army Special Operations Command, 2013). The CA Partnership sub-network is the primary network to be leveraged to assist with the Regiment's aims.

There are several important implications that the authors draw from this social network analysis. This information reveals that strategic messaging for the CA Regiment needs to occur within the CA Partnership sub-network. There is an opportunity for the CA Regiment to signal its external stakeholders within this network with one voice. On the other hand, if the community continues to signal and promote different narratives and messages, it can only confuse these stakeholders regarding CA's strategic value.

*c. Force Structure*

An analysis of the current CA force structure reveals some of the issues facing the community. Figure 11 outlines the different commands to which CA forces are assigned: USSOCOM, FORSCOM, USARPAC, and USAEUR. It also illustrates the size of the RC with six flag officer billets and nine BDEs compared to the AC with two BDEs. Additionally, Figure 11 highlights the variation in training conducted within the force:

- AC Officers (38A) and AC NCOs (38B) go through one-week CA assessment and selection (CAAS) followed by 42-week CA qualification course (CAQC).
- RC Officers (38A) conduct 20-week distance learning course followed by 4-week residence course.
- RC NCOs (38B) attend 4-week reclassification course.
- RC Officers (38A) and NCOs (38B) attend mobilization training conducted by different organizations—1st SWTG(A), 1st TNG BDE(A), and 80th TASS CMD.

This visual depiction illuminates some of the many differences in training within the CA Regiment. The implications are that these different training pathways produce differences in skills and interpretations of CA roles that manifest in distrust among CA forces and a lack of credibility to external stakeholders because of the variations of CA skills delivered.




Figure 11. Current CA Force Structure and Training Pipelines

## 5. Emergent Themes and Challenges

From the archival record, the authors identified recurring themes representative of the CA Regiment’s ongoing challenges and presented those themes to the design team members as a context for further dialogues and discussions during the Design Thinking workshop.

### a. 2006 Reassignment of USACAPOC(A) to USAR and Its Implications

In 2006, all RC CA units under USACAPOC(A) were reassigned to USAR while the 96th CA Battalion (Airborne) [96th CA BN(A)] remained under USASOC. Such reassignment, commonly referred to as the “CA divorce” by members of the CA Regiment, effectively split the Regiment along the AC/RC line with unintended consequences at the detriment of the Regiment’s cohesion, interoperability, and overall readiness.

***b. Who Are We?***

CA personnel often identify themselves by the functions they perform (e.g., generalists vs. functional specialist), the tasks assigned to them (e.g., project manager, HA coordinator), whom they support (e.g., GPF vs. SOF), their mission (e.g., tactical CAT vs. CMSE), or a variety of monikers adopted or socialized by various CA organizations (e.g., Warrior Diplomat, Master of the Human Domain, and Civil Scout).

***c. CA As “Do-Gooders” (Build Stuff, Give Away Stuff and etc.)***

After years of poorly managed and executed reconstruction activities during OIF and OEF by the U.S. military *and* the interagency, many stakeholders have simply equated CA with projects (e.g., wells, schools, clinics) and HA supply drops (e.g., soccer balls, rice, bean). These became perceived as the *only* roles of CA, and were attributed to CA even when conducted poorly by non-CA entities.

***d. Burnout of the Force Due to OPTEMPO and its Implications***

The high demand signal for CA, especially during OIF and OEF, resulted in high deployment rates and consequently operational fatigue for both RC and AC. Many functional specialists left the force, causing a brain drain in the RC. The mass production of CA to replenish its ranks diluted the CA brand.

***e. One standard for All versus Specialized Standards***

Currently multiple different CA training pipelines exist in the U.S. Army, with different lengths, qualities, contents, and producing inconsistent levels of skills. Additionally, only the AC personnel go through CAAS. The disparity in CA training between the RC and AC, and its resultant disparity in the quality of their personnel deepens the divide.

***f. How to Manage and Share Data/Information within CA and between CA’s Partners***

The capabilities gaps in CIM, a CA core task, coupled with shortfalls in CIM systems, and poor interagency cooperation presented many challenges to effective management, analysis, and sharing of information with CA’s partners.

## B. DISCUSSIONS

During the course of the Discovery Phase, the authors and the design team conducted 21 discussions with stakeholders, non-CA and CA personnel. The two authors conducted nine initial discussions prior to the workshop and the workshop participants added twelve additional discussions with during the workshop. Figure 12 offers a breakdown of discussants during the workshop.




Figure 12. 21 Stakeholders' Discussions

Using general questions as outlined in Chapter III, the design team created Empathy Maps for each discussant. Figure 13 illustrates a sample Empathy Map for a non-CA discussant, who is described as an intrinsically motivated public servant. The discussant talked about the following:

- There is a disconnect between old and new generations
- Leadership challenge due to lack of assessment/selection for older generation of senior leaders
- Misrepresentation of CA at strategic level leads to misuse or underutilization of force
- Senior leaders shape a narrative that does not reflect their teams capabilities
- Misrepresentation by others
- Negative experience with CA weighs heavily in minds
- Mismanagement of personnel and inconsistent leadership

- CA has no voice excluded
- Always have to differentiate between SOF and RC
- Single training pipeline builds similarity within the force
- No one knows about us; we do not know about each other

In addition, the design team recorded the following observations of the discussant's demeanor:

- Rigid body language; sweat on forehead
- Engaged
- Held back when describing interactions and thoughts of RC

From the above information, the design team inferred the following beliefs and thoughts that the discussant might have:

- Personnel mismanagement and inconsistent leadership are detrimental to the force
- There is a disconnect not only between CA orgs, but also between CA leadership and their own orgs
- Things will improve when the new generation is in charge

Furthermore, the design team inferred that the discussant might have the following feelings:

- Anger at the loss of quality CA officers and NCOs
- Concern about the misrepresentation of CA
- Frustration about CA being marginalized

Taken as a whole the Empathy Maps offer valuable insights to help the authors interpret the archival data. Problem Definition Phase of Design Thinking is presented in the next chapter to illustrate how the Empathy Maps produce Point of View Statements for discussants and how the Point of View Statements are merged with the archival data to generate and frame the major problems confronting the CA Regiment.




Figure 13. Example of an Empathy Map

## **IV. PROBLEM DEFINITION AND IDEATION PHASES**

During the Problem Definition Phase, the design team followed three steps. First it created POV statements from the Empathy Maps for each discussant. POV statements synthesize the discussant's verbal and non-verbal statements and the design team's interpretations of them. Each POV statement then becomes one discussant's views which provides rich details and stories from his/her perspective on CA's problems. Second, integrating the archival data and the POV statements, the design team identified the major problem themes confronting CA. Last, the design team organized and prioritized the problem themes and framed them as four general problem areas.

Upon completion of problem framing, the design team then turned to Ideation, the generation of new ideas to address the problems. Both Problem Definition and Ideation Phases and their results are presented in this chapter.

### **A. PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION: POV STATEMENTS**

#### **1. POVs from Non-CA Personnel**

POV statements by non-CA personnel reveal that CA is important to the Army's strategic mission, but CA needs to transform itself. The authors extracted for the following observations from the POV statements:

- The CA Regiment is broken and needs to have a clear strategic message to explain its relevance
- While CA is important and relevant to the current and future operational environments, maneuver commanders do not understand its roles and capabilities
- SOF recognize the critical CA roles that can be expanded
- There is a disconnect between the old and new generations of CA
- The CA Regiment is fractured; senior CA leadership needs to unify the force
- CA is a function and not a force
- Instead of authority, CA needs to deliver legitimacy through engagement and capacity building

- Misrepresentation of CA at strategic level results in mismanagement and misemployment of the force
- CA is a force multiplier that needs to market itself better
- RC readiness is a problem due to problematic RC unit designations
- CA is one of the most important functions in DOD
- CA needs a benefactor with longevity, access and influence to advocate for the Regiment

These observations drawn from the POVs underscore the point that the CA Regiment cannot do business as usual. These external stakeholders want the Regiment to develop its skills and forces, and communicate its value to all stakeholders. Interestingly enough, across the board, the stakeholders want CA to transform itself and indicate people are waiting either for the change to occur now, or for the next generation in the Regiment to take the reins. Although these stakeholders recognize CA's strategic value, they are frustrated with the CA Regiment's ability to adapt and change. Figure 14 illustrates a sample of the POV statements from non-CA personnel.




Figure 14. Sample POV Statements from Non-CA Personnel



## **2. POVs from CA Personnel**

Discussions with CA personnel surfaced underlying frustration within the Regiment and ignited deep, strongly held beliefs and responses. There was general agreement that CA must address its problems to move forward. Such responses provided the design team with rich content, as illustrated in the following insights from the POVs:

- Changing the frame of the problem from internal challenges to the CA branch's strategic relevance will help focus the Regiment's transformation.
- Change will likely have to be directed externally (from OSD); the CA branch needs to shape the process through effective strategic communication.
- CA can enhance its strategic relevance through better information sharing and integration with CF/SOF/UAPs.
- The relationship between RC and AC has deteriorated and needs to be improved through inter-organization cooperation and personal links.
- CA should have a common narrative to better inform JFCs and UAPs of its roles and capabilities.
- There should be a single training standard for the both RC and AC, or different MOS to ensure proper certification of the force.
- CA branding is necessary to enable consistencies in skill levels to meet and/or shape external stakeholders' expectations.
- Language, Regional Expertise and Culture (LREC) is a key distinguishing factor in the Regiment; language, cultural expertise and the ability to bridge networks are CA's niche.
- Innovative solutions require both the political power to implement such solutions and a consensus within the CA Regiment.
- Oversold, uncertified functional specialties undermine CA's credibility and can have negative long term strategic effects.
- There need to be mechanisms to rid the branch of unqualified personnel.
- CA personnel need SNA and network development training to be able to better understand how their efforts fit into the campaign plans.

These insights suggest that the CA Regiment is in a state of crisis. Furthermore, the internal stakeholders recognize the challenges, but feel powerless to change the status

quo, and consequently rely on external stakeholders to be the catalysts for change. The members of the Regiment’s younger generation feel disenfranchised by the senior CA leadership; they are waiting for the leadership baton to pass to them. Alarming, the new generation reflects a sentiment that if something is not done soon, there will not be much of a CA branch left. Therefore, this CA 2025 capstone project carries a sense of urgency. Figure 15 illustrates a sample of CA Personnel POV statements. Appendix D contains a complete list of the 21 POV statements.




Figure 15. Sample POV Statements from CA Personnel

## B. ORGANIZED AND PRIORITIZED PROBLEM THEMES

From the insights and perspectives gathered through archival record and POVs statements, the design team generated problem statements using post-it notes—one problem statement per post-it note as described in Chapter III. Then using affinity diagrams, design team members organized the individual problem statements into major problem themes:

- Branding: Use of symbols, strategic communication to improve the image and reputation of CA to internal and external stakeholders.
- Strategic Messaging: Communication with external stakeholders to inform them on CA roles and capabilities.
- Education: Undergraduate and graduate degrees, credentials.
- Selection & Recruitment: The process to recruit, screen, select, and assess prospective CA personnel.
- Training: Training pipelines, qualification courses, reclassification courses, advanced skills vs. core skills.
- Force Structure: Departmentation of CA forces and implications on coordination, cooperation, overall readiness and organizational culture.
- Talent Management: Human resource management to recruit, train, certify the right personnel with the right skills for the right jobs.
- Information and Knowledge Management: The collection, processing, analysis, dissemination and sharing of civil information, lessons learned.
- Culture: The set of norms, shared values and beliefs among the organizational members.
- Career Management: Matching the right personnel who have the right skills with the right jobs, taking into consideration first the needs of the U.S. Army, then the welfare of the personnel and their families.
- Generational Gap: Differences of outlook or opinion between people of different generation.
- Money: Pay & benefit for personnel.
- Metrics/Feedback: Mechanisms to measure performance, effectiveness, efficiency for a system to make corrective adjustments.
- Benefactor: Someone in a position of authority or power who is willing to help the Regiment.

### **C. PROBLEM DEFINITION AND PRIORITIZATION**

Based on a quick voting process described in Chapter III, the design team prioritized the problem themes and reduced them to four major areas: CA Identity; CA Strategic Messaging and Branding; CA Human Resource Management; and CA Force Structure.

## **1. Problem 1: Lack of Common CA Identity**

The design team identified CA's core problem as a lack of a common identity. Considering the influential role organizational identity has in decision-making, sense-making, influencing the organizational culture, and determining the organization's brand, the design team concluded that four questions needed to be addressed to develop a common identity: Who are we? What do we do? How do we do it? Why do we do it?" (See Figure 6, Chapter II).

## **2. Problem 2: Poor Strategic Messaging and Branding**

Inconsistencies in strategic messaging have resulted in systemic misunderstandings by decision makers of CA's roles and capabilities. Given the broad range of CA functions and activities, both CA doctrine and unorchestrated strategic messaging efforts by CA personnel have fallen short in informing JFCs and UAPs what CA's core competencies and value-added contributions are. The misunderstanding of CA's roles and capabilities among JFCs and policy makers, who systematically lack experienced CA personnel on their staffs, has led to misemployment and mismanagement of CA forces.

Furthermore, an organization's brand or image *vis-à-vis* other organizations affects a member's loyalty to his organization, his behaviors and relationships with other members, and ultimately the Regiment's *esprit de corps*. Currently, CA personnel tend to "brand" themselves by the various tasks they perform, the organizations to which they are assigned, or the organizations that they support, resulting in potentially reducing overall Regiment cohesion.

In addition, CA offers different stories and opinions about its history and lineage making it difficult to link the members' past and present. Finally, symbols can be powerful and effective means in creating and reinforcing organizational brands. However, there are differing sentiments among the members of the CA Regiment as to whether the current Regimental and unit symbols (e.g., crests, patches) accurately or sufficiently represent its history and its identity.

### **3. Problem 3: Inconsistent Human Resource Management**

There are problems with CA recruitment and selection models that need to be examined to address the shortfalls not only of numbers but also the quality of CA personnel. The different training pipelines and selection processes—particularly between the AC and RC—remain significant challenges to the CA Regiment. In 2005, in an effort to recruit quality candidates for ARSOF, the U.S. Army Recruiting Command established the Special Operations Recruiting Battalion (SORB), which began recruiting active duty CA Officers and NCOs in 2007. Since the 2006 split between the RC and AC, USACAPOC(A) has conducted its own screening and recruitment for RC CA soldiers (Edwards, 2012, pp. 16–17). RC soldiers have the option to attend the 10-week CA Advanced Individual Training (AIT) after basic training to become CA soldiers. Otherwise, CA is a non-accession branch with no entry-level enlisted or officer opportunity (Storey, 2012, p. 8). Pre-deployment training for RC CA units—including those with provisional status after being redesignated from other MOS to meet the high CA demand during OIF—was previously provided by 1st Training Brigade whose personnel were primarily Infantry without operational CA experience (Malik, 2008, p. 42). While the SORB continues to recruit active duty personnel for the 95th and 85th BDEs, USACAPOC(A) maintains a separate—and much less stringent—recruitment process for the RC personnel. Beginning in 2010, prospective CA recruits for the AC have had to undergo a 10-day CAAS during which their mental, physical and psychological aptitudes were tested in various scenarios to screen out those unfit for CA. No such selection process exists for RC personnel.

The disparity in CA training between the AC (42-week residence course for *both* NCOs and officers) and the RC (29-day residence course, preceded by 6-month online training for RC officers; 4-week reclassification training for RC NCOs) results in different levels of MOS proficiency (Daniels & Foster, 2014, p. 20), and perpetuates the environment of separate communities within the branch (Little, 2013, p. 30).

In addition, a lack of standardized baseline MOS skills not only impedes coordination, but also degrades interoperability between the AC and RC elements. Negative anecdotal experiences between the two components, or between one component

and the external stakeholders due to under-delivered technical CA skills, continue to deepen the divide along the AC/RC line and induce a culture of distrust. At a lesser degree, a similar divide emerges between the two active BDEs, since one supports ARSOF and the other GPF.

Skillset mismatches in recruitment for RC functional specialists—those who have the functional specialty skills from their civilian jobs as lawyers, educators, police officers, firefighters, doctors, etc.—are also problematic, as Kimmey (2005) observes, “CA officers and NCOs are currently pressed into jobs they might know something about, but too often we expect a reservist who works for a bank to know how to set up a banking system” (p. 18). Another troubling trend is the claim oversold to the U.S. Army by USACAPOC(A) that since CA skills are so specialized, they can only be found in the RC, when in reality such skills remain lacking on functional specialty teams (Florig, 2006; Edwards, 2012, p. 17).

#### **4. Problem 4: Capabilities Gaps in Analytical Skills and Lack of Unity in Force Structure**

As directed in JROCM 162-11, an analysis of the requirements for Civil Domain Analysts and CIM Network Architecture Specialists needs to be conducted. Analytical skills, such as SNA, Visual Analytics, and ARCGIS are critical capabilities gaps at the Team and Company levels. In addition, the current size of four personnel of a CAT impedes its operational autonomy, especially in a non-permissive environment where force protection requirements exceed its organic capacity in terms of number of personnel and vehicles. The dependency on others for augmented forces in order to operate perpetuates the support or “enabler” role of CA.

Since the 2006 split, the 96th CA BN(A) has grown into the 95th CA BDE(A) which remains under USASOC. Another AC unit, the 85th CA BDE, was activated in 2011 as a direct reporting unit to FORSCOM to support GPF under Army Structure Memorandum 10-15 (Walsh, 2013, p. 20). The split of U.S. Army CA forces, however, has had “unintended consequences” for CA as a branch, as widely observed by CA practitioners. Walsh (2013) contends, “A force designed to be interoperable, interdependent and mutually supportive is fractured along component, force designation

and Mission Command lines,” resulting in “... disruptive challenges affecting funding, equipping, training and education, and interoperability of the force” (p. 20). Similarly, Little (2013) postulates that the “operational territorialism” induced by competition over resources, especially when faced with new fiscal realities, degraded the unity of effort within the branch and reduced its overall capacity to support JFCs and UAPs (p. 29). Since the realignment of RC CA in 2006, Storey (2012) also observes an environment of distrust within the CA community along the AC/RC line as a hindrance to the cooperation between the two components (p. 15).

#### **D. IDEATION: SEARCHING FOR NEW IDEAS AS SOLUTIONS**

##### **1. New Ideas for CA Identity**

The design team sub divided into three subgroups to brainstorm ideas in the search for new identify for CA. The team identified three criteria to guide their efforts: ideas should identify what is central or core to the organization; ideas should identify what is distinctive about the organization and what distinguishes it from others; and ideas should underscore what is enduring that enables the organization’s temporal continuity (Albert & Whetten, 1985, p. 265; Hatch & Schultz, 2000, p. 15; Whetten, 2006, p. 220).




Figure 16. Building Blocks of a CA Identity Statement

Through the ideation process, the subgroups generated three identity statements. After briefing the different ideas each subgroup surfaced, the design team used a “fishbowl exercise”<sup>18</sup> to synthesize the ideas into a single CA identity statement. This CA

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<sup>18</sup> A dynamic group setting where a small number of people in the center take part in the exercise while others stand outside, observe the process, and provide feedback as necessary.

identity statement, agreed upon by all design team members, is presented as a prototype in Chapter V.

## **2. New Ideas for Strategic Redesign**

With an identity statement crafted that represented foundational understanding of CA and guidance for CA 2025, the next step was to brainstorm and ideate on the remaining three problem areas: CA Strategic Messaging and Branding; Human Resource Management; and Force Structure. Design team members moved into one of the three sub-groups based on their interest and expertise. To launch the brainstorming and ideation, sub groups asked “how might we questions.”

### ***a. How Might We Redesign Strategic Messaging and Branding for CA?***

Generated ideas about of strategic messaging: narratives to different stakeholders; functions, tasks, and skills; shaping options; effects; mission sets.

- Generated ideas on a CA creed: Warrior Diplomat; ambiguous complex environment; the human domain.
- Generated ideas on CA history: Thomas Jefferson’s Corps of Discovery; Lewis & Clark; James Beckwourth.
- Generated ideas on CA symbols: gray beret; crossed tomahawks; unit and regimental insignia that would represent CA better.

### ***b. How Might We Redesign CA Human Resource Management?***

- Generated ideas on recruitment and selection: ROTC, OCS, MA as additional recruitment sources; 38X program; preparatory course pre-CAAS; single vs. multiple pipelines for AC and RC.
- Generated ideas on training: Single vs. multiple training pipelines; modular phases; ARSOF CCC; additional skills in negotiation, planning, and analysis; lengths of training; funding sources and implications.
- Generated ideas on professionalization of CA: branch vs. specialty branch vs. functional area; civilian credentials; CA board; CA curricula; command vs. admin tracks.



*c. How Might We Redesign CA Force Structure?*

- Generated ideas on team/company composition: six- or eight-person CATs; operational autonomy; gaps in analytical skills; CA warrant officer program.
- Generated ideas on a unified command: multi-component at BN vs. BDE levels; USASOC/1st SFC(A)/FORSCOM as parent organization; cross-training between RC & AC; regional alignment; crossing of P11 and P2 funding; components to fill command/staff billets; losses of one-star billets; increased coordination, efficiency and effectiveness.

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## V. PROTOTYPING PHASE

### A. PROTOTYPE 1: CA IDENTITY STATEMENT

The prototyping process surfaced different concepts and language the design team wanted to include in the design statement. For example, CA tagline variations included “Masters of the Human Domain” and “Elites in the Civ-Mil Domain, etc. Despite the variations, building on the four main components of CA’s identity—who we are, what we do, how we do it, and why—the design team unanimously accepted the CA identity statement shown in Figure 17.

#### **U.S. Army Civil Affairs**

#### **Experts in the Civ-Mil Domain**

We are a professional civil-military enterprise.  
We access, analyze, understand, and influence  
the human domain by globally employing  
specially selected, educated and trained  
adaptive thinkers who shape the human  
networks to promote U.S. interests.

Figure 17. Prototype 1: CA Identity Statement

### B. PROTOTYPE 2: STRATEGIC MESSAGING AND BRANDING

The rich discussions around strategic messaging and branded yielded two main distinct prototypes: strategic messaging and branding. Additionally, based on the ideation and brainstorming around branding, the subgroup decided to create three different prototypes for branding: CA creed; CA historical roots; and CA symbols.

#### **1. Prototype 2a Strategic Messaging**

Given the persistent insufficient understanding of CA roles and capabilities among decision makers—JFCs, UAPs and relevant stakeholders—the design team developed a prototyped solution in strategic messaging to address this knowledge gap.


This strategic message can be delivered as an elevator speech or an in-depth discussion with stakeholders. The intention of this messaging is for the all members of the CA Regiment to speak with one voice and stay on message at all levels. The three messaging areas in Figure 18 highlight why CA is important, how CA can shape the environment, and the methods by which CA achieves its mission. Embracing these identity and capability features will be critical in meeting the challenges of the future operational environments, supporting the 7th WfF, enhancing the U.S. Army's capabilities to operate in the human domain, and ultimately supporting the Army 2025 Vision.

Improving the external stakeholders' understanding of CA's values is an important part of strategic messaging. Outlining what CA brings to the fight at the different levels—CA Soldier/Warrior Diplomat, CA Team/Company, and CA BN/BDE—enables the stakeholders to conceptualize and understand CA's knowledge, skills, attributes, and capabilities. With this understanding, stakeholders then will be able to employ CA forces more effectively to achieve the desired end states. The fact is, at the unit of action levels—Team and Company—CA has enjoyed tactical success that can be built upon to expand the scope of operational autonomy in the future. However, connecting tactical success to operational and strategic objectives has been problematic for CA. Concerted efforts in strategic messaging at all three levels from tactical to strategic to articulating CA's roles, capabilities and functions are, therefore, crucial in demonstrating CA's strategic value to the U.S. Army.

## Why Civil Affairs Is Important

- Analyze complex systems in the human domain
- Understand how the relationships between the governed and those who govern affect collective behavior
- Shape the systems for desired end states

## Shaping Options



## Methods

- Legitimize the host nation government through capacity building
- Build consensus among the relevant stakeholders
- Assist the host nation government in identifying and addressing the root causes of civil unrest

## What CA Brings to the Fight




Figure 18. Prototype 2a: Strategic Messaging

## **2. Prototype 2b Branding; CA Creed**

As noted in Chapter IV, CA currently does not have a creed that inspires its Soldiers. However, it was hoped that in addition to its aspirational values, a CA creed would evoke encourage Regimental beliefs, standards, principles, and aims needed for 2025. The CA creed, as shown in Figure 19, is designed to be simple, and yet powerful enough that every CA Soldier could memorize it and refer to it throughout his career and rely on it in difficult times. This call to arms speaks to both the internal and external audience of the CA Regiment. Internally, it implores CA soldiers to always strive to maintain a high state of readiness, especially given CA's deployment rates, the highest in the U.S. Army in the last decade, are likely to continue into the future. Internally, the creed signals to those who cannot maintain these standards that this CA may be not for them. To an external audience, the CA creed can be a recruiting tool to attract the right personnel for the CA mission, as well as an assessment guideline for the best-qualified recruits. The statement, "I accomplish my mission anytime, anywhere, and under any conditions" requires mental, physical, and emotional toughness, whereas "adapting and thriving in ambiguous environments" demands adaptive, mature critical thinkers in the Regiment's ranks. Lastly, to the external stakeholders, and to the Nation, the CA creed signifies a long-term commitment.

### **CA Creed**

I am a Civil Affairs Soldier, a professional on the cutting edge of war and peace.

I am an elite Warrior Diplomat, adapting and thriving in ambiguous complex environments.

I accomplish my mission anytime, anywhere, and under any conditions.

I am prepared to offer my expertise in all aspects of the human domain.

My mission's success will advance our national objectives.

Secure the Victory!

Figure 19. Prototype 2b Branding; CA Creed

### **3. Prototype 2c Branding; CA Historical Roots**

CA's rich history is more expansive than has been captured and represented to date. Currently, General Winfield Scott is regarded as the Father of CA, yet CA offers much more than the Military Governance (MG) capability historically traced to Scott. The design team offered a different perspective beyond General Winfield Scott's contributions. President Thomas Jefferson could be the Father of CA for his establishment of the Corps of Discovery to conduct CA-type activities. In addition, the design team highlighted three distinctive cases—Lewis and Clark, James Beckwourth and General Winfield Scott—to represent the breath and width of CA. Lewis, Clark and Beckwourth were specially selected, trained, linguistically and culturally astute civil scouts who effectively engaged the local populace; Scott successfully conducted MG.

#### ***a. Thomas Jefferson and the Corps of Discovery***

In 1803, President Thomas Jefferson commissioned the first U.S. expedition to the Pacific coast in order to explore the territory, make contact with indigenous nations and deny territorial claim to European powers through the projection of military and diplomatic force (Mullin, 2007). President Jefferson understood that the most effective way to establish legitimacy in this new territory was to build relationships with the inhabitants while mapping the physical and civil environment. The expedition was comprised of specially selected soldiers chosen from a pool of volunteers. CPT Meriwether Lewis and LT William Clark led the expedition, which became known as the Corps of Discovery. The team's core was comprised of 11 men, but expanded to 30 men, including officers, NCOs and enlisted soldiers, all coming from a variety of military and civilian backgrounds. Their common thread consisted of firmness of character, intellect, and skills as a frontiersman (Ambrose, 1996). The two-year expedition pushed the limits of adaptability and ingenuity, but through diplomacy and military prowess, Lewis and Clark established contact with numerous indigenous tribes, made countless scientific discoveries, and deterred Spanish invasion into U.S. territory. The highly skilled soldiers of the Corps of Discovery embodied the spirit of the CA Regiment. By mastering the civil environment, these soldiers became the eyes and ears of the nation. Their discoveries and the relationships they built informed U.S. policy and shaped the growth of the country.

According to Ambrose (1996), CPT Meriwether Lewis was chosen by President Jefferson to lead the expedition because

It was impossible to find a character who to a compleat science in botany, natural history, mineralogy & astronomy, joined the firmness of constitution & character, prudence, habits adapted to the woods & a familiarity with the Indian manners and character, requisite for this undertaking. (p. 76)

Thus, Jefferson proceeded to arrange for a year of specific scientific training for Lewis from some of the best-known scientists in the United States so that he would be equipped for some of the most academic challenges of the expeditions. His intent was for Lewis to carry the message that the tribes living in the Northwest had a new leader and for Lewis to highlight the technology of the time, while adding to the collective body of scientific knowledge.

***b. James Beckwourth***

James Beckwourth served as an Indian Scout, a guide, a frontiersman, and a mountain man in the early 19th century (Field, 2003). As a scout, he assisted the U.S. Army's westward expansion. As a guide, he discovered Beckwourth Pass facilitating the safe passage of civilians into California (Noy, 1999, p. 56). As a cultural expert, he negotiated treaties that ensured safe passage between the U.S. Army and various Native American tribes. Because of his cultural sensitivity and knowledge of his environment, he was uniquely suited to negotiate the civil and physical terrain associated with westward expansion. As a man born into slavery of mixed African-American and Caucasian ancestry, Beckwourth was later admitted into the Crow tribe (Gregson, 2005). His prowess on the battlefield and ability to understand the language and culture of the Crow earned him such respect that he was accepted within the tribe and elevated to chief. He spent his entire life bridging gaps between different ethnicities and cultures while reconciling various points of view.

***c. General Winfield Scott***

General Winfield Scott successfully conducted MG in Mexico in the 1840s. However, he was also in command of Indian removal at the execution of the Indian



Removal Act 10 years prior, commonly known as the Trail of Tears. The current CA brand suggests that CA's founding father was directly responsible for carrying out the most horrific population resource control activities conducted by the U.S. Army. See Figure 20.

## CA History


### CA's Father




Thomas Jefferson

## Three Cases

### Lewis & Clark



James  
Beckwourth



GEN. Winfield  
Scott

Figure 20. Prototype 2c Branding; CA History

## 4. Prototype 2d Branding; Unifying Symbols

### a. *Gray Beret*

Support for the gray beret was surprisingly unanimous among the design team members. The gray beret would distinguish the CA Regiment from support personnel in the U.S. Army who would wear the traditional maroon beret or no beret at all. There already exists a proposed set of flashes that could be adopted, but the color gray is significant in that it represents CA's ability to operate in the "gray area," or CA's

ambiguous and complex operational environments. In addition, the gray symbolizes the illumination of the dark spaces—unknown networks, ungoverned spaces, etc.—for military commanders conducting operations where the parameters of the mission may not be clearly defined. The team recommended the beret, only be awarded as an individual headgear following the completion of the CAQC, and *not* as a unit headgear, to symbolize the individual soldier’s qualification as a CA professional.

***b. Shoulder Sleeve Insignia***

Interestingly, the thirst for such a change is so strong within the CA Regiment that this insignia was produced long before the Design Thinking workshop. It is a prototyped solution to better represent who the members of the CA Regiment are and who they want to be.

- The Airborne Tab represents the airborne capability and status of the unit.
- The Shield symbolizes the Unit’s charter to protect and defend U.S. National interests abroad, and defend the civil populace of developing nations in war-torn countries in that populace’s darkest moments. The shield traces its lineage to the original 1st Special Operations Command, which later led to the design of the USACAPOC shoulder insignia.
- USASOC Arrowhead serves as the backdrop of the unit patch and signifies the regiment’s long-standing heritage and traditions with the U.S. Army Special Operations Forces.
- The Quill represents the Civil Affairs core task of bringing order and Governance to Nations crippled by war, conflict, and disaster.
- The Three Lightning Bolts represent Civil Affairs operations conducted on Land, at Sea (littoral), and from the Air (Airborne) in any environment in the world; they also commemorate the three campaign awards for the Unit’s service in Korea. The gold color of the lightning bolts denotes excellence.
- The V-42 Fairbairn-Sykes Dagger is symbolic of all Army Special Operations Forces, represents the lineage of Civil Affairs activities in SOF environments—permissive, semi-permissive, and non-permissive—across the globe, and denotes strength and honor.

***c. Crossed Peace Pipe Tomahawks for Branch Insignia and on Regimental Distinctive Insignia***

The consensus among the design team members was that the frontiersman better represents and embodies the spirit of future CA soldiers, and that the crossed tomahawks are a physical representation of that spirit. Tomahawks were a ubiquitous item from the early frontier history of America. Frontiersmen and Native Americans used tomahawks alike, and they originally came from English boarding axes that were used for trade. The tomahawk was a multifaceted item just as CA Soldiers are multi-capable soldiers. Specifically the pipe tomahawks were used as currency on the frontier as trade items and regarded as highly valued tools and commodities. The pipe tomahawk has a pipe bowl on one end, making it useful as a peace pipe; this represents CA's ability to engage in diplomacy. The sharp edge represents CA's ability as a tool to shape their environment, or when needed, perform as a weapon.

The idea of the pipe tomahawk as a symbol came from a former Special Operations Command (Forward) (SOC-FWD) commander who felt his efforts were failing because the military operated like hunters trying to chase down their prey. He believed that the frontiersman and the mountain man offered better methods. They were able to use their knowledge of the terrain to analyze and decide where their prey might be and to prepare themselves to catch that prey. He directed CA personnel to try to analyze the civil environment in a similar manner, to predict where problems might arise and develop solutions and effective responses before a crisis occurred.

***d. Regimental Crest***

For coherence among the new symbols, the design team replaced the former sword and scroll with the crossed peace pipe tomahawks. In addition, the design kept the torch due to its representation of illuminating the dark spaces where CA operates. All symbols are displayed in Figure 21.



Figure 21. Prototype 2d Branding; Unifying Symbols for the CA Regiment

## C. HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

Ideation for Human Resource Management (HRM) solutions yielded many new ideas as noted in Chapter IV. The subgroup on HRM, decided to create three prototypes to capture these idea: 3a Recruitment and Selection; 3b Training; and 3c Professionalization of CA.

### 1. Prototype 3a HRM; Recruitment and Selection

#### a. *Officer Recruitment and Selection*

In addition to a branch transfer, which is currently the only way for an officer to be accessed into CA, the design team examined commissioning sources—Officer Candidate School (OCS), Reserve Officer Training Course (ROTC), United States Military Academy (USMA)—as other possible accession opportunities for expanding recruitment. For this accession path from commissioning sources, personnel request entry into CA as 1LT/O-2. This path has an optional preparatory course designed to help prospective CA officers gain the required skills to successfully complete CAAS. Upon

successful completion of CAAS, individuals can pursue one of two routes: (1) they can be branch detailed to an Operations branch and transition to CA at the CPT rank, or (2) they can continue on to graduate school. The graduate school option entails a degree that CA pays for and is aligned with its desired skills. During graduate school, individuals must also serve in a RC unit to gain the necessary foundational skills prior to the CAQC. Common in both paths are airborne school, ARSOF Captains Career Course (CCC), and CA unit integration. Another notable change from the existing training pipeline is the completion of ARSOF CCC after the CAQC for AC personnel; the RC officers follow a different model.

Summary of the proposed changes (Figure 22, left side):

- Additional recruitment sources: ROTC, OCS, USMA
- Introduction of a preparatory course to prepare prospective CA recruits for CAAS
- Addition of Graduate school/Branch detail paths
- ARSOF CCC as a requirement *after* CAQC

***b. Enlisted Recruitment and Selection (38X)***

This prototype explored another recruitment path for enlisted personnel, called the 38X program, which is similar to the 18X program. This program aims to recruit college graduates who meet entrance requirements and want to enlist. Their path consists of basic training, airborne school, an optional CA preparatory course, CAAS, CAQC, and CA unit integration. The 38X prototype intends to increase the number in enlisted ranks with educated and mature personnel who are fit for CA.

Summary of the proposed changes (Figure 22, right side):

- Introduction of the 38X program to recruit college graduates for the enlisted ranks
- Introduction of a CA preparatory course to prepare prospective CA recruits for CAAS




Figure 22. Prototype 3a: CA Recruitment & Selection

## 2. Prototype 3b HRM; Training

Currently, due to the different paths available to those seeking to become CA (See Figure 11, Current Force Structure), CA is not producing the same baseline level of skills across the force, which has proven problematic. In Prototype 3b (Figure 23), baseline skills levels will be standardized across the components through a single selection and training pipeline to improve the value of the CA brand. Under this training model, RC personnel will go through the same qualification for the same amount of time as their AC counterparts. This four-phase training pipeline is designed to be completed either continuously or by modules. For example, if a RC soldier can allocate the time to attend the entire course, he will go straight through. On the other hand, if time does not permit, he will have two years to successfully complete all four phases and be awarded the MOS. In the event the individual does not complete it successfully within the given two-year period, he will have start over from the beginning. The assumption is, for an elite force, the committed recruits will make the time to complete the course.

In the training model prototype, the Civil Affairs Qualification Course (CAQC) includes (but is not limited to) the following modules:

- Language and cultural immersion (LREC)
- Civil Affairs core instruction (CR, NA, UW planning)
- Civil Information and Network analysis
- Negotiations
- FHA planning
- Human Performance and dynamics
- Operation Sluss-Tiller (OST) (Culminating Exercise)

Standardization will produce a common core of skills and provide a common experience. A common set of skills will reinforce the CA value. Currently, CA is the only branch with different standards between its RC and AC components, and yet its Soldiers are awarded the same MOS. Furthermore, the socialization and indoctrination process fostered through the common bonding experiences of training can help develop the individual-level bonds of trust and respect essential to improving the organizational culture in the Regiment.




Figure 23. Prototype 3b: CA Training

### 3.      **Prototype 3c HRM; Professionalization of CA**

Due the complexities and nuances inherent in human-centered affairs, CA practitioners frequently encounter unexpected situations and novel events. Therefore, the conduct of CAO requires critical analysis, reinforced with adaptive thinking by CA practitioners who are given more autonomy to devise innovative solutions that fit the environment. A descriptive comparison between a Branch and a Corps as shown in Figure 24 suggests that a Corps model is a better fit for CA. Following a Corps model, CA's civilian roots will also aid in its professionalization.

Prototype 3 HRM, *Professionalization of CA* entails the concept of creating the system to professionalize CA. CA meets the definition of professional work as far as it requires daily application of human judgment, application of theory to practice, etc. Typically, at minimum, the structure of a profession consists of a credentialing body to control entry, manage certification/licensure, monitor the conduct and merit of the practitioners, and maintain and disseminate the body of knowledge. Once it becomes a professional Corps, CA would interface with the U.S. Army in similar manner as other Corps, such as the Nurse Corps and Vet Corps. Figure 25 portrays the central role of the credentialing body—the CA Board, chaired by the CA commandant—in the career tracks for CA professionals. As a Civil-Military profession inherently has both Civil and Military aspects, members of the profession will be required to have a minimum amount of military experience, as well a minimum amount of civilian experience. Civilian credentials for CA professionals will come from undergraduate and graduate degrees in *Civil Affairs* and other disciplines related to the CA functional specialty areas (Figure 7). The *Civil Affairs* curricula will need to be jointly developed by CA proponenty and civilian universities. In addition to professionalizing CA forces, the processes that members go through in recruitment, selection, indoctrination, and socialization need to be established to forge a strong organizational identity and *esprit de corps*.



1. Seeks **Efficiency** first
2. "You develop me"
3. **Routine situations**
4. **Work** done by **all**
5. Little personal liability
6. SOPs; soft/hardware
7. Closely supervised
8. Externally imposed
9. Extrinsic motivations
10. A job

1. Seeks **Effectiveness** first
2. Accepts life-long learning
3. **New / Complex situations**
4. **Practice by professionals**
5. Unlimited personal liability
6. Invests in humans first
7. More autonomy
8. Maintain ethos, self-policed
9. Intrinsic motivations
10. A life-long “calling”

The diagram illustrates the IET recruitment process flow, starting from a recruit (IET COMPLETE) and moving through various stages: RESUME, UNIVERSITY APPLICATION FORM, ADMISSION, COMMON MIL TRAINING, and CERTIFICATION EXAM. The process involves a CA Board (Certification Board) and a CERTIFICATION BOARD, which are responsible for screening, approving, and monitoring the process. The process also includes a CONTROL phase and a final CERTIFICATION EXAM. The process is divided into two main tracks: WC (Warrant Officer) and ILE (Intermediate Level Ensign), each with its own CERTIFICATION BOARD and associated roles (WC, NCOES, ILE, NCOES). The process concludes with a final CERTIFICATION EXAM and a transition to the next stage (RA, USAR, CCC, NCOES).

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## **D. FORCE STRUCTURE**

The subgroup on Force Structure generated two prototypes: 4a. Team/Company Composition; and 4b Unified Command.

### **1. Prototype 4a Force Structure; Team/Company Composition**

As seen in Figure 26, the team/company prototype calls for an increase of the current team size by two personnel to address the problems of both analytical skills and operational autonomy. Such increase includes two 38Bs, one of whom with an F Additional Skill Identifier (ASI). This new ASI indicates completion of the Special Warfare Advanced Analysis and Targeting Course (SWAATC). Additionally, with its organic capacity increased to six, a CAT can potentially man two or more vehicles, which will lessen or alleviate its dependence on adjacent units for augmented manpower to meet force protection requirements to operate especially in semi- and non-permissive environments. Furthermore, at the CA company level, the CMOC will receive an additional 38B with an F ASI, and a CA warrant officer (380A). This 380A would replace the current CMOC deputy (38A O-3).

In the future, team size can be further expanded to eight, with the additions of a medic and a warrant officer. The increased team size will further improve the team's operational autonomy and the prospect of "owning" battle space.

This prototype also call for a CA Warrant Officer (WO) program that currently does not exist. A CA WO, as a technical expert, is expected to provide advanced analytical, mapping capabilities and working knowledge of Army information systems that enable information dissemination and sharing with JFCs and UAPs. A model for training and life cycle for the proposed CA WO program is shown in Figure 27.




Figure 26. Prototype 4a Force Structure; CA Team/Company Composition

### 380A CA WO Life Cycle Model




Figure 27. CA WO Life Cycle Mode

## **2. Prototype 4b Force Structure; Unified Command**

The current CA force structure—95th, 85th and USACAPOC(A) under three distinct chains of command—has contributed to degraded coordination between the three. Informal, or *ad hoc* communication, has been sporadic and heavily hamstrung by conflicting personalities and bureaucratic institutional constraints.

The restructuring will remove five one-star commands and one two-star command. This move is necessary to increase operational efficiency, enhance coordination, enforce common standards, flatten the organization, and remove bureaucratic roadblock. The headquarters will have the ability to reach down to any CA element for any operation as needed so that the force can go anywhere, anytime, under any conditions with minimal delay.

Within command elements, key billets, such as S-3, XO, and command teams would be dual-billet slots (AGR or AC). The CACOM would be a deployable element. Since the BDEs will be geographically aligned, units can be tasked to support ASCCs or TSOCs. JTF under SOCCOM will have special selection and recruitment to fill special missions. Special qualifications would be addressed by identifying one AC and one RC BN per BDE as airborne units in order to maintain airborne capability.

Option 1 (Figure 28) integrates multi-component personnel to the BDE level with three RC BNs and two AC BNs in each BDE. This option provides unified administrative functions at BDE and provides a quicker response to BN-size mission sets. Geographically aligned BDEs will be able to facilitate missions between AC and RC BNs. Concerns include maintaining the status quo for reserve readiness (culture, readiness, standards, etc.) and availability of RC personnel.





Figure 28. Prototype 4b Force Structure; Unified Multi-Component Command (Option 1)

Option 2 (Figure 29) adds multi-component personnel to the BN level with homogenous, integrated (AC/RC) COs as shown in Figure 28. This option provides uniformity of training and standards all the way to the CO level, increases the RC/AC interface of leadership and operations, and allows for mission sets to be managed and rotated between RC and AC at the BN level. However, inherent in this option are the challenges of managing administrative issues (e.g., evaluation, promotions, training, funding, finance) for both the AC and RC at the BN level. In addition, the availability of RC personnel to manage administrative systems at the BN level is a concern.



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## **VI. TESTING PHASE**

This chapter outlines the iterative and interactive process the design team followed to generate feedback on the prototypes. Feedback falls into three different waves. The first wave of testing occurred when peer sub-groups shared their low-resolution prototypes with other sub-groups. The next wave of testing came from discussants who had participated in the discovery phase during the NPS workshop. The authors and other members of the design team subsequently presented the prototypes to three groups in Fort Bragg—senior-level leaders, BN/CO-level leaders, and CAT-level leaders—to generate additional feedback from the force. To systematically capture the feedback during the Test phase, the design team members used quad-charts with four areas:

- What worked
- What could be improved
- Questions
- Ideas

Throughout this chapter, the sample feedback is presented in quad-charts with the corresponding prototype numbers to illustrate the evolution of the prototypes over time. Appendix E contains a number of refined prototypes, based on the feedback received during the Testing Phase.

### **A. FEEDBACK AMONG DESIGN TEAM SUB-GROUPS**

The first level of feedback was from within the sub-groups. Given their diverse backgrounds, the members in each of the three sub-groups collaborated on various prototypes, giving one another feedback while overcoming their own biases. The seasoned workshop facilitators guided the sub-groups through this process to develop fluency while ensuring forward progress. See Tables 4–7.

### 1. Feedback on Identity Prototype

The design team collaborated on the identity statement with its members giving one another feedback throughout the process.

Table 4. Identity Feedback from Peer-Groups

Identity	
What worked	What could be improved
1: Clear, concise and bold statement	1: Does not discuss building or breaking networks
1: Professionals and collaborative networks	1: Promotes US interests maybe offensive to HN
Questions	Ideas
1: How will this be adapted and enforced?	1: Need a simple message that clarifies US interest
1: Is this identity towards a specific audience?	1: Bridge Civ-Mil gap

### 2. Strategic Messaging and Branding

The Strategic Messaging and Branding sub-group (Table 5) received a great deal of feedback generated by these prototypes.

Table 5. Strategic Messaging and Branding Feedback from Peer-Groups

Strategic Messaging & Branding	
What worked	What could be improved
2a: Analyze complex systems	2c: In the Creed relook "losing the political OBJ"
2b: The Creed needs to address people skills	2d: Consider a darker color for the Gray beret to be distinctive from the Air Force's Gray beret (Combat Weathermen).
2c: Tying CA history back to the US Army	
2d: Beret and patch are essential to branding	
Questions	Ideas
2d: With the patch, is it suggested that all CA should be under USASOC?	2d: Switch the cross tomahawks to one pipe tomahawk and one hammer tomahawk.

### 3. Human Resource Management

Latent frustrations surfaced when the authors collected feedback on the Human Resource Management prototypes (Table 6), indicative of a problem area that requires serious examination for the CA Regiment.

Table 6. Human Resource Management Feedback from Peer-Groups

Human Resource Management	
What worked	What could be improved
3a: Great thinking to recruit from college	3b: A modular approach for RC to achieve one standard
3b: One standard, finally!	3c: Train with Industry
Questions	Ideas
3b: How much money is one training standard going to cost?	3c: Use a modular design to CA professionalization. Plug and play pieces to meet operational training

#### 4. Force Structure

Among the different prototypes under Force Structure (Table 7), the unified multi-component command concept was recognized by the design team members as likely to be the most contentious topic. However, they also recognized the need for optimized departmentation that would improve coordination, division of labor, and ultimately the overall readiness of the CA Regiment.

Table 7. Force Structure Feedback from Peer-Groups

Force Structure	
What worked	What could be improved
4b: Kept the Unified CMD regionally aligned	4b: Unified CMD needs to be flatter
4b: Unified CMD improves professional growth	4b: Link Unified CMD with ARFORGEN process
Questions	Ideas
4b: Does the Unified CMD (multi-Comp) deploy?	4b: Have a path to grow CA professionals outside the CMD track

## B. FEEDBACK FROM DESIGN WORKSHOP DISCUSSANTS

### 1. Feedback from Senior-Level Officer with a Strategic Perspective

As an influential voice of an external stakeholder with a strategic perspective, a senior-level officer who provides candid feedback has input that merits attention (Table 8). He recognizes the strategic value of CA, especially its critical role in influencing the relevant populations across the range of military operations. He also recognizes the generational gap that up-and-coming CA leaders will need to bridge and overcome in order to further the Regiment.

Table 8. Feedback from Senior-Level Officer with a Strategic Perspective

General Feedback	
What worked	What could be improved
1: The essence of the identity was spot on	1: Be bolder, do not let your past dictate your future
3c: CA professionalization	4b: In option 2, having two AC companies serve as cadre for the RC companies will improve RC skill levels; reexamine to see if it is possible administratively and logistically with the different funding lines (P2 vs. P11)
3b: Having the same baseline skills is critical to success	4b: For the unified CMD prototype, if CA wants to have a seat at the table, it needs to be under USASOC
Questions	Ideas
	2a: As the new generation of leaders, the future begins right here; design a viable strategic message that every one can stay on
	2a: CA is critical to the "Art of the Possible" ie. influence; embrace CA's strength and core competencies; do not waste effort trying to become SF-like

## 2. Other Feedback from NPS Design Workshop Discussants

The feedback from a mix of CA and non-CA, military and civilian personnel with whom the design team previously engaged during the Discovery Phase provided the last round of input for prototype refinement during the four-day Design Thinking workshop at NPS. It is important to note that the CA identity statement appeared to resonate the most with all discussants, especially the members of the Regiment. See Tables 9–12.

### a. Identity

Table 9 shows the feedback from the NPS discussants to the Identity prototypes.

Table 9. Identity Feedback from NPS Discussants

Identity	
What worked	What could be improved
1: A clear statement	1: Look for a better, bolder tagline
Questions	Ideas
1: Is the CA branch focused on Special Warfare?	1: Masters for the Civ-Mil Domain

***b. Strategic Messaging and Branding***

Table 10 shows the feedback from the NPS discussants to the Strategic Messaging and Branding prototypes.

Table 10. Strategic Messaging and Branding Feedback from NPS Discussants

Strategic Messaging & Branding	
What worked	What could be improved
2a: Strategic Messaging; more refinement needed	2d: Brand refinement; consider internal vs external stakeholder
2b: The CA creed is outstanding	2d: Build upon the beret and consider a tab or a special shoulder sleeve qualification insignia
2c: The new history is sound; Beckwourth fits well	2d: Civilian may not understand the crossed tomahawks
2d: Beret and patch concepts are great ideas	
Questions	Ideas
2c: Is CA history integrating the old or is it different?	2d: Is "Secure the Victory" is it the right motto for the Regiment or does it make CA an post operation force?
2d: Is the beret unit specific or by MOS?	

***c. Human Resource Management***

Table 11 shows the feedback from the NPS discussants to the Human Resource Management prototypes.

Table 11. Human Resource Management Feedback from NPS Discussants

Human Resource Management	
What worked	What could be improved
3a: Everyone goes through the same selection	3b: 18 months for training is too long
3b: One common foundation	3c: Training with Industry
Questions	Ideas
3a: Is ROTC too early to recruit for CA?	3b: Move RC CA to the NG, it may be a better fit
3b: Would OST still be part of CAQC?	3b: SNA needs to be added to CAQC
3c: Who would be on this CA Board?	3c: SSDCO replaces Senior Leaders Course

***d. Force Structure***

Table 12 shows the feedback from the NPS discussants to the Force Structure prototypes.

Table 12. Force Structure Feedback from NPS Discussants

Force Structure	
What worked	What could be improved
4a: Increasing the CA team size & analytical skills	4b: Explain better how this benefits the TSOCs
4a: Having a WO position is critical	4b: Develop C2 lines of support for the Unified CMD
Questions	Ideas
4b: Where is the 38G in the Unified CMD?	4b: Locate IMMSG at the BDE level in the Unified CMD
4b: Who commands in the Unified CMD?	4b: Ensure the HQs is deployable in the Unified CMD

### C. FEEDBACK FROM THE CA REGIMENT

To reach the widest audience, the authors chose Fort Bragg, NC—the home station for the majority of the participating organizations: 1st SWTG(A), 95th CA BDE(A), USACAPOC(A), IMMSG—as the location for the feedback sessions with the Regimental members. VTC and regular phone conference capabilities also enabled personnel from the outstations to dial in during or after the feedback sessions to provide their feedback.

#### 1. Senior-Level Leaders

Overall, the senior-level leaders expressed their overwhelming support of this capstone, as all recognized the many ongoing challenges facing the Regiment (Table 13). The feedback session in Fort Bragg, NC also served as a forum for senior leadership of the different organizations to share their opinions, ideas, and perspectives on the relevant topics of discussion.

Table 13. General Feedback from Senior-Level Leaders

General Feedback	
What worked	What could be improved
Overarching effort is sound	Widen sample of discussants, broader mix of officers & NCOs
Collaborative efforts by different organizations	More feedback from external stakeholders needed
Questions	Ideas
Who's going to carry on this capstone?	Future NPS students can have research topics assigned to benefit the branch

**a. Identity**

The CA identity statement received positive feedback from senior leadership (Table 14). Further refinement of the tagline was encouraged, with some differing opinions over the balance of “Who we are” vs. “Who we need to be in 2025” to be reflected in the statement. In addition, there are some concerns of potential confusions or ambiguities over the concept of Human Domain yet to be officially adopted in doctrine.

Table 14. Identity Feedback from Senior-Level Leaders

Identity	
What worked	What could be improved
1: Identity statement accurately represents the Regiment; tag line may need some work	1: Expert in the tag line implies already attained mastery
Questions	Ideas
1: Human Domain not commonly defined	1: Use INF as template; core identity complemented by additional specialties (ABN, AASLT, RGR, MTN, MECH)
	1: Who we are vs. who we support

**b. Strategic Messaging and Branding**

One salient question arose in the discussion among senior leaders on strategic messaging, “Do RC and AC need/have the same capabilities?” (Table 15). In doctrine, both components share many functions and capabilities, with the exception of LREC capability only maintained in the AC, and functional specialty cells only existing in the RC (FM 3-24, 2014, pp. 2-1–2-31). Many senior leaders asserted that the roles of CA in Phase-0 and UW need to be expanded and highlighted, given the contemporary and future global security environments. Others urged the group to focus on the needs of the Army and the Nation in designing CA for 2025, a point well received by the authors as it resonates with the purpose of this capstone.

The CA creed received unanimous support from the senior leadership, indicating a latent need of the Regiment. Similarly, the revised CA’s history proposed by the design team—with the introduction of Thomas Jefferson, Lewis & Clark, James Beckwourth—received broad support from the group.

Table 15. Strategic Messaging and Branding Feedback from Senior-Level Leaders

Strategic Messaging & Branding	
What worked	What could be improved
2a: "Why CA is important", "Shaping Options" and CA Methods received overall concurrence	2a: No mentioning of LREC
2b: The CA creed received unanimous support	2a: Add mission command
2c: Revised history of CA; needs to be expanded	2a: Add negotiation to skillsets
	2a: Add planning expertise
	2a: Add Stability Ops & Interagency cooperation
	2a: Capabilities for both RC & AC need to be identified up front to ensure both are reflected adequately in the strategic message
	2a: Focus on operational capabilities; start with the need of the Army & Nation
	2d: Gray beret is not necessary
	2d: The tomahawks are too war-like as symbols
Questions	Ideas
2a: Do RC and AC need the same capabilities?	2a: Explore CA function in UW
	2a: Harness & integrate networks
	2a: Phase-0 activities
	2a: Provide options tuned to current requirements
	2d: A CA or CIMIC patch of tab

*c. Human Resource Management*

The discussion on one vs. multiple training standards was relatively muted. A few senior leaders contended that having one training standard is necessary to improve the quality within the Regiment. Others raised the same question, “Do RC and AC need the same skills levels?” and suggested a lower baseline level of skills for the RC (Table 16).

Table 16. Human Resource Management Feedback from Senior-Level Leaders

Human Resource Management	
What worked	What could be improved
3b: One training standard is necessary to improve the quality of the Regiment	3a: WO not necessary at the CAT level
3a: 38X provides a viable option	
Questions	Ideas
3a: What benefits are there to have an accession branch? (tradeoff between number vs. maturity)	3a: WLC as Prep Course
3b: Do RC & AC need the same skills/levels?	3b: 38G as an ASI
3c: Is professionalization what's required or is improvement/revision of the branch more appropriate?	3b: Advanced training to improve and certify CA planning capability at ASCC/GCC level



**d. Force Structure**

While improved coordination was an attractive characteristic, the losses of one-star billets under the proposed unified command structure were raised as significant impediments to CA engagement at the GCC level. The crossing of P2 and P11 funding in a multi-component command would be another significant challenge requiring detailed feasibility analysis. The idea of bringing CA back under USASOC was mentioned as a potential solution. In addition, senior leaders appeared very receptive to the idea of the Warrant Officer program, though some shared the concern about potential depletion of the senior NCO ranks as a result (Table 17).

Table 17. Force Structure Feedback from Senior-Level Leaders

Force Structure	
What worked	What could be improved
4a: WO program	4a: Potential depletion of senior NCOs for WO program
4b: Improved coordination under unified command	4b: BG billets are necessary at GCC level
	4b: Crossing of P2 & P11 funding
Questions	Ideas
4b: Where will the proposed unified CACOM be assigned (OPCON)?	4a: Choose a different ASI instead of F for analyst
4b: Size of the force under the proposed unified structure?	4a: Focus on functions; do not try to become SF-like
	4a: SWAATC & OSINT quals
	4b: Bring CA back under USASOC
	4b: Use a different name instead of CACOM

**2. Battalion- and Company-level Leaders**

Much like the senior-level group, BN/CO-level leaders were enthusiastic about the collaborative efforts by the Regiment as they also recognized its challenges. By design, the focus for BN/CO-level discussion shifted more toward the operational level (Table 18).

Table 18. General Feedback from BN/CO-Level Leaders

General Feedback	
What worked	What could be improved
Collaborative approach	More input from external stakeholders
Dialogue among the different organizations	
Questions	Ideas
Who's going to implement the proposed prototypes?	The ultimate goal for 2025 should be to unify the components of CA

*a. Identity*

Even though the leaders from this group agreed on the necessity for a common CA identity statement, there were varying ideas on the tag line, or the title (Table 19). Some apprehension with claiming titles, such as “Master” or “Expert” originated from the underlying perceived trend of CA over-promising but under-delivering by external stakeholders. Some leaders proposed that CA personnel improve its capabilities first before claiming mastery or expertise, while others recognized the aspirational aspect of the identity statement, i.e., what the Regiment needs to be in 2025.

Table 19. Identity Feedback from BN/CO-Level Leaders

Identity	
What worked	What could be improved
1: Identity statement	1: A consensus on the tag line
Questions	Ideas
1: Oversell and under-deliver with "Expert" claim?	1: Civil Scout, Student of the Human Domain, "Winning the war without even going to battle," "Identifies, Engages, and Influences relevant stakeholders" as ideas for tag line

***b. Strategic Messaging and Branding***

The CA creed generated a lot of positive feedback and received overwhelming support from almost the entire group. The BN/CO-level leaders also expressed support for the revised history of CA and wanted to see it developed further. Additionally, the branding symbols e.g., crossed tomahawks and the proposed unit patch received favorable response from the group, with some leaders contending that the proposed symbols better represent the Regiment (Table 20).

Table 20. Strategic Messaging and Branding Feedback from BN/CO-Level Leaders

Strategic Messaging & Branding	
What worked	What could be improved
2d: Crossed tomahawks	2a: Add Mission Command
2b: CA creed	2a: UW as opportunity; expand
2c: Revised History of CA	2c: Expand History of CA
2d: The proposed unit patch	
Questions	Ideas
	2a: Add what CA does to the lexicon
	2a: CA representation at strategic level to engage the interagency
	2a: Deployable BN-level JCMOTF
	2a: Focus on core competencies

***c. Human Resource Management***

Having one training standard was one of the dominant topics of discussion as the link between skills levels and operational/tactical successes was more readily observed by the BN/CO-level leaders (Table 21). Many recognized the need for professionalization of the force and advocated for more options for CA personnel to pursue undergraduate and graduate degrees. Some, however, found the CA professionalization prototype too complex for implementation, since it clearly required much more detailed feasibility analysis. The idea of expanding recruitment to ROTC received positive feedback, whereas there was more apprehension about the 38X program due to the potentially lack of experience and maturity of X personnel.

Table 21. Human Resource Management Feedback from BN/CO-Level Leaders

Human Resource Management	
What worked	What could be improved
3a: Recruitment from ROTC	3a: Direct accession problematic
3b: One training standard	3c: Professionalization model too complex
Questions	Ideas
	3a: Develop the right AC/RC mix to meet operational requirements
	3c: Undergraduate and graduate degrees for CA personnel

**d. Force Structure**

The struggle to increase CA’s operational autonomy, as experienced or observed by the BN/CO-level leaders, manifested in the broad support for the prototyped solution to increase CAT size to 8, as well as the concept of scalable C2 in joint environment (Table 22). Some expressed concern, however, that 8-person size might be too large and consequently reduce the overall number of units of action.

The proposed Warrant Officer program received very positive feedback. It is important to note that there was another ongoing effort in the Regiment to advocate for a CA Warrant Officer program, as it was revealed to the authors during the feedback session. Recognizing the critical gaps in technical expertise, institutional knowledge, and operational-level planning during rapid expansion of the CA Regiment, Matelski, Grez and Ludwick (2015) propose, in their concept paper titled *Bridging the Technical Capabilities Gap: CA Warrant Officers*, the implementation of a CA Warrant Officer program in order to “adequately retain and invest in the experience and education of [CA] Soldier” (pp. 2–3).

Table 22. Force Structure Feedback from BN/CO-Level Leaders

Force Structure	
What worked	What could be improved
4a: Increased size of CAT to 8; scalable C2 and increased operational autonomy	4b: Retain the CACOMs and align them with the GCCs
4a: WO program	
4b: Unified command under USASOC	
Questions	Ideas
4a: 8-person team possibly too large	4a: WOs in CIM Cells
	4b: All CA should be under unified command under GPF
	4b: Improve interoperability between RC and AC through training & deployments

### 3. Team-level leaders

The CAT-level leaders displayed an encouraging level of enthusiasm during the feedback session (Table 23). Candid discussions demonstrated the strong drive in the younger generation to be proactive in meeting the Regiment’s ongoing challenges. They welcomed dialogue and discussions to discuss the future of the Regiment. As they also recognized the many challenges facing the Regiment, there was a clear desire for change. A question from the group, voiced a few times, was “Will senior leadership listen to what we have to say?”

Table 23. General Feedback from CAT-Level Leaders

General Feedback	
What worked	What could be improved
Dialogue and discussions within the Regiment	Video record of the session to ensure all feedback was captured
	Expand the pool of discussants to include new CAQC graduates
Questions	Ideas
Will CA senior leadership listen to CAT-level feedback?	More dialogue, discussions within the Regiment to share information, ideas, discuss Regimental challenges, and improve Regimental culture

**a. Identity**

As one of the CAT-level leaders correctly observed, the CA identity statement speaks to both internal and external stakeholders (Table 24). The concern about the Human Domain not yet defined/adopted in doctrine also was raised in this group, potentially leading to ambiguities to external stakeholders who might have different conceptual understanding of such term.

Table 24. Identity Feedback from CAT-Level Leaders

Identity	
What worked	What could be improved
1: The identity statement speaks to both internal and external stakeholders	1: "Human Domain" too vague
Questions	Ideas
1: What skills are required to be "Experts in the Human Domain"?	1: Consistent identity statement based on capabilities

**b. Strategic Messaging and Branding**

The branding symbols appeared to resonate the most with the younger generation. A leader shared with the group that based on his past literature review on symbolism, hats are the most noticeable symbols; the gray beret therefore will be a powerful symbol to implement for branding. Other branding symbols also received very positive feedback from the group (Table 24).

However, some members of the group cautioned that the proposal for the new head gear would need to be framed carefully to avoid being misconstrued as CA's desire to be "special" or SF-like.

Table 25. Strategic Messaging and Branding Feedback from CAT-Level Leaders

Strategic Messaging & Branding	
What worked	What could be improved
2d: Proposed symbols (beret, patch, insignia)	2a: CA role in UW
2a: Clear strategic message to external stakeholders to define what CA does	2a: Add Mission Command
2b: "Warrior Diplomat" is a powerful title	2a: More accurate description of actual LREC level (1/1 min is merely familiarity)
2d: Branding with the proposed symbols	2a: Shaping options need elaboration
2d: Gray beret; hats the most noticeable in terms of symbolism	2d: A way to reconcile different unit patches
2d: The proposed patch better represents CA	2d: Lighting rod too SF-like
	2d: More coherency/congruence in terms of color scheme for the symbols; align with CA creed
	2d: The gray beret needs to be framed properly to avoid misrepresentation
Questions	Ideas
2b: Diplomat a confusing/misleading title to DoS?	2a: "Legitimize partner governing body" vs. "HN government"
	2a: Distinguish CMO and CAO
	2b: "Expert in the Civ-Mil Domain"
	2b: Forefront vs. cutting edge

**c. Human Resource Management**

In addition to voicing their opinions regarding the necessity for the one training pipeline in order to standardize baseline skill levels, the CAT-level leaders also recognized that the Regiment needs to improve its existing core competencies, to include the functional specialties, in order to maintain an edge over the competition (e.g., HTS). The CA professionalization prototype also generated a lot of interests, at the same time drew criticisms for its complexity and potential high costs.

Compared to the two previous, more senior groups, the feedback from the CAT-level leaders to the 38X was significantly more negative (Table 26). Lack of maturity and Army experience were cited as the primary reasons, however in a much more emotionally charged manner, since these leaders would be the first ones dealing with such potential problems. They maintained the position that the costs of the 38X program would outweigh its benefits.

Table 26. Human Resource Management Feedback from CAT-Level Leaders

Human Resource Management	
What worked	What could be improved
3b: One training standard/One training pipeline	3c: Profesionalization model unrealistic; unclear
3c: Education at public/private institutions	3a: 38X costs will outweigh benefits; problematic
	3a: Lack of maturity and Army experience for 38X
	3b: More detailed costs vs. benefits analysis needed for the single training pipeline to receive RC buy-in
Questions	Ideas
3c: What civilian education will be required for E-8 and O-5 levels?	3a: RC needs better recruitment
3c: Costs of the profesionalization model?	3a: Rotate RC junior officers into BN/BDE-level staff
3c: Buy-in from RC to implement the profesionalization model?	3b: Improve existing core competencies to maintain an edge over potential competition (HTT, PRT, etc)
	3b: RC soldiers not intended to meet the same standard as AC; a feasible level of skill levels needs to be
	3c: Develop non-command track for CA officers
	3c: Fix the functional specialties
	3c: Obtain civilian credentials

*d. Force Structure*

There was a strong desire in the “younger generation” present during the feedback session to unify the Regiment, under USASOC or FORSCOM (Table 27). Many understood that a predicate for the unified multi-component force structure prototype would be one training standard. Some were skeptical about the benefits of cross-training between the RC and AC companies, with the exception of annual training, since RC trains on the weekends whereas AC mostly trains on week days.

The team composition prototype generated significant feedback. The proposed increase in team size, advised by a few in the audience, needs to take into consideration the systemic shortages in medic-qualified personnel (68Y, 38BW4). Others cautioned about using F as the ASI for the analyst, since it may be misconstrued for HUMINT analysts on SF teams. One potential solution, as ideated by the group, is to fill that capabilities gap with 35B personnel.



Table 27. Force Structure Feedback from CAT-Level Leaders

Force Structure	
What worked	What could be improved
4b: Unified command under USASOC	4a: A different ASI instead of F; potentially misconstrued for HUMINT
	4a: Consideration for current 68W shortage
	4a: Benefits from cross-training between RC & AC in a multi-compo unit minimal (weekend vs. weekday schedules)
	4a: Feasibility assessment of costs and mobilization requirements for RC to fill the proposed 60% under the unified command structure
Questions	Ideas
4b: One standard the predicate for unified command?	4a: E-8 as TM SGT to maintain experience longer on the TM; E-9 as CO SGM
4b: Mix of AGR/AC command billets?	4a: 35B on loan instead of 38F?
4b: Parent organization? (1st SFC, USASOC, FORSCOM)	4a: WO for UW
	4a: RC cross-training with AC during Annual Training

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## VII. RECOMMENDED NEXT STEPS AND FINAL THOUGHTS

*This is a golden opportunity. Don't worry about hurt feelings and our past. Focus on our community and its future.*

—A senior CA leader

This chapter offers a roadmap for the strategic design of CA in 2025, a plan for managing group prototypes, a recommended pathway of implementation through the Regimental Council, and future Design Thinking workshops to refine CA's 2025 strategic design. Implementation of these efforts requires dedicated and sustained leadership in CA and the Army system in which CA is embedded. The chapter ends with the authors' thoughts and recommendations about Design Thinking and CA 2025.

### A. PROPOSED ROADMAP

The proposed roadmap in Figure 30 for the strategic design of CA recommends an order of prototype implementation with accompanying leadership (shown in blue) needed to facilitate the process. The prototypes are organized under four groups: Identity, Strategic Messaging and Branding, Human Resource Management, and Force Structure. The prototypes emerged from problem identification and ideation in Chapter IV, low-resolution concepts and ideas in Chapter V, and were tested and refined in Chapter VI. These prototypes are the tangible results of this capstone project. The design team recommends an order of their implementation so each prototype can build on the foundation of the others one step at a time.




Figure 30. CA 2025 Proposed Roadmap

Implementing and managing this organizational change process will be challenging. First, CA must internalize its newly defined identity and begin to act on it through branding and strategic messaging. Branding will reinforce this new identity as it is expressed in the new creed, a revitalized history, and new symbols. Building on these advances, CA is better positioned to communicate with its stakeholders with one voice and a consistent strategic message. These three actions will help leaders strengthen the common organizational identity across the Regiment.

Next in the change process are the HRM prototypes of recruitment, selection, and training. All are critical in standardizing CA skill sets across the force so that stakeholders can reliably depend on a team's capabilities regardless of its component or unit designation. As discussed in Chapter V, these three prototypes will be implemented for both AC and RC as ongoing efforts to rebuild the CA brand. Leveraging CA's new brand power will likely increase recruitment, particularly through the proposed recruiting mechanisms, Army commissioning sources, branch transfers, and the 38X program.

Numbers will increase initially due to more recruiting options, but CAAS will allow only those with the key CA attributes to begin their training. Subsequent training in CAQC will determine who has the required knowledge, skills, and abilities to move forward and join the Regiment. These steps require CA leadership to make some hard choices for the betterment of the Regiment, potentially impacting funding allocations, organizational structure, and organizational culture. In addition, consolidating recruitment, selection and training into one standard will challenge leaders to build a consensus among the different organizations. Such leaders likely will have to assume political risks to bridge the deep divides within the current CA Regiment.

Within the change process, professionalizing the force requires a paradigm shift: from CA as a branch in the U.S. Army to CA as a Corps more in line with a specialty branch.<sup>19</sup> A shift of Regimental control from the CA Commandant to a CA Board (Figure 25, Chapter V) integrates a multi-disciplinary quality assurance mechanism to screen out the unfit. In addition, the CA professionalization prototype entails selecting partner universities to develop CA-specific curricula, establishing credentialing criteria, and interacting with the Army systems for DOTMLPF-P<sup>20</sup> requirements.

The last proposed step in the change process pertains to the force structure, arguably the most politically contentious prototype to implement since the proposed changes include removal of four one-star billets. The most expensive of the force structure change proposals and the most difficult, it requires a functional multi-component organization that can execute daily tasks, administrative tasks, training, and operational deployments. However, the short- to long-term benefits will include improved coordination, cooperation, and division of labor that will improve interoperability and contribute to the Regiment's overall readiness, organizational culture, and strategic relevance.

In sum, maturing the force requires leaders to change the institutional norms, transform both the CA Regiment and how it interacts with its stakeholders, improve

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<sup>19</sup> Current specialty branches include the Judge Advocate General (JAG) Corps, the Medical Corps, and the Chaplaincy Corps.

<sup>20</sup> Doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities and policy.

existing core competencies to ensure the Regiment's strategic relevance, and develop new capabilities for a dramatically changing environment. Such leaders are rare, and yet the Regiment needs them now to assist in implementing this proposed strategic design.

## **B. MANAGING PROTOTYPES**

### **1. Proposed Plan**

During the feedback session with the CA Regiment at Fort Bragg, N.C., the authors presented the prototypes, along with the list of recommended sponsors for each of them as seen in Table 28. This request for sponsorship received a variety of responses: praises that guides and mentors were seen as critical in the change process; offers to open access to information and contacts; and request for higher resolution prototypes before implementation could be launched. But beyond these general statements, there was virtually no further public commitment from the Regiment, suggesting some senior- and mid-leader apprehension in support of the changes. Although this tepid response may imply concern about the project's political risks, the authors were encouraged by the strong positive responses among the many leaders both inside and outside the Regiment who privately expressed their strong interests and support for the capstone project. A gradual consensus appears to be building that change is needed and in the authors' view some people are just more willing and ready to support it. As one design team exclaimed, "This opportunity only comes around once in a lifetime and I want to make sure that I leave a legacy for the CA community."

Table 28. Management of Group Prototypes

Theme	Number	Prototype	Project Description	Recommended Sponsor	Recommended Time Frame	Supporting Documentation
Identity	1	CA Identity	CA Identity		3 months	Sandler (1994), Kimmey (2005)
Strategic Messaging & Branding	2a	Strategic Messaging	One Voice	CA Commandant	2 year	Hicks & Wormuth (2009), Van Roosen (2009), Danfield & Bleakley (2012), Dainels & Foster (2014)
	2b	CA Creed			6 months	
	2c	CA History			6 months	
	2d	Unifying Symbols	CA Brand		1 year	
Human Resource Management	3a	Recruitment & Selection	Improve the Ranks	SORB	3 years	Malik (2009)
	3b	Training	Common Training Pathway	1st SWTG (A)	4 years	CBA, JROC 162-11
	3c	Professionalization of CA	The Profession	IMSG	8 years	Warmack, Chagaris & Vacha (2013)
Force Structure	4a	Team/Company Composition	Building Blocks	Force Modernization	9 years	CBA, JROC 162-11, Sisk (2009)
	4b	Unified Command	One House	USACAPOC (A), 95th CA BDE (A), 85th CA BDE	10 years	CBA, JROC 162-11, Storey (2012), Ferry & Romero (2013), Walsh (2013), Little (2013)

## 2. Updates on Implementation

The Branding prototypes are in the initial phases of implementation. Future updates on implementation will be maintained on the Civil Affairs 2025 Design online community page on the All Partners Access Network (APAN) at <https://community.apan.org/ca2025design/default.aspx>.

### a. *Prototype 2b Branding; CA Creed*

Due to the overwhelming support for the CA creed, the commandant requested it for action. Such action entails presenting both versions of the creed (see Figures 17 and 47) to his staff for their recommended changes through the Army channels.

### b. *Prototype 2c Branding; Unifying Symbols*

The Civil Affairs Qualification Course (CAQC) recognizes students' excellence with recommend symbols. Current, honor graduates receive a tomahawk from 3rd BN, 1st SWTG (A), which signifies the Soldier with highest GPA during the course and his or her ability to show a high degree of promise in CA. The coveted tomahawk comes with the following citation:

The tomahawk for Civil Affairs traces its lineage to the United States expansion westward when personnel like Lewis and Clark and James Beckwourth were hand selected for their skill to assist in obtaining access

for the eventual expansion to come. The tomahawk is the choice between war and peace; it represents the ability shape and builds the environment through its use a tool. The sharpened edge represents the ability to degrade and exploit through its use as a weapon, and the pipe bowl the ability to promote diplomacy or peace when objectives have been reached. This same spirit still embodies the role of Civil Affairs within Special Warfare. (M. Finnegan, personal communication, May 15, 2015)

## **C. RECOMMENDED PATHWAY**

### **1. Regimental Council**

A recommended way ahead came from a Regimental leader. During a phone feedback session, an experienced senior-level CA officer offered the authors a vehicle to guide implementation. “You guys [the authors] have done a lot of great work and taken this deep issue to a higher level,” he remarked, “Let the Regiment help you move this idea forward.” He proposed establishing a Council of Colonels for senior leaders from all organizations within CA Regiment to assemble on a monthly or quarterly basis. In these meetings, the senior leadership would confer on the Regiment’s challenges and collaborate on solutions for implementation within the Regiment or through the Army’s change process. One change the authors would add to his proposal is the representation from senior NCOs to this Regimental Council. In the authors’ experiences, NCOs are often overlooked and yet constitute a powerful driver in the change process.

### **2. The Next Design Thinking Workshop**

The authors recommend a second iteration of the CA 2025 Design Thinking workshop, with a focus on the external stakeholders who no doubt will view CA’s strategic design with a different set of lenses to view and refine the prototypes. During the first iteration of the Design Thinking workshop, the authors and the design team members recognized the value of the discussions with non-CA personnel during the Discovery phase. Some senior-level feedback affirmed the design team’s observation; there is a difference between how the Regiment views itself and how others view it. The second iteration of the Design Thinking workshop should aim to: (1) examine CA’s strategic design from external stakeholder perspective, (2) design a plan to bridge any gap between the external and internal stakeholder perspectives and modify the prototypes as



appropriate, (3) design a Regimental succession plan to develop the leadership needed for the transformation process, and (4) institutionalize Design Thinking Methodology as an organic planning capability within the Regiment to generate innovative solutions on an ongoing basis for complex problems.

The authors recommend that the proposed Regimental Council provide the sponsorship for future Design Thinking workshops in order to foster a culture of collaboration and innovation within the CA community.

#### **D. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS**

*Change requires true leadership, social entrepreneurs, and sponsors... So go find committed sponsors and leaders to protect your entrepreneurship and you will have a chance at lasting change!*

—Dr. Nancy Roberts,  
Design Thinking workshop organizer

After 14 years of war, General Raymond T. Odierno, Army Chief of Staff, and John M. McHugh, Secretary of the Army, (2015) recognize that the U.S. Army is at an inflection point in the face of the new fiscal reality and an increasingly complex security environment (p. 2). The CA Regiment has its own inflection point, after ten years of rapid growth following CA's designation as a branch in the U.S. Army of 2006. In addition to the successes it has achieved, and the recognition it has received from JFCs, COMs, and UAPs for its integral role in proactive engagement to advance U.S. interests, the CA Regiment continues to face many challenges. As the Army evolves and changes in response to the dynamic global security environment, so too must CA. The aim of this capstone has been to assist CA in strategically redesigning itself for the future.

Design Thinking was a suitable and useful method for two mid-level officers who sought to launch a bottom-up change effort to transform the CA Regiment. The five steps in Design Thinking methodology are simple and intuitive, and yet can be applied to a complex design or change effort, such as CA 2025. Its collaborative, multi-disciplinary approach, with a bias towards action and prototyping, enabled the authors and the design team to achieve significant progress in short amount of time. It was a process of learning

and evolving for the authors and many of the design team members, particularly during the Discovery phase. It broadened their understanding of the ongoing challenges facing the Regiment, and enabled them to overcome their own biases, open up to different perspectives, and to create innovative solutions to benefit the entire Regiment.

The authors recognize that many challenges remain ahead for CA's 2025 strategic design. The transition from rough prototypes to implementable action plans requires much more refinement and ongoing collaborative efforts. A dedicated design team and continued support from committed sponsors are needed to carry CA 2025 forward. However, the authors are optimistic about the future. Despite the frustrations, angst, and distrust members of the CA Regiment have expressed, the authors also heard expressions of commitment and belief in the CA mission and its future. There is a strong sense of pride in what the Regiment has achieved especially in the last 14 years of conflict. There is also a strong sense of hope among the younger members of the CA Regiment, who want to be a part of a CA Regiment that is well selected, trained, educated, and led in order to effectively deliver CA's unique capability in the human domain. CA's transformation to become a force of the future requires the collective effort of the entire Regiment; this capstone is merely the beginning of the effort.

## **APPENDIX A. PRE-WORKSHOP ARCHIVAL RECORD**

### **A. CA LINEAGE: DEVELOPMENT OF A CIVIL-MILITARY ENTERPRISE**

After the Continental Congress sensed an opportunity for rebellion against the British among the French Canadians, the Continental Army conducted its first MG and CA activities with the invasion of Quebec, Canada in 1775. Following the death of Continental Army General Montgomery during a failed assault on Quebec City, General David Wooster assumed command of the expedition and—through his reckless disregard for local traditions—managed to alienate the local populace. Despite the Continental Congress’s attempt to salvage the misadministration of MG under General Wooster by dispatching a diplomatic team headed by Benjamin Franklin to Montreal, the situation deteriorated beyond repair, resulting in the withdrawal of American troops from Quebec (Sandler, 1994, pp. 1–2). A successful implementation of MG by the U.S. Army was not realized until General Winfield Scott assumed control of territory during the Mexican War. On February 20, 1847, General Scott issued the bi-lingual General Order No. 20 governing the conduct of U.S. forces and Mexicans under U.S. jurisdiction in Vera Cruz. The order marked the first use of the term Military Government. Intent on preserving the local administrative system, Scott extended full honors to the capitulating Mexican army, local magistrates and clergy. After turning over control of the Vera Cruz MG to Brigadier General William Worth, Scott marched on to establish similarly successful MGs in Tampico, Puebla and Mexico city (Sandler, 1994, pp. 35–40).

Post-Civil War reconstruction saw MG enacted differently under different Military Governors. While Major General Benjamin F. Butler’s heavy-handed tactics through violent suppression of protests and the press in New Orleans backfired and generated resentment among the local populace, Major General George B. McClellan shared Scott’s view of preserving public order and protecting political rights under MG (Sandler, 1994, pp. 51–54). In order to set federal MG policy, President Lincoln appointed the Lieber Commission in 1862 to draft *The Code of War for the Government of the Armies of the U.S. in the Field*, which was adopted by the U.S. Army as General

Order No. 100. The Lieber Code also formed the basis for the subsequent Hague Conventions and the Geneva Convention (Sandler, 1994, pp. 54–55).

During the Spanish-American War in 1889, the U.S. Army administered MG in Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines under the Lieber Code and the 2nd Hague Convention. While MG remained relatively peaceful in Cuba and Puerto Rico, with authority ultimately returned to the indigenous civil governments, a large number of Filipinos waged an extended rebellion against the U.S. Army MG administration established on 19 May 1898 in the Philippines (Sandler, 1994, pp. 97–114). However, instead of adopting a heavy-handed approach, the American units conducted Civic Action activities to improve local conditions and enhance U.S. legitimacy. Such a counter-insurgency strategy proved successful in defeating a pre-Maoist rural insurgency. (Sandler, 1994, pp. 118–123).

The CA/MG doctrine was not officially established in doctrine in the U.S. Army until after WWI, in a manual entitled *Military Aid to the Civil Power*. The manual drew from past MG experiences, including the occupation of Rhineland, Germany by the American Expeditionary Force following the Armistice of November 11, 1918 (Sandler, 1994, p. 167). Further developments in the early 1940s, most notably the establishment of the School of Military Governance at the University of Virginia on April 2, 1942, set the conditions for CA/MG to gain further recognition as a military specialty (Hicks & Wormuth, 2009, p. 3). In May 1944, Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force established a Civil Affairs G-5 staff section to control the European CA Division (ECAD) composed of 2,500 officers and 5,000 enlisted personnel (Sandler, 1994, p. 187). The ECAD conducted CA/MG operations to maintain law and order, secure the populace and minimize civilian interference with military operations by working through or with local governments when possible (Hicks & Wormuth, 2009, p. 4). By mid-1945, most sub-national governance in Germany was administered by German officials under ECAD advisement (Zink, 1946, p. 346). In fact, during WWII, less than 9,000 ECAD personnel administered control of more than 80 million persons—half of whom enemy nationals—in seven countries, with almost no resistance (Sandler, 1994, p. 210). By not uprooting the bureaucracies in any of their occupied territories and preserving local order, the U.S.

MG administrations established the roots for future success with both Germany and Japan, subsequently achieving great economic success and, more importantly, lasting peace after WWII (Sandler, 1994, pp. 284–285).

On August 26, 1945 in Monterey, California, the U.S. Army activated the first permanent MG units, the 95th and 96th MG Groups, both of which experienced a series of activations and inactivations until the 1970s. The U.S. Army also established the first peacetime CA/MG units in 1949, followed by RC special units consisting of HQs and school units (Sandler, 1994, p. 308). Following the Korean War, the Department of the Army (DA) established the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) CA/MG officer branch, which was subsequently redesignated the CA branch on 2 October 1959. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) placed MG mission under the concept of CA, making CA the “all-inclusive term” for the branch (Sandler, 1994, pp. 337–338).

In 1965, at the request of the Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV), the 41st CA was the first of the three U.S. Army CA Companies deployed to Republic of Vietnam (RVN) as part of the U.S. effort to stabilize the situation (Sacquety, 2013, p. 52). With roughly 60 officers and 100 enlisted personnel per Company, the CA missions in Vietnam focused on three primary objectives: (1) Eliminate the Vietcong (VC) insurgency, (2) Diminish the VC’s ability to recruit, and (3) Recruit indigenous tribes to fight the VC and the communist National Liberation Front (NLF) (Hicks & Wormuth, 2009, p. 6). These CA units operated primarily at the tactical level as part of the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) program while under the operational control of U.S. Army or U.S. Marines combat units. The most common activities included Civic Action projects to repair schools, medical dispensaries, bridges, culverts, and infrastructures in the rural areas (Sacquety, 2013, p. 53). After the Tet offensive in 1968, CA forces in Vietnam shifted their emphasis from relief to refugees and restoration projects to long term development of viable communities. Units also transitioned from undertaking the projects themselves to assisting the RVN administrators and local leaders (Sandler, 1994, p. 360).

In 1972, the CA school relocated to Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and became part of the Institute for Military Assistance, which later became the USAJFCSWCS. The 96th

CA Group, after its reactivation in 1967, was redesignated as the 96th CA BN(A) on November 26, 1971, and moved to Fort Bragg in 1972 to be attached to the 95th CA Group. When the 95th CA was inactivated on December 18, 1974, the 96th CA BN(A) became the only AC CA unit (Sandler, 1994, p. 373).

During Operation URGENT FURY (1983) in Grenada and Operation JUST CAUSE (1989) in Panama, both AC and RC CA units deployed to provide combat support and restore the local governance functions and essential services. While both CA missions were successful, lessons learned highlighted the importance of high-level CMO planning, interagency coordination and pre-deployment preparation. In addition, URGENT FURY renewed the U.S. Army's emphasis on SOF and CA. When USSOCOM was established in 1987, CA was given "a high priority as one of the 10 special activities" assigned to the new command. Consequently, all U.S. Army CA forces—both RC and AC—were reassigned to USSOCOM. After the activations of USASOC in 1989 and subsequently its subordinate USACAPOC(A), all U.S. Army CA forces were assigned to USACAPOC(A) (Sandler, 1994, pp. 373–376).

After Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1991, CA played an important role in preventing civilians from interfering with combat operations by managing the influx of displaced personnel and providing much needed HA to the affected populace (Hicks & Wormuth, 2009, p. 7). Throughout Operations DESERT SHIELD, DESERT STORM and PROVIDE COMFORT, U.S. Army CA deployed two companies from the 96th CA and four RC CA Brigades. The length and scale of the deployment highlighted the need for RC and AC elements to complement one another in operational capacity, as well as in skillsets (Sandler, 1994, pp. 431–432). During the 1990s, both RC and AC CA forces deployed to Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia and Kosovo on various HA and peacekeeping missions, working with civilian populations and institutions, military, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations (Hicks & Wormuth, 2009, pp. 8–10).

In 2001, the 96th CA BN(A) deployed during the early phase of OEF. CA missions ranged from teams with TF DAGGER conducting civil assessments to the CJCMOTF in Kabul coordinating relief efforts after the Taliban were routed (Stewart, 2004, p. 19). The RC CA teams subsequently deployed to expand the CA mission in

Afghanistan, providing support to PRTs and BCTs (Bingham, Rubini, & Cleary, 2003, p. 12). While the RC CA also supported PRTs and BCTs during OIF, the AC teams deployed primarily with USSOF throughout the CENTCOM AOR, including with CMSEs working for COMs in select countries.

With the high demand for CA in both Afghanistan and Iraq, Secretary of SECDEF Rumsfeld in 2004 directed the DOD to increase the size of CA forces and also explore options to assign them to the U.S. Army with the intent of improving CA integration with the GPF. Despite resistance from senior DOD leaders, including the CJCS and USSOCOM commander, in 2006, USACAPOC(A) along with all RC CA<sup>21</sup> were reassigned to the USAR, while the 96th CA BN(A),<sup>22</sup> as the only AC CA unit, remained under USASOC. Such action effectively split the CA structure along the AC-RC line and set conditions for many of the organizational issues that currently plague CA as a branch. Following the split, the 96th CA BN(A) grew into the 95th CA BDE(A), currently with five Battalions: 91st aligned with AFRICOM, 92nd with EUCOM, 96th with CENTCOM, 97th with PACOM, and 98th with SOUTHCOM. In addition, the 85th CA BDE was activated in 2011 as another AC CA unit under FORSCOM to provide CA support to GPF.

## **B. STRATEGIC DIRECTION**

Deployed worldwide in support of TSOCs, GCCs and COMs, CA forces have demonstrated a unique special warfare capability to enhance U.S. influence over relevant populations so as to achieve U.S. objectives. In today's complex joint operational environment, CA forces play an integral role in assisting the JFCs to achieve unified action. Unified action requires leaders to "synchronize, coordinate, and when appropriate, integrate military operations with the activities of other governmental and nongovernmental organizations to achieve unity of effort" (JP 3-0, 2011, p. xi). In addition, the latest publications of strategic guidance and doctrine provides the context for CA to play an important role in shaping the global environment through proactive

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<sup>21</sup> 96 percent of the U.S. Army CA forces.

<sup>22</sup> 4 percent of the U.S. Army CA forces.

engagement. Such a role requires the CA Regiment to evolve and adapt to meet the dynamic global challenges while achieving the U.S. Army's vision.

The 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS) outlines comprehensive engagement as part of the strategic approach to further U.S. interests. Engagement, as defined in the 2010 NSS, is the active participation of the United States in relationships beyond its borders, through partnerships and alliances with its friends and allies, cooperation with regional powers, as well as bi-lateral or multi-lateral dialogues with adversarial governments to encourage their greater integration with the international community. In pursuing comprehensive engagement, the U.S. military plays an important role in preventing conflict and responding to crises through military-to-military, civil-military relationships in order to build partner capacity, strengthen civilian institutions and promote collaboration (White House, 2010, pp. 11–12). The 2015 NSS reemphasizes the need for collective action in international engagement to address global challenges. The scope of such cooperation, though, is continuously expanding and to date includes state partners, non-state and private actors, and international institutions (White House, 2015, p. 3). Similarly, the role of the DOD in comprehensive engagement to further U.S. interests is also highlighted in the 2014 QDR, which notes the military's efforts in proactive engagement to shape the dynamic global environment (Department of Defense, 2014b, p. 11).

In 2014, the DOD updated its policy on CAO by reissuing DOD Directive 2000.13 *Civil Affairs*. Most notable among the changes from the previous version are the omission of Paragraph 4.8, which designated U.S. Army CA as SOF (Department of Defense, 1994, p. 3), and the new responsibility of joint proponentcy, with coordinating authority for CA assigned to the commander of USSOCOM (Department of Defense, 2014a, p. 9).

The SOF designation for U.S. Army CA forces—particularly their assignment under USSOCOM—has been a subject of debate since 1979, largely stemming from concerns by DOD leaders over the level of access to CA support for GPF during major combat operations. All CA forces, both reserve and active, were initially assigned to USSOCOM upon its activation in 1987 for the categorization of CA as one of the ten



special warfare activities, and especially for its role in low-intensity conflicts (Sandler, 1994, p. 376). SECDEF Donald H. Rumsfeld renewed the debate in 2003, and ultimately directed the split of U.S. Army CA forces in 2006 (Storey, 2012, p. 15). As a result, all RC CA units under USACAPOC(A) were reassigned to the USAR to support GPF missions; the 96th CA BN(A) remained under USASOC as the only AC CA unit to support USSOCOM missions (Van Roosen, 2009, pp. 2–3).

In the U.S. Army and joint doctrine, CAO remains among the special operations core activities. “While CF also conduct some of these activities (e.g., FID, SFA, foreign humanitarian assistance [FHA], and COIN),” JP 3-05 *Special Operations* describes, “SOF conduct all of them using specialized tactics, techniques, and procedures, and in unique conditions and to different standards, but in a manner that complements CF capabilities” (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2014, pp. II–2-3).

Proactive engagement, as outlined in the NSS and QDR, is an integral part of the Army’s strategic vision—through Regionally Aligned Forces (RAFs) as part of a whole of government approach—as articulated by General Raymond T. Odierno, the 38th Army CSA, in the 2014 Army Strategic Planning Guidance (ASPG) (U.S. Army, 2014, p. 13). In *Army 2025 Vision*, Odierno and McHugh (2015) identifies both the future requirements for *increasing the number of operations within and among populations* and *an enhanced ability to consolidate and integrate contributions from government, military, and coalition partners* (p. 3). CA has an integral role in both of these realms with the ability to access, analyze, and influence the relevant populations, as well as the ability to coordinate and collaborate with UAPs, HN partners, and the local populace to achieve unified action in support of U.S. objectives.

In his vision for the ARSOF 2022 transformation—which he calls “a blueprint for change”—Lieutenant General Charles T. Cleveland, the USASOC commander, outlines his priorities for future ARSOF: (1) Invest in Human Capital, (2) Optimize SOF/Conventional Force/JIIM<sup>23</sup> Interdependence, (3) Operationalize the CONUS base, (4) Develop SOF Capabilities at the operational level, (5) Facilitate SOF Mission

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<sup>23</sup> Joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational.

Command, and (6) Optimize Resourcing and Commodity Areas (U.S. Army Special Operations Command, 2013, pp. 3, 18). ARSOF 2022 describes the 7th WfF, introduces the Human Domain concept, and highlights how SOF are “uniquely assessed, selected, trained, educated and equipped to affect and influence human behavior” (U.S. Army Special Operations Command, 2014, p. 4). The 95th CA BDE(A) is taking steps through its redesign to mature the profession, address capability gaps, and strengthen interdependence with CF and UAPs. The BDE is developing the “Civil Affairs Science”—in cooperation with U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSWCS) and UAPs—to accelerate the professionalization of SOF CA in support of special warfare. Additionally, the BDE is developing Civil Information Node to enhance information sharing and collection with UAPs; optimizing partnerships with UAPs through the establishment of the CMAG; and providing specially trained CA planners to key operational and training SOF commands to enhance SOF/CF/JIIM Interdependence (U.S. Army Special Operations Command, 2014, pp. 19–24).

### **C. CORPORATE BRANDING: AN UNDERPERFORMING CA BRAND**

In the rich, multi-disciplinary field of organizational studies of the identity concept, corporate identity and organizational identity are the two disciplines more frequently selected to discuss the identity of an organization and how it relates to the stakeholders. Stakeholders are categorized as *external*, or those outside of the organization (i.e., customers, investors, the public), and *internal*, or the members of the organization. Hatch and Schultz (2000) discuss both corporate identity and organizational identity, and take a combined approach in examining the relational aspects among image (as perceived by stakeholders), organizational identity and culture. A corporate identity communicates four things to external stakeholders: who we are, what we do, how we do it, and where we want to go (p. 13). Formulation of a corporate identity involves choosing symbols by the top management and their staff, taking into considerations perceptions and reactions of organizational members (p. 17). The concept of organizational identity, on the other hand, is self-reflective with three defining attributes for an identity statement: central (what is seen as the core, or essence of the organization), distinctive (what distinguishes the organization from others), and enduring

(the organization's temporal continuity) (Albert & Whetten, 1985, p. 265; Hatch & Schultz, 2000, p. 15; Whetten, 2006, p. 220). For the purposes of this capstone, the authors also take a combined approach in examining the organizational identity of the CA Regiment with a focus on how its influential role in decision-making, sense-making, and fostering relationships between regimental members relates to the branding of the CA Regiment.

The concept of product branding emerged in the late nineteenth century and has contributed great successes for businesses (Olins, 2000, pp. 52–53). The scope of a product brand is limited to one product or service, or a group of closely related products. A brand identity is developed by advertisers, who are informed by market research, and then targeted to customers. Corporate branding is much more expansive in scope and scale, encompassing the entire enterprise and all of its stakeholders. In addition, the origins of a corporate brand include not only the organization's heritage, but also the values and beliefs shared by its members. The target audience is also expanded to include multiple stakeholders—both internal and external. In further discussion of corporate branding, Hatch & Schultz (2008) introduce the Vision-Culture-Image (VCI) Alignment Model (Figure 31) to examine the coherence of an organization's strategic vision (who we want to be), its culture (who we are), and the stakeholder image, i.e., expectations by the external stakeholders of the organization (their image of us). With organizational identity at the center of the model, a greater coherence between the vision, culture, and image indicates a stronger brand; misalignments, or gaps between the three conversely indicate an underperforming brand (pp. 8–12).



Figure 31. The VCI Alignment Model (from Hatch & Schultz, 2008, p. 11)

Despite the detailed description of the CA Regiment, its role, and capabilities in doctrine, misalignments in the VCI model persist for the Regiment, indicating an underperforming CA brand. FM 3-57 Civil Affairs Operations (Department of the Army, 2014a) defines the mission of CA forces as *to mitigate or defeat threats to civil society and conduct responsibilities normally performed by civil governments across the range of military operations by engaging and influencing the civil populace and authorities through the planning and conducting of CAO, or to enable CMO, to shape the civil environment and set the conditions for military operations. CA forces plan, prepare for, execute, assess, and transition CAO at all levels of war* (p. 1–1). CAO are further defined as *actions planned, executed, and assessed by civil affairs forces that enhance awareness of and manage the interaction with the civil component of the operational environment; identify and mitigate underlying causes of instability within civil society; or involve the application of functional specialty skills normally the responsibility of civil government* (p. 1–2). In addition, FM 3-57 provides detailed description of the five CA core tasks: populace and resource control (PRC), foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA), civil information management (CIM), nation assistance (NA), and support to civil administration (SCA). Various widely disseminated joint publications, such as JP 3-57,

also provide similar detailed description of CAO and CMO. However, during the Change of Command ceremony for USACAPOC(A) in June 2014, Major General Jeffrey Jacobs, the outgoing commander, remarked that

what the Army is not getting is a conventional force that fully understands the roles and mission capabilities of Civil Affairs units. I observed long ago that many conventional maneuver commanders, although are experts of employing their engineers, their aviation, their fire support, their logistics assets, you name it, they come up short when understanding how to employ their Civil Affairs forces ... unless and until we can fix that disconnect, we, USACAPOC, cannot provide the best possible Civil Affairs support to the United States Army and the Army will not truly interest itself in CA and Civil Affairs will not achieve full equality as a branch of the Army ... now I understand this is a complex issue; I know it's a politically charged issue within the Army. (Wells, 2014)

Such frustration over the “persistent deficiencies in commanders’ understanding of CA capabilities and how to use them”—or a strategic vision-stakeholder image misalignment—has been invariably observed at different times throughout CA history, from CA assets being merely perceived as “disaster relief teams” during the Korean War, to similar confusions during Operations DESERT STORM and DESERT SHIELD (Hicks & Wormuth, 2009, pp. 15–16). Confusions among military and civilian decision makers over the difference between CA and MG—the latter a more politically sensitive term suggesting long-term occupation and likely nation building effort—resulted in missed opportunities in proper employment of CA in the pacification effort in South Vietnam (Sandler, 1994, p. 356). Once deployed to RVN, a CA commander also observed the same insufficient understanding of CA’s role, the lack of CMO guidance by military commanders, and consequently the lack of support for CA forces in theater (Sacquety, 2013, p. 52). Another observation in the 2009 Center for Strategic International Studies (CSIS) report was perhaps the most succinct:

Not only is there a dearth of senior advocates for civil affairs within DOD, there also is a profound lack of familiarity with civil affairs missions and forces outside the immediate civil affairs community itself. Civil affairs is not part of the broader education and training curriculum within military schoolhouses, experience with civil affairs in the broader Army is very limited, and anecdotes of negative experiences with civil affairs personnel in the field are common, although in many cases the negative experiences

are by-products of the stepchild status of civil affairs. While the special operations community has a greater familiarity with civil affairs than do general purpose forces, because they have operated with civil affairs for many years, there is still relatively little understanding or appreciation even in this community for the capabilities of civil affairs forces or how civil affairs forces operate in the field. (Hicks & Wormuth, 2009, p. 39)

While doctrine alone has failed to sufficiently inform JFCs on CA's mission, roles and capabilities, the trifurcation of U.S. Army CA forces—95th BDE(A), 85th BDE, and USACAPOC(A)—has only added to the confusion among decision makers (Walsh, 2013, p. 20) who systemically lack experienced CA personnel on their staff, (Little, 2013, p. 29), resulting in misemployment and mismanagement of CA forces.

As candidly observed by two USSOF officers during Operation JUST CAUSE, Professional military education (PME) is one area to be considered in improving JFCs understanding of CA's roles and capabilities:

Tactical commanders were often unaware of the full scope of a CA unit's capabilities, indicating a need for including instruction on CA doctrine, missions, and capabilities in all branch officer basic courses, all branch officer advanced courses, the Command and General Staff Course, and the War College. (Sandler, 1994, p. 401)

Additionally, in order to realign the CA strategic vision, its roles and capabilities with external stakeholders' expectations, strategic communication between the CA Regiment and the external stakeholders (JFCs, UAPs, policy makers) needs to be reexamined in these areas: (1) the projection of a clear strategic message, (2) the projection of that message through existing communication channels, and (3) the reinforcement of that strategic message with positive experiences for the stakeholders. A clear strategic message first and foremost requires consensus among CA practitioners from both the RC and AC on a common, core CA identity. Therefore, a common organization identity that is central, distinctive, and enduring needs to be developed and adopted by the Regiment.

Efforts to inform can also be facilitated through engagement, collaboration, dialogues and discussions, all of which require access to the desired audience. Such access for advocacy, particularly to key decision makers, necessitates the placements of

capable strategic communicators—CA practitioners who have received advanced training in national level strategy and policy guidance, strategic planning, and strategic communication—in key liaison and staff positions with UAPs, TSOCs, ASCCs and GCCs (Hicks & Wormuth, 2009, p. 35). Moreover, a clear strategic message propagated successfully to its audience still needs to be reinforced by measurable results delivered by capable CA forces. Stakeholders’ poor anecdotal experiences with CA elements—regardless of their organizational origins, components, or skill sets—can still potentially diminish the effectiveness of strategic messaging, while also widening the organizational culture-stakeholder image misalignment in the VCI Alignment Model. To mitigate such misalignment, CA units need to deliver the expected results for the relevant stakeholders in a manner consistent its strategic message. Clear challenges remain for the CA Regiment until recruitment, selection, and training of its personnel can be standardized in order to establish a baseline in specialty skills not only aligned to its strategic vision, but also as expected by stakeholders.

#### **D. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN: CA REGIMENT’S ONGOING CHALLENGES**

Due to the complexities and nuances inherent in human-centered affairs, CA practitioners frequently encounter unexpected situations and novel events. In addition, CA planning process requires critical analysis, reinforced with adaptive thinking in order to devise innovative solutions that fit the different environment settings. A solution that yields desired effects in one locale, with a particular populace, may not, and often does not, work for other locales. While a variety of U.S. Army field manuals and joint publications provide general guidelines for the CA work processes, CAO and CMO are commonly conducted in an environment where the cause of, or solution to, a problem is not clear, requiring CA practitioners to rely on their operational experience and intuition.

The high demand for CA support during Operations OEF and OIF—in excess of 1,100 personnel every 9–10 months at its highest point—resulted in high deployment rates and large number of CA units (Edwards, 2012, p. 8). To meet such high demand, quality of training suffered, especially for the RC units that received diluted and insufficiently certified programs of instruction (POIs). In addition, USAR took drastic

measures, such as the *redesignations* of entire RC companies from low-demand MOS (e.g., Chemical Support) to provisional CA status<sup>24</sup> in order to supplement the RC CA units from USACAPOC(A) in Iraq. While the officers from these provisional units attended an abbreviated course called Mobilization Civil Affairs Training (MCAT) that lasted about two and half months at Fort Bragg, NC, the non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and soldiers were “familiarized with their new specialties” during their one-month reclassification training at Fort Dix, NJ (Chace, 2009). The resultant poor preparation in CA specialty skills, coupled with a lack of operational experience, did not sufficiently prepare such units for CAO in support of stability operations. When faced with complex tasks of assessing, analyzing, and influencing the civil component, the ill-trained CA units instead focused their efforts on simpler “winning hearts and minds” tasks, e.g., reconstruction projects and delivery of HA supplies, in many cases without sufficient analyses of the operational environment. Poorly planned, conducted and managed reconstruction projects were not only ineffective in enhancing U.S. influence or HN legitimacy, but also potentially detrimental to the overall coalition efforts. The roles of project managers and HA supply deliverers, as typically assigned to many deployed CA personnel, became the *only* CA roles as perceived by stakeholders, particularly the JFCs, UAPs and relevant populations. Such negative experiences diminished the effects of strategic messaging by the CA Regiment, widened the misalignments between strategic vision, organizational culture, and stakeholder image, and ultimately weakened the CA brand.

An analysis of the organizational structure of the CA Regiment also reveals other capability gaps hindering its overall readiness and organizational cohesion. Under the current CA force structure (Figure 32), the main departmentation is based on component (RC or AC), the COCOMs to which CA forces provide support, and the geographical AORs. The main unit groupings are summarized in Table 29, to include the 95th CA BDE(A) assigned to 1st SFC(A) under USASOC as force provider for USSOF; the 85th CA BDE assigned to FORSCOM as force provider for GPF; and USACAPOC(A) assigned to USAR under FORSCOM, also as force provider for GPF. The 361st and

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<sup>24</sup> Provisional units would revert to their original designations upon redeployment.



322nd CA BDEs are organic units providing direct support only to their respective ASCCs.<sup>25</sup>

The three distinct command structures under which the 95th CA BDE(A), the 85th CA BDE and USACAPOC(A) are assigned prove problematic for the division of labor and coordination mechanisms. The 95th CA BDE(A) provides CA forces for TSOCs and COMs under the CME program; and Joint Task Forces (JTFs). In addition, the BDE participates in Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) activities, such as JCET exercises to build partner capacity. For overseas contingency operations (OCO), the 95th also provides forces as needed to support GCCs. Due to the wide spectrum of mission sets and high demand signal, operational tempo remains high for the 95th with many validated missions it cannot fill. With the 95th's personnel having the highest deployment rates in USASOC, the BDE struggles to manage dwell ratios to mitigate operational fatigue and burn-out of its personnel.

Table 29. Main Unit Groupings of U.S. Army CA Forces

Main Grouping	Component	Organizational Structure	Customers
95th CA BDE(A)	AC	5 regionally aligned BNs	TSOCs, COMs, JTFs, GCCs (contingency)
85th CA BDE	AC	5 regionally aligned BNs	BCTs, DIVs, Corps, ASCCs
USACAPOC(A)	RC	7 BDEs under 4 regionally aligned CACOMs	BCTs, DIVS, Corps, ASCCs, GCCs
361st CA BDE	RC	HQ and 1 BN	USAREUR
322nd CA BDE	RC	HQ	USARPAC

<sup>25</sup> 361st CA assigned to U.S. Army Europe (USAEUR); 322nd CA assigned to U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC).




Figure 32. Current CA Force Structure (after Ferry & Romero, 2013, p. 59)<sup>26</sup>

The high demand signal for CA support to GPF during OIF and OEF led to the U.S. Army's authorization for another active CA BDE in March, 2010 to raise the distribution of AC CA to about 20 percent of the total CA forces in the U.S. Army (Storey, 2012, p. 11). Six months later, OIF transitioned to Operation NEW DAWN, signifying the end of major combat operations by the U.S. military in Iraq. The 85th CA BDE was finally activated in September 2011 in Fort Hood, TX, initially with two BNs, and three more to be activated subsequently with personnel from CAQC and the 95th. In December 2011, as the Status of Force Agreement (SOFA) signed by President Bush in 2008 expired, the United States withdrew its troops from Iraq. As a new unit struggling to fill its ranks while building its capability and reputation, the 85th BDE did not begin to deploy its CA personnel until 2012, with a few companies in support of OEF, and others in support of TSC activities, such as Joint Chief of Staff (JCS) exercises. In addition to the manning shortfalls, the 85th CA BDE, as a relatively new unit, is not yet part of the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) cycle of the Planning, Programing, Budget and Execution (PPBE) process. Consequently, funding for the BDE's equipment, training and deployments continues on an *ad hoc* basis with FORSCOM and the GCCs. As NATO

<sup>26</sup> Adopted from Ferry and Romero and modified from the original source to reflect current structure after the activation of 1SFC(A).

concluded its combat operations in Afghanistan in December, 2014, the demand for CA support, particularly from GPF, significantly dropped. In the new fiscal reality with more budget constraints driving force reductions, the 85th is currently at risk of being downsized.

For the RC CA units, the high deployment rates in support of OIF and OEF resulted in operational fatigue, as well as a brain drain of its functional specialties, as many RC personnel left the force (Edwards, 2012, p. 9). The reduced quality in training and selection of personnel—in a desperate effort to fill its ranks—further degraded the capabilities of the USACAPOC(A). In the same hostile environment of budget constraints and force reductions, a lower demand signal for RC CA also spells troubles for USACAPOC(A). Efforts, such as the establishment of the IMMSG at Fort Bragg, NC to professionalize and certify the functional specialists will slowly rebuild such capacity for the RC.

The organization of CA forces—particularly for the 95th, 85th and USACAPOC(A) under three distinct chains of command—also contributed to degraded coordination between the three. Informal, or *ad hoc* communication, which is vital in nonroutine and ambiguous situations (Daft, 2010, p. 234), has been sporadic and heavily hamstrung by conflicting personalities and bureaucratic institutional constraints. As the main force providers to all five major AORs,<sup>27</sup> personnel from the three organizations frequently operate not only in the same countries, but also in sub-national level locales. However, a troubling trend of territorialism and parochialism persists at the detriment of collaboration and the pooled interdependence of these CA personnel (Daft, 2010, p. 287). Coordination through formal hierarchy—at home stations or on deployments—works to some extent, depending on the flexibility and efficiency of the reporting and coordinating channels established. This coordination mechanism is, however, not a good fit for the unstable and dynamic environment where CA practitioners operate. Coordination through standardized skills presents another problem—given the disparities in training, education and experience between AC and RC, resulting in a wide spectrum of skill levels and operational experiences (Daft, 2010, pp. 234–236).

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<sup>27</sup> AFRICOM, CENTCOM, EUCOM, PACOM, and SOUTHCOM.

Professionalization of the CA Regiment has suffered from the multiple training pipelines with inconsistent standards, brain drain from high deployments, as well as the lack of proper certification for the functional specialists. The ill-trained RC CA units—such as the provisional CA units during OIF—and poorly executed training programs, such as MCAT diluted the skillsets and tarnished the credibility of CA as a branch. The dire need to fill the RC CA ranks persists, with *quality vs. quantity* calculus a haunting dilemma for USACAPOC(A) leadership. A troubling trend exists with RC units filling their ranks with insufficiently vetted personnel to be reported as part of their manning strength while these personnel await their opportunities to go through one of the training pipelines to become MOS qualified (MOSQ). Many such personnel assumed key positions (e.g., CMOC chief, Company command, CMO planner, etc.) while non-MOSQ, and even deployed as such, ultimately relying on on-the-job training and trial-and-error *modus operandi*. The failures by unqualified or poorly trained CA personnel to deliver results continue to accentuate the inconsistencies in strategic messaging about CA roles and capabilities.

#### **E. ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE: A FRACTURED CA REGIMENT**

Literature on organizational theories recognizes the significance of organizational culture. Daft (2003) contends that culture often attributes to organizational success or failure because it serves two critical functions in an organization: internal integration and external adaptation. Internal integration occurs with members developing a collective common identity and learning to collaborate and cooperate effectively. An adaptability culture—characterized by strategic focus on the external environment through flexibility and change—helps an organization respond rapidly to changes in the external environment and needs of the customers (pp. 112–113). Furthermore, organizational culture has a unifying power with a focus on the collective interest of the organization through shared systems of beliefs, habits, and traditions that form a shared identity (Quinn, Mintzberg, & James, 1988, pp. 344–346). A lack of common CA identity manifests in degraded collaboration and cooperation along the AC/RC divide, and to a lesser extent the 85th /95th divide. Internal integration within the CA Regiment is further complicated by parochialism and personality conflicts. In addition, to foster an

adaptability culture responsive to increasingly complex and unstable operational environments, CA practitioners need to be screened, recruited, selected and trained to be adaptive thinkers. While embracing the broad range of skill sets from core competencies to functional specialties across the CA Regiment, shared systems of values and beliefs based on commonalities among the members of the Regiment must be strengthened, starting with recruitment, to realize the unifying power of organizational culture.

Given shared assumptions—or the internalized beliefs and values that members of an organization hold in common—Sathe (1985) asserts that the content of an organizational culture is determined by how they interrelate, or more specifically, how they are prioritized by the organization. Differences in recruitment, selection, training, promotion systems, etc. result in different contents (pp. 13–14). Currently the culture within the CA Regiment is fractured into three separate sub-cultures with different contents, driving different directions of behavior patterns.

The divergent sub-cultures in the CA community can be explained by the lack of reinforcement of a shared organizational identity, or ideology, through identifications. Even though individuals can volunteer and request to join CA because they become attracted to the CA mission or a CA identity—a process called *natural identification*, they still have to go through the *selected identification* process during which they are recruited, screened and selected (Quinn et al., 1988, pp. 347–348). The RC/AC divide begins with the separate recruitment and selection processes between the two components. This type of divide runs deeper through the *evoked identification* process of indoctrination and socialization in different training pipelines (e.g., CAQC) where individuals normally *would* begin to adopt the identity of the organization (p. 348), except RC and AC personnel adopt separate respective RC and AC identities. The indoctrination and socialization continue as personnel arrive at their units—RC or AC—after accession into the branch. As the reinforcement of the organizational identities occurs perhaps more strongly at the respective units, a divide between the 95th and the 85th BDEs manifests post-CAQC for their personnel. Due to the different mission sets, more specialized training, and the different external stakeholders that the two BDEs support, an *us vs. them* mentality emerges. In such an environment of parochialism,

collaboration and coordination suffer, setting the condition for more negative anecdotal experiences that continue to deepen the divides in a re-enforcing loop, increasing the respective strengths of the three separate sub-cultures.

## APPENDIX B. GLOBAL CA PRESENCE (BY COCOMS) 2006–2014

### A. AFRICOM




Figure 33. AFRICOM CA Presence (by Component) from 2006–2014

CA deployments to AFRICOM support what the combatant commander, General Rodriguez (2014), refers to as one of the “smallest combatant commands.” Though it is small, AFRICOM has a robust set of mission requirements given the fact the geographic combatant command plays a key role in “strengthening relationships with current and potential regional powers” and is “key to shaping the future security environment to advance our enduring national interests of security, prosperity, values, and promoting international order” (p. 2). CA forces, as depicted on the map, are deployed to a significant amount of countries in Africa, particularly across the central portion of the continent known for instability and being an area in which Al Qaeda linked terrorist organizations are known to operate.

Since AFRICOM is considered a small combatant command and receives a proportional amount of resources, this forces the commander to prioritize what assets can best get the biggest payoff with the least amount of investment. CA assets are ideal for this situation due to the fact they represent a relatively minimal amount of investment—anywhere from four personnel (CA team) to 32 personnel (CA Company)—with a high rate of return via capacity building activities, as well as reach back to interagency and international organizations. By training host nation personnel, and enabling them to achieve success in governance development, AFRICOM resources can be utilized elsewhere.

Based on geospatial analysis, RC CA has deployed to the most countries. This is most likely because AFRICOM locations tend to be environments that are more permissive and require more assistance in governance and capacity development activities, which is what RC CA forces excel at doing through functional specialties. Additionally, these type of recurring deployments can be programmed well in advance, which provides reservists time to mobilize and train to support those mission sets. The second most deployed entity is the 95th CA BDE(A). This makes sense given the Counter Terrorism focus in the central portions of Africa.



## B. CENTCOM



Figure 34. CENTCOM CA Presence (by Component) from 2006–2014

The CENTCOM Mission Statement reads “With national and international partners, CENTCOM promotes cooperation among nations, responds to crises, and deters or defeats state and non-state aggression, and supports development and, when necessary, reconstruction in order to establish the conditions for regional security, stability and prosperity” (Austin, 2014, p. 4). CA deployments between 2006 and 2014 are in line with the combatant commander’s intent, particularly with regard to cooperation with partner nations, and developing capacity through enabling development and reconstruction. This was clearly evident in Iraq and Afghanistan where all three CA organizations—USACAPOC(A), 95th CA BDE(A) and 85th CA BDE—have deployed in support of OIF and OEF. This is of no surprise considering those two locations were where the bulk of U.S. forces (SOF and GPF) have deployed in support of the Global War on Terror.

Through geospatial analysis, the authors were also able to identify Jordan as a country in which all three CA organizations have deployed. It is the authors’ assumption that this is due to the fact the U.S. is supporting capacity building activities, as well as establishing a forward presence in the event the humanitarian crises in Iraq and Syria bleed over in to Jordan, specifically with regard to refugees fleeing the fighting.

Additionally, the presence of all three CA entities in Jordan gives the CENTCOM commander operational flexibility, especially if U.S. actions against ISIS in Syrian and Iraq evolve to the point in which ground forces are introduced to support U.S. objectives.

Last, through geospatial analysis the authors were able to determine that the 95th CA BDE(A) and USACAPOC(A) elements deployed to the most countries in the CENTCOM area of operations. This is due to not only the large SOF and GPF presence in Iraq and Afghanistan, but also due to the SOF only presence in Yemen, Pakistan, Qatar, and Tajikistan—95th CA BDE(A)—and the GPF specific presence in Kuwait and Kazakhstan. Also, both CA organizations—95th CA BDE(A) and USACAPOC(A)—have been in existence longer than the 85th CA BDE, which is a key factor when discussing the amount of countries CA forces have a presence.

### C. EUCOM




Figure 35. EUCOM CA Presence (by Component) from 2006–2014

In addition to the requirements set forth by the 2014 QDR, the EUCOM commander's priorities are as follows: (1) Preserve our strategic partnerships; (2) Sustain relationship with our allies to ensure a strong NATO Alliance; (3) Preserve recently developed allied and partner capability and interoperability; and (4) Maintain regional

stability and security (Breedlove, 2014, pp. 2–16). As depicted on the ARCGIS map, CA deployments over the course of the eight years seem to fall in line with EUCOM commander's priorities. Specifically, Reserve CA assets have been utilized to sustain relationships with U.S. allies, particularly NATO allies (i.e., UK, France, Poland, Hungary, Netherlands) and the 95th CA BDE(A) has been utilized to preserve strategic partnerships especially in the Balkans through CMSE. The 85th CA BDE has been used mostly to support interoperability exercises in countries, such as Poland, Macedonia, Bosnia, and Italy (Breedlove, 2014). Where all CA forces have had a presence is in Bosnia, which is not surprising considering the rise of violent extremism that has strategic implications given reports that several fighters from the region have traveled to the Iraq and Syria to fight on the side of ISIS (Khederian, 2014).

The CA presence in several EUCOM countries, particularly enduring and new allies reinforces EUCOM commander General Breedlove's belief that persistent presence and engagement with U.S. partners is critical in developing trust and credibility, which is crucial in order to have success in when operating as a coalition. He stated, "That trust comes from the relationships that can only be built and maintained through the actual, consistent and persistent presence of U.S. forces in Europe" (Breedlove, 2014, p. 7). This task is being handled by USACAPOC(A), which is of no surprise considering those type of deployments are the most predictable which suits the RC that has to plan further ahead than their active counterparts based on mobilization and training cycles required.

## D. PACOM




Figure 36. PACOM CA Presence (by Component) from 2006–2014

The PACOM Posture Statement (Locklear, 2013) states, in 2011, the President directed his national security team to make America’s “presence and mission in the Asia-Pacific a top priority” (pp. 2–5). This became known as the “Pivot to the Pacific” or the “rebalance to the Pacific.” Once given the task, U.S. Pacific Command developed a strategy via four lines of operations that supported this strategic shift: (1) strengthening alliances and partnerships, (2) improving posture and presence, (3) developing capabilities and concepts, and (4) planning for operations and contingencies. The PACOM commander, Admiral Samuel Locklear (2013), stated in his posture statement that it is imperative that during the shift of focus, “we must clearly communicate to our allies and partners our commitment by maintaining a credible, forward deployed, sustainable force” (p. 7). That said, through spatial analysis it is clear that U.S. Army CA forces, regardless of component, are playing a key role in the shift, particularly with

regard to establishing a presence in several countries throughout the Pacific. This presence not only strengthens ties with partner nations, but also enables a force that specializes in capacity building and humanitarian relief to be forward deployed to region in which humanitarian assistance/disaster relief operations have become commonplace during the past decade.

Given those lines of operations, CA deployments between 2006 and 2014 in the PACOM AOR support, “Strengthening alliance and partnerships, Improving posture and Presence, and Planning for Operations” (pp. 1–2), which supports the strategic shift. This is evident, particularly with regard to the 85th CA BDE, which has had a presence in five of the United States’ seven treaty allied countries (Australia, Japan, Korea, Thailand, and the Philippines) and has had some type of presence in the most PACOM countries when compared to the 95th and USACAPOC, the 85th CA BDE is greater. These forces supported GPF in exercises, such as Talisman Sabre (Australia 2013), Yama Sakura/Orient Shield (Japan 2013 and 2014), Garuda Shield (Indonesia 2014) and Keris Strike (Malaysia 2014) in which the U.S. Army’s I Corps units were being evaluated. This was also an opportunity for U.S. forces to continue to strengthen relations with a key ally in the Pacific, as well as to build interoperability capacity with the Australians, Japanese, Indonesian and Malaysian forces. Additionally, all CA forces have had a presence in Indonesia, whether as part of an enduring CMSE embedded with the U.S. Country Team, or participation in an increasing amount of joint training and exercise. Such presence is in line with the PACOM commander’s desire to support the Indonesian government’s desire to quell violent extremism, characterized as “the cornerstone” of the U.S.’s counterterrorism strategy in Southeast Asia (Locklear, 2013, p. 2).

What the authors found of particular interest in their analysis is that a former U.S. adversary, Vietnam, provided access to U.S. CA forces in 2012 during the Pacific Partnership Exercise. Through cooperative engagement, the U.S.-Vietnamese relationship has improved in recent history. Such relationship building can be assumed that Vietnam’s willingness to provide access to a U.S. CA team was done for two reasons. First reason, CA teams are often viewed as being non-lethal in nature, as opposed to traditional

military units, particularly combat arms units. Second reason, China’s effort to gain influence in the Pacific, particularly in the contested Spratly Islands (Locklear, 2013).

## E. SOUTHCOM




Figure 37. SOUTHCOM CA Presence (by Component) from 2006–2014

SOUTHCOM is openly referred to by its commander, as an economy of force combatant command meaning it has to achieve its objectives without the same level of resources that other, high priority COCOMs, such as CENTCOM and PACOM (Kelly, 2013). In order to work towards achieving the three objectives outlined in the 2014 QDR—including “Protect the Homeland” given the proximity of South America to the United States—is through building partner capacity. The rationale being that if U.S. partners are capable in achieving and maintaining security in the region through training and exercises, the U.S. benefits with relatively low investment of resources, as opposed

to deploying large combat formations. In his posture statement, SOUTHCOM commander General Kelly (2013) specifically mentioned how the 95th CA BDE(A) forces support this effort:

In 2012, SOCSOUTH had eleven civil affairs teams helping nine partner nations reduce the vulnerability of key populations to influence by transnational organized crime or violent extremism. These civil affairs teams assisted with counter-recruitment programs and, in many cases, helped partner nations build their own civil affairs capacities. (p. 40)

Regarding persistent engagement, 95th CA BDE(A) and USACAPOC(A) have fit this niche nicely by both maintaining enduring presence through recurring deployments and/or exercises in which they conduct low-cost humanitarian assistance programs and provide training to build military and governmental capacity (Kelly, 2013).

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## APPENDIX C. CA NETWORK 2006–2014

### A. CA COMMAND NETWORK

This network highlights the formal hierarchal relationships that exist between two CA units that conduct CA operations worldwide. Figure 38 is a sociogram of the CA Command Network, and Table 30 is its metrics.




Figure 38. 2014: CA Command Network

Table 30. CA Command Network Metrics

Topography		Centralization			
Diameter	Average Path Distance	Degree	Betweenness	Closeness	Eigenvector
6.000	3.938	0.023	0.016	0.001	0.061

Analysis of this sub-network indicates a disconnected network where organizations are isolated in the sociogram. Isolation is caused by the lack of a unified

command for CA. In addition, the metrics shows that the longest path to travel is 6 and the speed, in which, information travels is 3; therefore, information can be slow going through out this network. This slow dispensing of information and timely communications can be problematic for internal and external stakeholders. Centrality measures reveal USACAPOC (A) with highest betweenness centrality measure, 0.017. In the context of this sub-network, it makes sense since this RC unit has majority of the political connections, general officers, and has been around the longest. Hence, USACAPOC (A) is in the best position to champion its organizational message; unfortunately, the CA community is divided on what is and how should that strategic message be administered.

## B. CA TRAINING NETWORK

This network highlights the formal training relationships that exist among the CA force. Figure 39 is a sociogram of the CA Training Network, and Table 31 is its metrics.




Figure 39. 2014: CA Training Network

Table 31. CA Training Network Metrics

Topography		Centralization			
Diameter	Average Path Distance	Degree	Betweenness	Closeness	Eigenvector
3.000	1.805	0.024	0.001	0.000	0.875

Analysis of the CA Training sub-network indicates, also, a disconnected network where organizations are isolated in the sociogram. Isolation is caused by the lack of a unity and same standards among its five various training courses, which all results in a trained CA soldier. Even though 1st SWTG(A) is responsible for the training, it is administered through three major organizations—1st SWTG(A), 1st Training BDE(A), and 80th TASS BDE. The metrics indicate that the longest path to travel is 3 and the speed, in which, information travels is 1.8; therefore, information can move faster, but it is in three different silos. The various training organizations are problematic and lacks a common bonding experience within the force, which is further exacerbated at the operational level, and strategic level with varying degrees interpretations of what civil affairs is and can do. Centrality measures reveal 3rd TASS BDE with highest eigenvector centrality measure, 0.982 and the overall highest score. Interestingly, another RC unit has a position to have the most influence; yet this organization is only responsible for executing training for one of the five current training courses. Therefore, the CA Community can bring its training under one command or invest in training that is more individual in order to bridge the organizational divide that currently exists between the forces.

### C. CA OPERATIONAL NETWORK

This sub-network is where CA units were deployed to foreign countries conducting CA operations-missions, exercises, training foreign militaries, assisting with local governance activities, international distastes, etc. Figure 40 contains the sociograms of the CA Operational Network, and Table 32 is its metrics.




Figure 40. 2006–2014 CA Operational Network

Table 32. CA Operational Network (1 Mode) Metrics

Topography		Centralization			
Diameter	Average Path Distance	Degree	Betweenness	Closeness	Eigenvector
7.000	2.183	0.016	0.003	0.000	0.467

The CA Operational sub-network was depicted, regardless of operational affiliation—SOF, RC, and GPF—by CA units supporting the COCOMs. Through multi-step analysis, this depiction aided with visualizing which units historically supported the assigned COCOM. The first step entailed coding a two-mode network with units and countries. It was assumed that CA units in the same country had some contact with each other, which was coded in the second step. This assumption allows for linking two CA units together that were in the same country in order to facilitate a one-mode network, which was important for combining all the networks together. As the analysis yielded, the 350th CA BDE has been the most active unit outside of its assigned AOR. Centrality measures reveal 97th CA BN with highest degree centrality measure, 0.017. Interestingly, the 1st AC unit has the position to have the most influence, the 97th CA BN supports

PACOM and has assisted with operations in CENTCOM, and this makes sense with the pivot to the Pacific in support of National Security Strategy, 2010.

This sub-network is where one organization is connected to another organization for collaborative activities. Table 33 is a complete list of the organizations within the network; Figure 41 is a sociogram of the CA Partnership Network, and Table 34 is its metrics.

Figure 41. 2014 CA Partnership Network



Table 33. CA Partnership Network Units and Organizations

CA Types of Influence			
AC	RC	SOF	Interagency
FORSCOM	IMSG	USASOC	DOS
85th CA BDE	USARC	USAFKSWCS	J Family Bureaus
84th CA BN	80th TASS COM	1st SWTG (A)	CSO
83rd CA BN	3rd TASS BDE	3rd BN	PRM
82nd CA BN	4/104 TASS BN	1st SFC (A)	INL
81st CA BN	5/95 TASS BN	95th CA BDE (A)	CT
80th CA BN	5/98 TASS BN	CMAG	Humanitarian Info Unit
DoD	5/ 108 TASS BN	98th CA BN	Pol-Mil
JCS	12/ 100 TASS BN	97th CABN	Foreign Service Institute
Joint Force Development	USACAPOC (A)	96th CA BN	Other USG
IW Assessment & Integration	1st TNG BDE (A)	92nd CA BN	DoI
J-38 (SMA)	1st TNG BN	91st CAN BN	NCTC
USMC	350th CACOM	USSO COM	USDA
CMIT	402nd CA BN	IAPP/SOSTs	SOST Network
Stab OPS Branch	436th CA BN	GMSC	NSS
CAGs	478th CA BN (A)	J3 CA	Transnational Org Crime
Center for Disaster & HA Medicine	486th CA BN	J3 Fusion	USAID
TF BSO	321st CA BDE	J1ATF-NCR	Bureau for Democracy
National Defense University	410th CA BN	GSN OPT	Conflict & Humanitarian Assistance
Center for Complex OPS	413th CA BN	J54	OTI
PKSOI	451st CA BN	J56	CMC
AWG	490th CA BN	J39	OFDA
HODA	351st CACOM	TSOCs	USIP
SOD	364th CA BDE	ASD-SOLIC/IW	Intergovernmental Affairs
G 3/5/7	405th CA BN	CTTSO	Academy for International Conflict Mgmt & Peacebuilding
<b>Professional</b>	445th CA BN	DHA	Middle East Initiatives
Friends of CA	448th CA BN	IW	DEA
CA Association	440th CA BN	CIG	DOE
<b>Private Sector</b>	358th CA BDE	MEG	DOT
Caerus Associates	416th (A) CA BN	SWD	DSCA
ISOA	425th CA BN	OSW	NGA
NDIA	426th CA BN	<b>Academia</b>	
RTI	492th (A) CA BN	MIT	<b>NGOs/ Non-Profit</b>
Creative Associates	352nd CACOM	Prince of Whales Fellows	Fair Trade Organizations
AECOM	354th CA BDE	Harvard	Interaction
McKellar Corporation	401st CA BN	Humanitarian Initiative	World Vision
Navanti Group	414th CA BN	Medical School	Mercy Corp
Tesia	422nd CA BN	George Washington University	Partners for Democratic Change
J. SW Corporation	437th CA BN	Elliott School of International Affairs	Lawry Research Associates International
Monitor 360	360th CA BDE	University of Notre Dame	Build Change
Aptima	412th (A) CA BN	Mendoza College of Business	Catholic Relief Services
Palantir	431st CA BN	University of Colorado	Spirit of America
<b>IOs</b>	450th (A) CA BN	Global Projects	Synan Support Group
United Nations	489th CA BN	Tufts University	Army Aviation Association
Civ-Mil Coordination Section	353rd CACOM	Fletcher School	Army Civilian Personnel Alumni Association
Red Cross	304th CA BDE	USMA	Army Historical Foundation, Inc.
NATO	403th CA BN	Center for Study of Civ-Mil Operations	Association of Military Colleges and Schools of the US
Strategic Issues & Engagement	404th CA BN (A)	John Hopkins	Foreign Area Officers Association
	411th CA BN	SAIS	Military Order of World Wars (MOWW)
<b>Foundations/ Think Tanks</b>	443rd CA BN	George Mason University	NG Association of the US
Smith Richardson Foundation	308th CA BDE	Peace Operations	Reserve Officers Association
National Endowment for Democracy	407th CA BN	University of Hawaii	Society of American Military Engineers
Institute for State Effectiveness	415th CA BN	National Disaster	SF Association
Atlantic Council	418th CA BN	Preparedness Training Center	The Military Coalition
WORDE	432nd CA BN	Naval Post Graduate School	The Alliance for Peacebuilding
Freedom House	USAREUR	CORE Lab	NATO CIMIC Center of Excellence
Wilson Center	7th CSC	Defense Analysis	The US Global Leadership Coalition
American Islamic Congress	361st CA BDE		
Hudson Institute	457nd CA BN		
	USARPAC		
	9th MSC		
	322nd CA BDE		

Table 34. 2014 CA Partnership Network Metrics

Topography		Centralization			
Diameter	Average Path Distance	Degree	Betweenness	Closeness	Eigenvector
6.000	3.499	0.352	0.795	0.244	0.888

Analysis of the CA Partnership sub-network indicates that there are potentially narrative wars within the CA community. Key players within the narrative and strategic messaging are the CMAG, a recent ARSOF 2022 initiative to improve CA's strategic value; the FOCA, a group that supports the interests of the 95th CA BDE (A); the CAA, a group that supports the interests of USACAPOC(A); and the IMMSG, a group that has the charge to develop, assess, and integrate civilian professionals in the CA Community. Table 35, degree centrality measure is below.

Table 35. 2014 CA Partnership Network Degree Centrality Measure

Degree	
Organization	Value
CMAG	0.361
IMMSG	0.134
CAA	0.099
FOCA	0.048

Despite the CMAG being recently established in 2012, its ability to develop an influential network is impressive. With a two-person element posted in the National Capital Region (NCR), the CMAG has the potential to champion the CA Regiment's strategic message with external stakeholders.

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## APPENDIX D. POV STATEMENTS

### A. DISCUSSIONS WITH NON-CA PERSONNEL




Figure 42. Non-CA Personnel POV Statement 1 of 2

## Discussions with non-CA personnel

### POV Statements 2 of 2




Figure 43. Non-CA Personnel POV Statement 2 of 2

## B. DISCUSSIONS WITH CA PERSONNEL

### Discussions with CA Community

#### POV Statements 1 of 3




Figure 44. CA Personnel POV Statement 1 of 3

## Discussions with CA Community

### POV Statements 2 of 3




Figure 45. CA Personnel POV Statement 2 of 3

## Discussions with CA Community

### POV Statements 3 of 3




Figure 46. CA Personnel POV 3 of 3

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## APPENDIX E. REFINED PROTOTYPES

### CA Creed

I am a Civil Affairs Soldier, a professional on the cutting edge of war and peace.

I am an elite Warrior Diplomat, adapting and thriving in ambiguous complex environments.

I am a culturally attuned Civil Scout, tracing my lineage from Lewis and Clark's Corps of Discovery and Beckwourth's expedition to the American West.

I am an extension of the rich history of service by Civil Affairs/Military Government Soldiers from the Reconstruction Era, through WWI & II, to the contemporary conflicts facing this great nation.

I am a specially selected, trained, and educated adaptive thinker.

I am a civil-military expert who studies human networks and understands how they affect human behaviors.

I train hard to master my skills and fight harder than my enemy in order to break his will.

I accomplish my mission anytime, anywhere, and under any conditions.

I am prepared to offer my expertise in all aspects of the human domain.

My mission's success will advance our national objectives.

Secure the Victory!

Figure 47. Refined CA Creed




Figure 48. Alternate Versions of the CA Symbols Reflecting the Regimental Lineage to Thomas Jefferson's Discovery Corps



## Why Civil Affairs Is Important

- Analyze complex systems in the human domain
- Understand how the relationships between the governed and those who govern affect collective behavior
- Shape the systems for desired end states

## Shaping Options



## Methods

- Legitimize partner governments through capacity building
- Build consensus among the relevant stakeholders
- Assist partner governments in identifying and addressing the root causes of civil unrest

## What CA Brings to the Fight




Figure 49. Refined Prototype 2a: Strategic Messaging

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